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more on The Columbia space shuttle accident report
From: Dave Farber <dave () farber net>
Date: Mon, 20 Oct 2003 11:46:02 -0500
Delivered-To: dfarber+ () ux13 sp cs cmu edu Date: Mon, 20 Oct 2003 08:39:14 -0700 (PDT) From: Joseph Lorenzo Hall <jhall () SIMS Berkeley EDU> Subject: Re: [IP] The Columbia space shuttle accident report To: Dave Farber <dave () farber net> Cc: Andreas Ramos <andreas () andreas com> On Sun, 19 Oct 2003, Andreas Ramos <andreas () andreas com> wrote: > NASA managers, with their demand to stick to the schedule, their > refusal to listen to the engineers, and using threats of reprimands > against engineers who spoke up, caused the loss of the shuttle and > the deaths of the astronauts. I would say it's more complicated than that, and I'd be quite surprised to find that wording in the CAIB report. You both (and perhaps the IP list) would likely be interested in reading a forthcoming paper of mine in the November issue of Space Policy (most of this paper was written in May): Columbia & Challenger: Organizational Failure at NASA http://pobox.com/~joehall/papers/nasa.pdf Abstract: The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)as the global leader in all areas of spaceflight and space science is a unique organization in terms of size, mission, constraints, complexity and motivations. NASAs flagship endeavor--human spaceflight--is extremely risky and one of the most complicated tasks undertaken by man. It is well accepted that the tragic destruction of the Space Shuttle Challenger on 28 January 1986 was the result of organizational failure. The surprising disintegration of the Space Shuttle Columbia in February 2003--nearly 17 years to the day after Challenger--was a shocking reminder of how seemingly innocuous details play important roles in risky systems and organizations. NASA as an organization has changed considerably over the 42 years of its existence. If it is serious about minimizing failure and promoting its mission, perhaps the most intense period of organizational change lies in its immediate future. This paper outlines some of the critical features of NASAs organization and organizational change, namely path dependence and normalization of deviance. Subsequently, it reviews the rationale behind calling the Challenger tragedy an organizational failure. Finally, it argues that the recent Columbia accident displays characteristics of organizational failure and proposes recommendations for the future. ----------------------------------------------------------------- Joseph Lorenzo Hall Graduate Student http://pobox.com/~joehall ------------------------------------- You are subscribed as interesting-people () lists elistx com To manage your subscription, go to http://v2.listbox.com/member/?listname=ip Archives at: http://www.interesting-people.org/archives/interesting-people/
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- more on The Columbia space shuttle accident report Dave Farber (Oct 20)