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IP: An International Treaty on Cybercrime Sounds Like A Great Idea, Until You Read The Fine Print


From: David Farber <dave () farber net>
Date: Wed, 21 Mar 2001 16:29:04 -0500



Date: Wed, 21 Mar 2001 16:18:23 -0500
To: eff-priv () eff org
From: Lauren Gelman <gelman () eff org>

WATCH OUT

An International Treaty on Cybercrime Sounds Like A Great Idea, Until
You Read The Fine Print



By Mike Godwin

IP Worldwide, April 2001



Maybe you're a civil libertarian, and maybe you're not. Maybe you
worry about how the United States exercises its vast investigative
and prosecutorial powers, and maybe you don't.

But if you counsel U.S. corporations on computer-related issues, you
should be concerned about a new proposed treaty known as the
"Convention on Cybercrime." The Council of Europe, a 43-nation public
body created to promote democracy and the rule of law, is nominally
drafting the treaty. Curiously, however, the primary architect is the
United States Department of Justice.

The Department of Justice and Federal Bureau of Investigation are
using a foreign forum to create an international law-enforcement
regime that favors the interests of the feds over those of ordinary
citizens and businesses. Their goal is to make it easier to get
evidence from abroad and to extradite and prosecute foreign nationals
for certain kinds of crimes.

Maybe you trust the law-enforcement chiefs in D.C. to do the right
thing. But here's the catch. The same new powers given to the United
States will also handed over to Bulgaria, Romania, Azerbaijan, and
other Council of Europe nations that-although officially democratic
now-don't have a strong traditions of checks and balances on police
power.

Do you want investigators rummaging around your clients' computer
systems on warrants issued by former Soviet bloc nations?

That's the prospect that has pushed AT&T Corporation and other
high-technology companies into feverishly trying to stop or at least
soften the treaty. The U.S. Chamber of Commerce and Information
Technology Association of America also oppose it.

Stewart Baker is one of the chief lobbyists for the treaty opponents.
As a former general counsel of the National Security Agency and
recipient of the Department of Defense Medal for Meritorious Civilian
Service, he's got street cred on these issues in corporate America.

What worries Baker and his colleagues? Consider the following
hypothetical: A Los Angeles screenwriter corresponds by e-mail with a
neo-Nazi in Germany while researching a script. Shortly after, he
finds federal agents examining the files on his home computer. The
agents also visit America Online Inc. to retrieve records of the
screenwriter's AOL usage.

The agents are fulfilling a warrant issued by German authorities
allowing them to search for Nazi propaganda. Such material is
unlawful in Germany but not in the U.S. They framed their warrant in
terms of "suspected terrorist activity."

Maybe the screenwriter should have anticipated this scenario, given
the vigor with which German and other European authorities pursue
hate crime on the Internet. Maybe he's willing to run that risk and
bear the burden of this kind of search.  But what about AOL?

AOL already handles dozens of search warrants and subpoenas every
month. What would change under this treaty is that, in addition to
getting those submitted by U.S. law-enforcement officials, they'd
also have to respond warrants and court orders from 43 additional
nations. All Internet service providers and phone companies-and
perhaps other businesses besides-would have to cooperate with these
types of investigations. They worry they would also have to foot the
bill for complying with them.

Maybe AOL and AT&T should expect this sort of intrusion as a cost of
doing business in the Internet era. But what about the rest of us?
The treaty would likely apply to any business or individual operating
a computer connected to a network, according to Marilyn Cade, AT&T's
director of Internet and e-commerce policy. If you cable together two
computers, you could be forced to comply with investigations that
originated in Sofia or Riga.

Even foes say that there might a need for a limited treaty
harmonizing laws globally. Last year, for example, the Philippines
was unable to prosecute the creator of the love bug virus. Its laws
did not fit his deeds.

Déjà Vu

The treaty has supporters, of course. The Motion Picture Association
of America, the Recording Industry of America Association, and the
Business Software Alliance all favor the treaty's requirement that
certain copyright infringements be handled under criminal law. "Our
members, of course, constantly face problems connected to the
unauthorized transmission of their copyrighted materials," the three
organizations stated in a joint letter regarding Draft 25. "Thus, we
believe that ensuring that a greater number of countries make such
attacks illegal and actionable under national law is a high
priority." In general, such "attacks" are now handled under civil law
in most countries. The copyright industry hopes the treaty will
extend the United States's increasing use of criminal sanctions to
deter infringement to the Council of Europe's member states, and
ultimately to the rest of the world.

Critics sometimes compare the cybercrime treaty to the intellectual
property treaty promulgated by the World Intellectual Property
Organization in 1996. That treaty was designed to update laws for the
Internet era. It was largely the handiwork of the Clinton
Administration's Bruce Lehman, the head of the Patent and Trade
Office.

After the United States and other nations signed and ratified the
WIPO treaty, Congress crafted the Digital Millennium Copyright Act to
implement the treaty. Congress did not seriously debate the most
controversial in part because of the perceived need to implement the
treaty. One of those made it unlawful to tamper with anticopying
devices and software.

For these critics, the analogy between the WIPO treaty and the
Convention on Cybercrime is clear. "The [cybercrime] treaty was
written by government bureaucrats for government bureaucrats," says
Baker, a partner at Washington, D.C.'s Steptoe & Johnson. "The
process was entirely dominated by one viewpoint-criminal enforcement."

What It Does

If the treaty is so bad, why has it gotten so little attention-a wire
service report here, a trade publication article there? The answer,
it seems, is that it is not easy to explain. But let's try.

The treaty has three primary sets of provisions. All three are aimed
at setting basic computer-related criminal-law standards for
signatory nations.

First, it would require nations to outlaw such things as unauthorized
computer intrusion; the release of viruses; and the use of a computer
to commit acts that are already crimes, such as fraud and
distribution of child pornography.

This part is relatively uncontroversial. The exceptions are the move
to bring copyright under criminal law and the expansion of
child-pornography statutes to so-called "virtual child porn." A
similar U.S. law is now under constitutional challenge in the United
States.

Second, it requires nations to develop standard procedures to capture
and retrieve online and other information. Nations would have to be
able to issue "retention orders" that would "freeze" data on any
computer. Governments would also need the ability to capture in real
time the time and origin of all traffic on a networks, including
telephone networks. For serious crimes, they would be required to
intercept the actual content of the communications.

Third, nations would have to cooperate with other nations in sharing
electronic evidence across borders. And this cooperation requirement
would apply to all crimes. They don't have to be the cybercrimes laid
out in the first section of the treaty or even actions unlawful under
U.S. law.

Bones of Contention.

The second and third parts of the treaty-individually and
together-are the hot buttons. Phone companies and Internet providers
are worried that they will spend their days meeting the demands of
foreign investigative authorities. They won't get reimbursed for
compliance with foreign evidence orders in their non-U.S. branches
and subsidiaries. And they worry that coping with unlimited
compliance orders will disrupt their businesses, or those of their
clients, according to James Halpert, a partner in the Washington,
D.C., office of Piper, Marbury, Rudnick & Wolfe.

One moment, an Internet provider might be turning over all Bulgarian
folk songs to an investigator. The next moment, it might be searching
for e-mail traffic between customers in Latvia and the Ukraine.

All companies will have to pay closer attention to their employees'
computer habits. The treaty imposes criminal liability on businesses
if they fail to supervise users who commit bad acts. If the treaty is
taken to its extreme, "companies will have to surveil every single
thing that users are doing on their computers," says Halpert, who
represents a coalition of Internet portal companies.

How radically will the treaty affect U.S. law? The Justice Department
says hardly at all. It may be possible to sign the treaty without
adopting implementing legislation. Other nations, however, will have
to strengthen and extend their criminal laws substantially.

Lawyers get paid to worry about what-if scenarios. There's a huge one
lurking here. What if signatory nations pass laws that creates crimes
broader than those described in the treaty? Normally, this would not
be a huge cause for concern. But in this context, it might mean that
U.S. law-enforcement agents would be enforcing criminal process
against American citizens for acts that are not crimes in the United
States.

The Internet sometimes makes strange bedfellows. As when they
coalesced to oppose the Communications Decency Act regulating
indecency on the net, industry and civil liberties groups are
rallying to oppose the treaty. "Industry and civil liberties groups
are remarkably aligned" in their opposition to the treaty, especially
in the areas of due process protection, says partner Jeffrey Pryce of
Steptoe & Johnson.

In the eyes of the critics, the treaty is an open invitation to
regulatory mischief. For example, newly democratic nations without
traditional due process and other safeguards could require providers
to build in monitoring technologies or could outlaw anonymous or
untraceable Internet use. Those battles have been fought in the U.S.,
but they might play out differently, and worse, in other nations.

In one likely scenario, the treaty could emerge as the Internet
version of the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act,
known colloquially as CALEA. That 1994 law, highly controversial at
the time, required U.S. telephone companies to make sure that
authorities could both trace and tap calls carried over their
networks.

Internet services are not currently included under that law, but the
Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Department of Justice have
long sought to expand CALEA to reach computer-based communications.
"It's as if the FBI, having failed to expand CALEA to computer
networks here in the U.S., are trying to do so abroad, and import
that expansion home as a treaty provision," says one industry
representative.

That last concept is what is known as "policy laundering." Dave
Banisar of Privacy International, a privacy-rights watchdog group,
says that the Justice Department and FBI are pursuing their
law-enforcement agendas overseas with the goal of bringing the
resulting treaty back to Congress. They will then say, Banisar
contends, "Well, other nations are doing it, so we should too."

Justice and FBI officials decline to comment on this contention. In
private meetings with industry/public policy groups, however, Justice
officials have sought to mollify the treaty's critics. So has the
Council of Europe. In a memo released in February, the Council of
Europe suggested ways that countries could limit their implementing
laws. But while this memo may be a kind of legislative history, it
isn't binding.

The Treaty Process

The treaty has been developed under the aegis of the Council of
Europe, an organization created after World War II. Although the U.S.
is not a member, the Department of Justice is what Baker calls a
"leading force" in the process.

The drafting process was secret until draft 19 was publicly released
in April 2000. Even now Justice officials won't comment publicly on
their role in drafting the terms of the treaty.

American don't like that the treaty was kept under wraps until it was
well along the way to final form. "A lot of the provisions were
largely locked in" by the time the treaty was publicly released,
Baker says.

The Justice Department responds by noting that, since last April, it
has made numerous presentations and met repeatedly with business and
other private-sector interests. It is "about as open a process as I
can think of," says Betty Shave of Justice's Computer Crime and
Intellectual Property Section, who has represented DOJ in the treaty
negotiations.

Stop It Or Fix It?

Industry groups believe that the best strategy is to try to improve
the treaty rather than kill it. Even if it switched position, the
United States alone "couldn't stand downhill in front of the snowball
and expect to stop it," Baker adds.

There are no indications that the Bush Administration will stop this
initiative begun during the Clinton era. But even if the United
States doesn't sign the treaty, it will likely affect U.S. companies
doing business internationally, their business partners, and clients.
"Just backing away from it is not the right answer," Cade says.

U.S. businesses are now starting to appeal to their counterparts
overseas, including the International Chamber of Commerce, in hopes
of turning sentiment against the treaty. Perhaps, if the United
States's role in shaping the treaty becomes better known, European
policymakers will turn away from it. Even many Europeans familiar
with the treaty don't know what it says precisely -- only English and
French translations are available. (English and French are the
official languages of the Council of Europe.)

"Neither the U.S. Department of Justice nor the U.S. alone will be
able to achieve the kinds of changes that the coalition is seeking in
the treaty without help from the other countries who are their
trading partners and allies," Cade says.

Short of an international backlash against it, treaty watchers are
uncertain how the U.S. Congress will respond to the treaty if the
United States signs it. Whether senators decide that the need to
combat cybercrimes trumps concerns about submitting U.S. citizens and
companies to foreign criminal process remains an open question.





________________________________________________
 Lauren Gelman                  Phone: 202/487-0420
 Director of Public Policy             email: gelman () eff org
 Electronic Frontier Foundation









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