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How Peter Thiel's Secretive Data Company Pushed Into Policing


From: "Dave Farber" <farber () gmail com>
Date: Sun, 20 Aug 2017 13:45:28 -0400




Begin forwarded message:

From: Dewayne Hendricks <dewayne () warpspeed com>
Date: August 20, 2017 at 1:19:51 PM EDT
To: Multiple recipients of Dewayne-Net <dewayne-net () warpspeed com>
Subject: [Dewayne-Net] How Peter Thiel's Secretive Data Company Pushed Into Policing
Reply-To: dewayne-net () warpspeed com

How Peter Thiel's Secretive Data Company Pushed Into Policing
By by Mark Harris, Rhett Allain, Steven Levy, Stephen Wolfram, Karen Wickre, Negar Mottahedeh, Jessi Hempel, Gabriel 
Nicholas
Aug 9 2017
<https://www.wired.com/story/how-peter-thiels-secretive-data-company-pushed-into-policing/>

When Sergeant Lee DeBrabander marked a case confidential in the Long Beach drug squad’s Palantir data analysis system 
in November 2014, he expected key details to remain hidden from unauthorized users’ eyes. In police work, this can be 
crucial—a matter of life and death, even. It often involves protecting vulnerable witnesses, keeping upcoming 
operations hush hush, or protecting a fellow police officer who’s working undercover.

Yet not long after, someone working in the gang crimes division ran a car license plate mentioned in his case and was 
able to read the entire file. “Can you please look at this?” DeBrabander wrote to a Palantir engineer in an email, 
which was obtained by Backchannel in response to public records requests.

Palantir had been selling its data storage, analysis, and collaboration software to police departments nationwide on 
the basis of rock-solid security. “Palantir Law Enforcement provides robust, built-in privacy and civil liberties 
protections, including granular access controls and advanced data retention capabilities,” its website reads.

But DeBrabander had a hard time getting Palantir to respond, emails show. Two weeks after he made his first 
complaint, his sensitive case was still an open book to other detectives at Long Beach PD. “I went over to Gangs and 
had them run the plate since they are not listed in our confidentiality group, and sure enough the plate was found 
within the narrative of the very report we want to keep tight control on,” he complained in an email to Palantir. 
Four months later, his case was still visible to other officers, and he was still sending emails to Palantir to fix 
the problem.

Law enforcement accounts for just a small part of Palantir’s business, which mostly consists of military clients, 
intelligence outfits like the CIA or Homeland Security, and large financial institutions. In police departments, 
Palantir’s tools are now being used to flag traffic scofflaws, parole violators, and other everyday infractions. But 
the police departments that deploy Palantir are also dependent upon it for some of their most sensitive work. 
Palantir’s software can ingest and sift through millions of digital records across multiple jurisdictions, spotting 
links and sharing data to make or break cases.

The scale of Palantir’s implementation, the type, quantity and persistence of the data it processes, and the 
unprecedented access that many thousands of people have to that data all raise significant concerns about privacy, 
equity, racial justice, and civil rights. But until now, we haven’t known very much about how the system works, who 
is using it, and what their problems are. And neither Palantir nor many of the police departments that use it are 
willing to talk about it.

In one of the largest systematic investigations of the company to date, Backchannel filed dozens of public records 
requests with police forces across America. When Palantir started selling its products to law enforcement, it also 
laid a paper trail. All 50 states have public records laws providing access to contracts, documents, and emails of 
local and government bodies. That makes it possible to peer inside the company’s police-related operations in ways 
that simply aren’t possible with its national security work.

What’s clear is that law enforcement agencies deploying Palantir have run into a host of problems. Exposing data is 
just the start. In the documents our requests produced, police departments have also accused the company, backed by 
tech investor and Trump supporter Peter Thiel, of spiraling prices, hard-to-use software, opaque terms of service, 
and “failure to deliver products” (in the words of one email from the Long Beach police). Palantir might streamline 
some criminal investigations—but there’s a possibility that it comes at a high cost, for both the police forces 
themselves and the communities they serve.

These documents show how Palantir applies Silicon Valley’s playbook to domestic law enforcement. New users are 
welcomed with discounted hardware and federal grants, sharing their own data in return for access to others’. When 
enough jurisdictions join Palantir’s interconnected web of police departments, government agencies, and databases, 
the resulting data trove resembles a pay-to-access social network—a Facebook of crime that’s both invisible and 
largely unaccountable to the citizens whose behavior it tracks.

This is the story of how Palantir, despite the issues unearthed by Backchannel’s investigation, came to quietly 
dominate the domestic law enforcement intelligence infrastructure of the US’s most populous state—and how it could 
replicate that across the nation and around the world.

No one outside Palantir seems to know for sure how many police departments in America use its technology. (Despite 
multiple requests, Palantir declined to make anyone available for an interview, or to comment on any of Backchannel’s 
findings.) The New York Police Department has certainly used it, as have Cook County sheriffs in Chicago, the 
Virginia State Police, the Metropolitan Police Department in Washington, D.C., and a dozen law enforcement agencies 
in Utah.

The public contracts and data acquired during our months-long investigation almost certainly paint an incomplete 
picture. However, they suggest that one state, California, accounts for many of the deployments—and perhaps close to 
90 percent of the sales—of Palantir’s systems to domestic law enforcement to date.

Palantir’s software has been deployed by police departments in Los Angeles (LAPD), Long Beach (LBPD), and Burbank; 
sheriff’s departments in Sacramento, Ventura, and Los Angeles Counties (LASD); the state’s highway patrol; and 
homeland security “fusion centers” run by local departments in Orange County, San Francisco, Silicon Valley, San 
Diego and Los Angeles. Purchase orders and invoices show that these agencies have spent over $50 million with 
Palantir since 2009.

The first city in California to get involved was Los Angeles. In 2009, LAPD’s then chief of police, Bill Bratton, 
wanted to test the real-time analysis and visualization of data. “We were looking for [a] tool to do a better job of 
visualizing our radio calls as they were coming out,” remembers Sean Malinowski, then a captain but now a deputy 
chief at the LAPD. “Palantir partnered with us on [an] experiment to come up with [a] situational awareness tool.”

[snip]

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