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more on comments on NIST "Draft Report on Voting System Vulnerability"
From: David Farber <dave () farber net>
Date: Tue, 5 Dec 2006 05:19:01 -0500
Begin forwarded message: From: L Jean Camp <ljean () ljean com> Date: December 4, 2006 6:17:35 PM EST To: dave () farber netSubject: Re: [IP] comments on NIST "Draft Report on Voting System Vulnerability"
We have a process and a history. We can no more dump that process than can we dump english and select a superior language. I know many many people advocate movement towards a professional civil service for voting oversight. Others believe that this is impossible, and embrace the hackery so often common now as better than smooth professional subversion. Whatever the case, we certainly should not adopt a technology that fails to fit the process.
We also should not adopt a single mechanism for voting that is, excuse me, patented by the person advocating it.
Here are some basic recommendations, none of which require major reconfiguration of the process.
• Open TechnologyThe acquisition and evaluation of election and voting technology should be subject to public participation. Further, symposium participants advocate the use of open code in electronic systems to facilitate transparency. EAC and NIST voting standards should be open and implemented freely.
• The Power of Hybrid Electronic-Paper Voting SystemsPaper and electronic systems each have unique and potentially complementary strengths. Electronic systems can provide fast counts, suitable ballots, and ease the vast logistics problems of voting. Paper provides auditable counts, ease of use, and voter confidence. Emphasis on accurate vote counting must be balanced with speed – a tally can be quick or rigorous, but not both.
• Rigorous TestingRigorous testing and certification of electronic voting technologies is needed, for security, reliability, and usability. Such testing should be led by NIST and the EAC and should be implemented quickly.
• Focus on The Human ElementWith improved technologies, the people who administer elections matter more, not less. More training, additional incentives and improved remuneration for poll workers is needed immediately.
• Technically Appropriate ProcessesProcesses should be designed to address the unique strengths and weaknesses of particular voting systems. Process design should assume that failure will occur and address the possibility of failure before an election. There should be agreed-upon rules for resolution of uncertainty before the conflict occurs.
• AuditingThere should be extensive random auditing of election outcomes as well as a binding reconciliation process. Ballots should be tracked through a custody chain.
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Current thread:
- more on comments on NIST "Draft Report on Voting System Vulnerability" David Farber (Dec 04)
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- more on comments on NIST "Draft Report on Voting System Vulnerability" David Farber (Dec 05)