Observations On The War By Harvey Sicherman from Foreign Policy Research Institute

[Dave Farber <dave () farber net>]

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From: Foreign Policy Research Institute <fpri () fpri org>
Subject: **SPAM** Observations On The War By Harvey Sicherman
To: David Farber <dave () farber net>

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OBSERVATIONS ON THE WAR
by Harvey Sicherman

March 12, 2004

Harvey Sicherman,  Ph.D., is President of the Foreign Policy
Research Institute.  A former aide to three U.S. secretaries
of state, he is co-editor, with John Lehman, of "America the
Vulnerable" (FPRI, 2002).


                  OBSERVATIONS ON THE WAR

                    by Harvey Sicherman

The War  on Terrorism  is now  two-and-a-half years old.  As
the candidates  prepare for  the 2004 Presidential election,
the fog  of partisanship  will soon obscure much of what has
been done,  and not  done.  That in mind, a few observations
may be  made about  the military,  intelligence, diplomatic,
and homeland security aspects of the struggle.

MILITARY: THE "NEW-OLD" WAR
Recent changes in military technology, on ample view in both
Afghanistan and Iraq, seem to have a very clear implication:
less can be more.  Fewer forces, acting through combined air
and ground  units, more  accurate and  lethal, can  equal or
exceed the  firepower  previously  available  only  in  much
larger units.   We  should be  wary of  drawing too  neat  a
conclusion, however,  given Afghan and Iraqi deficiencies in
training, air  power, and  equipment.   Still, it is safe to
say that the American "new way of war" dominates most of the
"conflict spectrum."

Most, but  not all.   Three  divisions were enough to defeat
Saddam just  as the  rented infantry  of the Northern Front,
joined to  Special Forces  and airpower,  broke the Taliban.
But neither  sufficed to harness the military victory to the
political objectives  which, in  both countries,  demanded a
security available  only through a full military occupation.
New technology  notwithstanding, sometimes  there can  be no
substitute for  "boots on  the ground"  to succeed.  And the
outcome reflected an old American problem, the perils of the
endgame,  when  the  military  strategy  does  not  entirely
support  the   post-war  political  objectives.    Thus  the
lessons:   more firepower  for fewer  forces to  defeat  the
enemy; more  forces with  different  skills  to  secure  the
victory once  the enemy  is  defeated.    The  Pentagon  has
acknowledged this  obliquely by  boosting its  end strengths
30,000 beyond  those authorized  in order to ease the strain
on both  regular  forces  and  the  Reserves  --  both  much
stressed by  shortages, especially  in  the  "post  combat,"
political reconstruction  skills.  Clearly, the United State
must adapt  its military  to "nation-building" if the war on
terrorism is  to leave in its wake decent government instead
of a new chaos.

INTELLIGENCE: WHAT IS KNOWN AND WHAT IS NOT KNOWN
Both Prime  Minister Blair and President Bush have lost some
public   confidence   in   their   leadership   because   of
intelligence  controversies.    Blair  was  cleared  of  the
"sexing up"  charge but  not before  considerable damage was
done.   Bush has now undergone a similar trial following the
Kay Report  that  the  CIA  had  erred  about  Saddam's  WMD
stockpiles.   Alongside  the  error,  however,  stand  these
correct judgments:   Saddam wanted such weapons; he retained
a residual  capability to  make them,  more so in biological
and chemical than nuclear; and he had already obtained a new
missile system to deliver them.

These conclusions  should be  put in  the perspective of the
"Saddam watch"  over the  past two decades.  Saddam had been
seriously underestimated before 1991 on his nuclear efforts,
and  before   1995  on  his  biological  program,  when  his
defecting son-in-law  spilled the  goods.  More recently, he
seems to  have been  seriously overestimated on his residual
weapons stocks.

This record does not inspire much confidence in the accuracy
of either  the intelligence  agencies or  the  international
inspectors.   Bush's description  of Saddam  as a "grave and
gathering danger"  reflected the  consensus  of  the  record
already available  to his  predecessor who, in 1999, used it
to justify a brief bombing campaign when the U.N. inspectors
were forced  to leave.   The  only  thing  standing  between
Saddam and  a fuller  rearmament was  the increasingly shaky
international sanctions  regime already  widely violated and
denounced for  impoverishing Iraq's  citizens.    The  issue
therefore is  not whether  the President lied or exaggerated
the intelligence;  he did  not.    The  question  should  be
whether the  CIA's longstanding  lack of  human  sources  of
intelligence --a  point Kay  emphasized -- made a difference
to the  October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate of "high
confidence" that Iraq had WMD.

An intelligence agency that errs is not necessarily inept or
corrupted by  politics.   Sergei Khrushchev  relates that at
the height  of the Cuban Missile Crisis, his father, Premier
Nikita Khrushchev,  revealed  that  the  United  States  had
grossly overestimated  Soviet ICBMs.   "We  have nothing  to
hide," Khrushchev  said, "We have nothing.  And we must hide
it."  (Sheldon  M.  Stern,  "Averting  the  Final  Failure,"
Stanford University  Press, 2003,  pp. 28-29).   This hardly
meant that  Kennedy's CIA  was incompetent,  only  that  the
Soviets had  successfully concealed  the truth  for  awhile.
That the  U.K., French,  German (and  Israeli)  intelligence
joined the  U.N. inspectors  in concluding  that Saddam  had
WMDs in  larger stocks  than discovered may mean simply that
he had  less and disposed of it, or was running a bluff that
he  himself   may  not   have  realized   given   the   lies
characterizing the regime.

Nonetheless, it  must be  dismaying to learn that the CIA is
still struggling  with the  lack of  "people on the ground."
The Agency  has not  overcome its infatuation with technical
means rather  than human intelligence, including specialists
in  Arabic,   Persian,   Pashto,   and   Urdu   (the   Joint
Congressional Committee  established last year that U.S. spy
agencies had  only 30%  of  the  capacity  needed  in  these
languages).   Yet, before the investigatory commissions warn
once  more  about  these  deficiencies,  including  lack  of
operatives, the  Congress should  recall its  own history on
this score.   The likely sources for CIA spies -- indeed the
spies themselves  --  are  not  likely  to  be  of  spotless
character.  Unless the agency is freed of fears that lawyers
and committee  hearings will  expose the  seamy side as they
did in the 1970's, recruitment and sources will be scarce.

DIPLOMACY: REAPING THE BENEFITS
The United  States is  now reaping  diplomatic benefits from
the Afghan and Iraqi operations.  The so-called rogue states
are reappraising  the risks  they run  in either  sponsoring
terrorism or  seeking WMD.   Libya  wants out  of the risks;
Iran wants to reduce them; so does Syria.  No doubt fears of
American  action   stimulated  this   new   willingness   to
negotiate.   But fear  will wear off, possibly sooner rather
than later, especially if it looks like a new President will
ease the pressure.  Even so, all of the WMD-terrorist states
will try  to negotiate  some variation of the excruciatingly
difficult North Korean deal.  They will offer to give up, or
freeze, weapons  the United States does not like; in return,
they want  Washington to  assure their survival.  The United
States may  be asked  to choose  between the  elimination of
weapons and "regime change."

This issue  overhangs the  political  part  of  the  war  on
terrorism.   The  short-term  objectives  of  preventing  or
containing proliferation must somehow be accommodated to the
longer-term objective  of ridding the world of dictatorships
dangerous to their own people and others.

The war  on terrorism  is also forcing decisions by American
allies with dubious records.  President Bush's argument that
"you're either  with us  or against  us"  omitted  important
governments that  are simultaneously with us AND against us.
Two of  these --  Saudi Arabia  and  Pakistan  --  have  now
decided that  the previously  tolerated  Jihadists  threaten
their survival.   Should the Saudi princes and the Pakistani
general prevail  over their  enemies, their  countries  will
cease  to  be  centers  for  the  religious  propaganda  and
technological leakage that, together, offer such devastating
potential for terrorists.

Another set  of much  closer allies also changing course can
be found  in Europe.  Despite the heated quarrel at the U.N.
over Iraq,  both France and, especially Germany, facilitated
the movement  of coalition  forces to the battlefield.  This
was quite  unlike earlier  crises over the Middle East when,
for example,  overflight rights  were denied to the U.S. and
arms  embargoes   enforced,  not   to  speak  of  the  still
remembered 1956 Suez disaster.  The Schroeder government, in
particular, wants  out of  any long-term  quarrel  with  the
Americans.   Berlin (and  Paris) are trying to mend the rift
whether through  NATO, the  U.N., or  the "Group  of  Seven"
industrialized nations (G-7).  There are opportunities here,
too, for  a reconciling  American diplomacy.   Together, the
allies must find a formula that moves the Middle East out of
its current violence and economic stagnation without harming
necessary U.S. allies in the process.

A STILL BITTER HARVEST
All plans  to change  the Middle  East for  the better  will
necessarily involve  a fresh  effort to  ease  the  Israeli-
Palestinian  conflict,  the  very  same  conflict  that  was
supposed to  be the major beneficiary of the Iraq war.  Thus
far, however,  the harvest  has been  bitter.  The June 2003
Aqaba Summit,  where Bush  embraced  then-Palestinian  Prime
Minister Abu  Mazen as  the alternative  to  Arafat,  proved
premature.   Palestinian security  forces were still largely
in Arafat's  hands, ultimately making it impossible to crack
down on  terrorism.   The President  had moved  too quickly;
Israeli Prime Minister Sharon then moved too slowly, helping
Abu Mazen  only grudgingly.   Ultimately,  Abu Mazen  proved
unable to  act at  all.    Arafat  quickly  exploited  these
blunders and by Fall had regained much of his authority.

This offered  no way out.  Both Israel and the United States
regarded the Palestinian leader as an incorrigible terrorist
unwilling or  unable to  act as  partner for peace.  But the
Israeli public,  fed up with three years of terrorism and no
change in  sight, suddenly  seemed  to  lose  patience  with
Sharon's policy.   The  Prime Minister, already in political
trouble over scandal, detected a seismic political shift and
promptly took  the initiative.   Borrowing some Labour Party
ideas, the  veteran  former  general  declared  that  better
short-term security  against suicide  attacks and  long-term
security against the Palestinian birthrate could be achieved
if Israel  withdrew settlements  and soldiers  from much (or
all of)  Gaza, and some from the West Bank, too.  Meanwhile,
the construction  of Israel's controversial barrier, some of
it lying  beyond the  pre-1967 War  "green line,"  would  be
rushed to  completion.  This new deal could only be executed
with U.S.  support and some local Palestinian cooperation if
it was  not to  make Gaza  a province  of Hamas, the Islamic
terrorist group.   Bush's vision of a democratic Palestinian
state at peace with Israel still seemed a mirage.

THE THREE NEGATIVES
Meanwhile,  in   Iraq  itself   the  Americans   were   also
discovering the  pitfalls between  democratic  rhetoric  and
less than  democratic reality.   The  Shiite Grand Ayatollah
Sistani, heretofore  not distinguished  for his  interest in
political philosophy,  demanded direct  elections to  a  new
Iraqi government  in opposition  to  Washington's  plan  for
self-selecting caucuses.  The embarrassed American occupiers
retreated under cover of the U.N. to allow a postponement of
this transparent  attempt to  put Iraq  at the  behest of  a
Shiite majority.

The reality  is that the new Iraq can only be built on three
fundamental negatives.   (1)  the Shiites  and Kurds  do not
want Sunni rule; (2) the Kurds and Sunnis do not want Shiite
rule; and  (3)  the  Sunnis  and  Shiites  do  not  want  an
independent Kurdistan.  Any constitution that reflects these
"red lines"  will have  grudging acceptance.   Anything else
will threaten  civil strife,  a point  that  seems  to  have
registered with  Sistani himself  in the  argument over  the
interim Iraqi  Basic Law.   The longer-term will then depend
upon sharing  the oil  wealth  and  an  army  determined  to
preserve the  agreed upon  constitution as the only antidote
to disastrous  civil war.   Until then coalition forces will
have to  provide the  backbone.   Not an  easy formula but a
workable one.

REMOBILIZING THE HOME FRONT
In America,  homeland defense  is the necessary partner to a
forward deployed  war against  the terrorists.   Indeed, the
more effective  the United  States and  its allies become in
places like  Afghanistan or  Iraq, the more attractive "soft
targets" may  become in  the United  States.  A large action
that seriously  disrupts the  United States,  especially its
economy, tells  the world  that the  terrorists are still in
business notwithstanding  all of  the Bush  Administration's
efforts.

Nothing on  this scale has happened since 9/11, although the
accidental blackout  of 2003 illustrated that essential U.S.
infrastructure remains  highly vulnerable.   The public does
not know  how many  attempts have been frustrated, making an
overall evaluation  of  the  homeland  defense  effort  very
difficult.   We do  know, however,  that a  year  after  the
Department of  Homeland Defense  was established,  the JRIES
Program (Joint  Regional Information  Exchange  System)  for
sharing intelligence  at local,  state, and  national levels
has just  been  adopted;  that  many  holes  remain  in  the
immigration procedures;  and that  the legalities of the war
on terrorism  are receiving their first tests in the courts.
Progress, such as it is, seems very slow.

To this  incomplete picture  we must  add  another  feature.
Homeland security in the United States is determined more by
state,  local,   and  private   entities  than  the  Federal
government.   Electricity, power plants, chemical factories,
mines, railroads,  supply chains,  communications, etc.  are
owned, run, or regulated by those entities.  But few of them
can evaluate  threats or  gauge when  and how to spend their
money on  meeting them.  Thus, homeland defense for many has
become an  extra ambulance  or better  training  for  "first
responders" to  an incident rather than a defense against an
incident in the first place.

Moreover, two-and-a-half  years after  the  event,  the  war
itself  has  not  led  to  significant  change  in  American
domestic life  save perhaps  for airport security procedures
and security checks on certain public or private sites.  The
American people  have had  little mobilization to match past
national emergencies  and almost  no  outlet  for  patriotic
energies.

Certainly, the  war against terrorism is a different kind of
struggle, one  that does  not require  "a nation in arms" to
pursue successfully.   "Act  normal but keep your eyes open"
would seem  good advice  -- yet  it does  not go far enough.
For the war to succeed abroad, there must be arrangements on
the homefront  to protect  vital facilities; education about
the struggle;  and a  sustained effort  to stay alert.  Some
new balance  must be  found between  peacetime liberties and
wartime restrictions.

The American  people are  on the  edge of  understanding, as
they did  in 1951,  that this  conflict, like  the Cold War,
will be protracted.  Costs, burdens, and sacrifices are here
to stay.   It  will be an immense disservice if the election
campaign leaves  the impression  in America  and abroad that
the war  on terrorism  is a  short-term affair  that can  be
quickly concluded.   Many  things can  soon go  wrong.   The
United States  could suffer  another attack  at home  on the
scale  of   the  Madrid   massacre  or   larger.    American
reinforcements patrolling the Iraqi borders could clash with
Syrian and Iranian infiltrators.  The Saudi government might
be crippled by a terrorist strike.  All of this or any of it
might try an American public misled by expectations of swift
victory.  Woe to the politician thought to be concealing the
costs and duration of the war.

CONCLUSION
After September  11, 2001,  the obvious question was whether
the United  States had  the skill  and persistence to defeat
the terrorists,  even if  it meant taking on the states that
helped or  harbored them.   The  answer must be "yes" in the
most egregious  cases:   both al-Qaeda  in  Afghanistan  and
Saddam's Iraq  were poster  examples of  violent action  and
violent ambition.   But  in the  wake of those campaigns the
job remains  incomplete.   Four areas  demand movement:  (1)
reform of  the military  and intelligence  to prosecute  the
war; (2)  exploitation of  U.S. military  victories  to  win
lasting change from the WMD states while reconciling allies;
(3) stimulating  beneficial political and economic change in
the Middle  East; and  (4) creating at home a private-public
partnership that  protects vital  facilities while  a  legal
balance is  established that  protects security and liberty.
These are big and lasting demands on the American people and
their leadership.   The War on Terrorism, like the Cold War,
will test America's capacity to persist until victory.


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