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TELEPOLIS: Why Was the Blackout So Widespread? (fwd)


From: Dave Farber <dave () farber net>
Date: Mon, 18 Aug 2003 22:11:50 -0400


Date: Mon, 18 Aug 2003 21:50:43 -0400 (EDT)
From: Ronda Hauben <ronda () panix com>
Subject: TELEPOLIS: Why Was the Blackout So Widespread? (fwd)
To: dave () farber net
Cc: Ronda Hauben <ronda () panix com>



Dave

It was interesting to see the quotes from you and your son about
the importance of the energy policy in today's New York Times story
"The Bits Are Willing But the Batteries are Week"

It is important that there be serious public discussion and debate about
what happened that allowed there to be such a massive blackout and what to
do to deal with the problem.

An article I wrote on the blackout is in Telepolis.

The url is

http://www.heise.de/tp/english/inhalt/co/15464/1.html

The article follows.

Why Was the Blackout So Widespread?
Some Technical and Policy Questions to be Answered
    by Ronda Hauben   19.08.2003

The most recent North American energy blackout spread widely, affecting
an estimated 50 million people in two countries. This is a larger
geographic and population area than any previous energy blackout in the
history of North America.

Investigations are being initiated at the state, provincial, national
and North American levels to determine the sequence of events that
created the blackout. These will try to identify what events may have
started the blackout1

The more important question raised for these inquiries, however, is why
and how the blackout spread so massively. Supposedly, the transmission
grid was designed to prevent the massive spread of a problem to others
on the grid.

"If we designed this system for this not to happen, how did it happen?"
asks Michehl R. Gent, the CEO of the North American Energy Reliability
Council (NERC).

 NERC [1] was created after the 1965 energy blackout. It's mission was
to prevent such a blackout from ever happening again. Yet in 1977, and
then again in 2003, such blackouts occurred. The NERC is a private,
non-profit industry self regulatory organization. Can a private
organization be entrusted with the regulation of an industry? Can
voluntary compliance to standards and rules be relied on to provide
electric power to a nation's population?

One report of last Thursday's events describes how Roger Harszy, an
operations director for Midwest Independent System Operator, in Carmel,
Indiana, was watching a computer screen on Thursday, August 14. It had
just revealed to him that 1,000 megawatts of wayward electrical power
were surging around the top of the Lake Erie loop from the Toronto area
into Detroit, MI2

He observed that the "oscillating power phenomenon" occurred along four
transmission lines, which he monitored from the control room at Midwest
ISO, which oversees the movement of electricity in a 15-state region of
the Midwest.

Describing the event, Gent explains that "300 to 500 megawatts...were
moving west to east from Michigan to New York through Ontario, when the
problem struck - either the failure of some power plants or of some
transmission lines." He noted that suddenly there was a change in the
flow of electric power and it reversed direction, "pulling 500
megawatts from east to west, out of New York -- a swing, in the space
of a few seconds of as much as 1,000 megawatts, the output of a large
power plant."3

Gent says he is at a loss to explain why this more widespread effect on
the transmission system occurred.

In response to a question to the NERC about whether this sudden change
of direction of electric power was a common occurrence on a smaller
scale, David W. Hilt, the NERC Director of Compliance wrote:

"Power moves on the grid on a moment-by-moment basis. This is based on
transmission lines and generators in service. Changes on a given line
or a given interface on a smaller scale are somewhat common." David W.
Hilt, Email, August 16, 2003

But such a change in the direction of such a massive amount of electric
power is not common. Then why did it happen on August 14, 2003?4

The transmission grid system breakdown is a mystery that has to be
understood in order to prevent such future breakdowns. Yet there are
obstacles to identifying and understanding the nature of the problem.

One such obstacle, according to Gent, is the change in the politics of
energy creation and transmission in the U.S. Under the current forms of
'deregulation' various owners of the different power entities are not
likely to want to share information which might give up their own
competitive advantage.

Elaborating on this problem, Jennifer Granholm, Governor of Michigan,
describes the changes in the regulatory structure of the energy system.
When Michigan began to deregulate its electricity market, the Michigan
electric utility, Detroit Edison, became DTE and sold its transmission
lines. She notes that the transmission system hadn't been upgraded in
20 years. She explains, "The people who own the transmission system are
out of state and are not necessarily...accountable. The issue of who
owns the transmission, who owns the generation, who owns the
distribution, all of those are areas we're going to have to look at."5

While some of the media reports are looking for the technical cause of
the breakdown, there are others emphasizing the political nature of
energy regulation in the U.S. Gent comments that, "The grid is now
being used in ways for which it was not designed."

The grid was designed as part of an electric power utility. This
utility had its origins in the 1930s, when the U.S. Congress broke up
large interstate holding companies, passing the Public Utility Holding
Company Act (PUHCA). This law gave federal government sanction to
monopoly operation of electric power companies over limited areas. In
return for their regulated monopoly position, these companies agreed to
provide reliable electric service to their customers at regulated
rates6 .

The corporate deregulation ferment in the U.S., in the 1980s and 1990s,
however, required that utilities give access to the transmission lines
to their competitors. Not only are the transmission lines being used by
others than those who formerly built and maintained them as part of a
state government regulated power entity, but also the transmission
lines have become part of a system for selling and buying power. The
lines are not now for transporting electricity so that it will be low
priced and reliable. The transmission lines are instead seen as a
market mechanism "to send power in different directions to different
customers at different times at different prices in response to
different demands."7

Will the blackout be used as a political excuse to provide for federal
subsidies for private corporations to increase their ownership and
control of the U.S. energy system, like the corrupt model of Enron? Or
will there be a public debate of how to make the U.S. energy system
into a reliable public service?

The current U.S. corporate model of private control of all public
services has been called into question by the blackout. People around
the world, and their governments, can see the consequences of adopting
the U.S. 'deregulation' model for the management of public services. As
Michigan's Governor Granholm explained, "the utility industry needs to
become more heaviliy regulated to ensure accountability. As a result of
deregulation, Michigan has become dependant on utilities across many
states to feed its power needs - 'which makes it more difficult to hold
people accountable'." She recognizes the problem of "reliability
standards for utilities which are voluntary", and she observes, "And
that just doesn't cut it."8

Literaturangaben

1) The owner of the transmission lines that serve the Ohio area is
FirstEnergy Corporation. The recent spotlight has beeen focused on
problems this company had on August 14, and how they may have helped to
set off the series of events. But why some energy organizations were
able to isolate themselves from the problems, and others, couldn't,
will also be a source of questions. For example, New York State didn't
isolate itself from the problems, while Vermont was able to.

2) New York Times, Matthew L. Wald, Richard Perez-Pena, and Neela
Banerjee, "Experts Asking Why Problems Spread So Far",  August 16,
2003 [2] The New York Times article describes the importance of
maintaining the 60 cycles per second rate. "If power plants in an area
are producing less electricity than consumers are demanding, the system
falls below 60 cycles per second (the frequency at which electrons in
the wires reverse directions) and damage can be done to the equipment.
When that happens, the plants are quick to shut down." This happens
unless the plants are able to pump slightly more electrical power than
needed. In this case they can stabilize the rate.

3) Times Wire, "Rogue Power Burst Crippled System", St. Petersburg
Times,  August 16, 2003 [3]

4) Describing his experience on August 14, the manager of the New York
Port Authority's Niagara hydroelectric plant, Ronald W. Ciamaga,
observed that the delicate balance between consumption and generation
was not being maintained. He was watching a meter to monitor that the
electric power generation was at its normal frequency for North
America, which is 60-cycles/second. "I was up there in the control
room," he explains, "seeing frequency variations I've never seen." The
rate dropped to 57 cycles/second, when fluctuations are usually
measured in the hundreds or tenths of cycles/second. Ciamaga had worked
at the plant for 30 years and this was the first time he had seen such
a drop in frequency. (See Matthew L. Wald, Richard Perez-Pena, Neela
Banerjee, "Electricity returning to East, but big power gaps still
remain. WHAT WENT WRONG: Huge power reversal overloaded system", The
New York Times,  August 15, 2003 [4]

5) Lorraine Mirabella, "Power loop probed as blackout's cause remains a
mystery, Experts zero in on ring surrounding Lake Erie; answer could
take weeks", Baltimore Sun,  August 16, 2003 [5]

6) See  Electricity Deregulation: What's the Issue [6].

7) Daniel Yergin and Lawrence Makovich, "The System Did Not Fail. Yet
the System Failed." New York Times, August 17, 2003

8) David Zeman, Nancy A. Youssef, and Kathleen Gray, "Analysts Say
Blackout Began With a Zap, and Then Got Weird", Detroit Free Press,
 August 17, 2003 [7]

Links

[1] http://www.nerc.com
[2]
http://story.news.yahoo.com/news?tmpl=story&cid=68&ncid=68&e=5&u=/nyt/20
030816/ts_nyt/expertsaskingwhyproblemsspreadsofar
[3] http://www.sptimes.com...nation/Rogue_power_burst_cri.shtml
[4]
http://www.theledger.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20030816/NEWS/308160
343/0/FRONTPAGE
[5]
http://www.sunspot.net/business/bal-te.bz.why16aug16,0,2463869.story?col
l=bal-business-headlines
[6] http://www.opensecrets.org/news/electricity.htm
[7] http://www.centredaily.com/mld/centredaily/news/6556536.htm

Telepolis Artikel-URL:
http://www.telepolis.de/english/inhalt/co/15464/1.html

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