Live Webcast of CMU SCS Distinguished Lecture (9/18, 4 pm EST)

[Dave Farber <dave () farber net>]

> Delivered-To: dfarber+ () ux13 sp cs cmu edu
> Date: Wed, 17 Sep 2003 17:31:58 -0400
> From: hzhang+ () cs cmu edu
> Subject: Live Webcast of CMU SCS Distinguished Lecture (9/18, 4 pm EST)
> To: dave () farber net
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>
>
> Dave,
>
> this may be of interest to people on your list ...
>
> Hui
>
>
>  >
>  > The following event will be broadcast live over the Internet.
>  > For instruction on how to tune in, please check
>  >
>  >    http://esm.cs.cmu.edu/
>  >
>  > Event:   DISTINGUISHED LECTURE
>  >            SCHOOL OF COMPUTER SCIENCE
>  >            Carnegie Mellon University
>  > Date:    Thursday, 18 September 2003
>  > Time:    4:00 pm -5:00pm EDT
>  >
>  >         MAKING MARKETS AND DEMOCRACY WORK:
>  >          A STORY OF INCENTIVES AND COMPUTING
>  >
>  >               TUOMAS SANDHOLM
>  >
>  >
>  >          This talk is a representation of Dr. Sandholm's
>  >          IJCAI "Computers and Thought Award" Lecture 2003.
>  >
>  >
>  > ABSTRACT
>  > ********
>  > Collective choice settings are the heart of society. Game theory
>  > provides a basis for engineering the incentives into the
>  > interaction mechanism (e.g., rules of an election or auction) so
>  > that a desirable system-wide outcome (e.g., president, resource
>  > allocation, or task allocation) is chosen even though every agent
>  > acts based on self-interest.
>  >
>  > However, there are a host of computer science issues not
>  > traditionally addressed in game theory that have to be addressed
>  > in order to make mechanisms work in the real world. Those computing,
>  > communication, and privacy issues are deeply intertwined with the
>  > economic incentive issues. For example, the fact that agents have
>  > limited computational capabilities to determine their own (and others')
>  > preferences ruins the incentive properties of established auction
>  > mechanisms, and gives rise to new issues. On the positive side,
>  > computational complexity can be used as a barrier to strategic
>  > behavior in settings where economic mechanism design falls short.
>  >
>  > Novel computational approaches also enable new economic institutions.
>  > For example, market clearing technology with specialized search
>  > algorithms is enabling a form of interaction that I call expressive
>  > competition. As another example, selective incremental preference
>  > elicitation can determine the optimal outcome while requiring the
>  > agents to determine and reveal only a small portion of their
>  > preferences. Furthermore, automated mechanism design can yield
>  > better mechanisms than the best known to date.
>  >
>  >
>  > SPEAKER BIO
>  > ***********
>  > TUOMAS SANDHOLM is an associate professor in the Computer Science
>  > Department at Carnegie Mellon University.  He received the Ph.D.
>  > and M.S. degrees in computer science from the University of
>  > Massachusetts at Amherst in 1996 and 1994.  He earned an M.S.
>  > (B.S. included) with distinction in Industrial Engineering and
>  > Management Science from the Helsinki University of Technology,
>  > Finland, in 1991.  He has published over 160 technical papers on
>  > artificial intelligence; electronic commerce; game theory; multiagent
>  > systems; auctions and exchanges; automated negotiation and contracting;
>  > coalition formation; voting; safe exchange; normative models of bounded
>  > rationality; resource-bounded reasoning; machine learning; networks; and
>  > combinatorial optimization.
>  >
>  > Dr. Sandholm has 13 years of experience building electronic
>  > marketplaces, and several of his systems have been commercially
>  > fielded.  He is also Founder, Chairman, and Chief Technology Officer
>  > of CombineNet, Inc.  He received the National Science Foundation
>  > Career Award in 1997, the inaugural ACM Autonomous Agents Research
>  > Award in 2001, the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation Fellowship in 2003,
>  > and the IJCAI Computers and Thought Award in 2003.
>  >

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