more on Can you be compelled to give a password?

[David Farber <dave () farber net>]

Begin forwarded message:

From: Lauren Weinstein <lauren () vortex com>
Date: August 8, 2006 8:56:14 PM EDT
To: dave () farber net
Cc: lauren () vortex com
Subject: Re: [IP] more on Can you be compelled to give a password?


Dave,

I wonder how long all of these fascinating, sophisticated techniques
will hold up when persons are threatened with:

  a) Lengthy extended prison terms for not coughing up exactly
     the demanded data with no screwing around ...

  and/or:

  b) Coercive techniques of the sort that the White House implied
     they could continue to use (as noted in the signing statement
     for an anti-torture bill) at their discretion

--Lauren--
Lauren Weinstein
lauren () vortex com or lauren () pfir org
Tel: +1 (818) 225-2800
http://www.pfir.org/lauren
Co-Founder, PFIR
   - People For Internet Responsibility - http://www.pfir.org
Co-Founder, IOIC
   - International Open Internet Coalition - http://www.ioic.net
Moderator, PRIVACY Forum - http://www.vortex.com
Member, ACM Committee on Computers and Public Policy
Lauren's Blog: http://lauren.vortex.com
DayThink: http://daythink.vortex.com

  - - -

> Begin forwarded message:
>
> From: Ed Gerck <edgerck () nma com>
> Date: August 8, 2006 5:49:21 PM EDT
> To: Ariel Waissbein <wata.34mt () coresecurity com>
> Cc: Cryptography <cryptography () metzdowd com>
> Subject: Re: [IP] more on Can you be compelled to give a password?
>
> Ariel Waissbein wrote:
>
> > Please notice that a second "distress" password becomes useless if  
> > the
> > would-be user of this password has access to the binaries (that is,
> > the
> > encrypted data), e.g., because he will copy them before inserting the
> > password and might even try to reverse-engineer the decryption
> > software
> > before typing anything. So I'm not sure what is the setting here.
>
> The worst-case setting for the user is likely to be when the  
> coercer can
> do all that you said and has the time/resources to do them.  
> However, if
> the distress password is strong (ie, not breakable within the time/
> resources
> available to the coercer), the distress password can be used (for
> example)
> to create a key that decrypts a part of the code in the binary data  
> that
> says the distress password expired at an earlier date -- whereas the
> access
> password would create a key that decrypts another part of the code.
>
> There are other possibilities as well. For example, if the binary data
> contains code that requires connection to a server (for example, to
> supply
> the calculation of some function), that server can prevent any further
> access, even if the access password is entered, after the distress
> password
> is given. The data becomes inaccessible even if the coercer has the
> binary data.
>
> Another possibility is to combine the above with threshold  
> cryptography.
>
> Cheers,
> Ed Gerck
>
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