Interesting People mailing list archives

IP: Cyanide for Code Red: [risks] Risks Digest 21.57


From: David Farber <dave () farber net>
Date: Tue, 07 Aug 2001 14:22:25 -0400



Sounds like a Sci-Fi book I have read djf


Date: Mon, 6 Aug 2001 10:55:07 +0800
From: "Jeremy" <jeremy () electrosilk net>
Subject: Cyanide for Code Red

Code Red may or may not be the major disaster that CERT predicted.  It is
certainly present and apparently mutating already.

What does not seem to have happened is the production of an effective
stopper for the Code Red.  Present prophylactic activities involve getting
as many systems as possible updated with 'the fix'.  This of course will not
work as a large number of systems are run out of the box by people with
little to no technical training.  They won't even know how to recognise they
have the worm, let alone fix it.

One simple fix is a passive worm that sits on a target machine and when a
Code Red attack arrives, infects the attacker using the same technique that
Code-Red uses (by definition, an attacking machine must be vulnerable to the
attack).  The passive worm could disinfect the attacker, and then sit
waiting for further attacks on the original machine plus on the newly
disinfected attacker.  The rate of spread of the passive worm would be
directly proportional to the spread of Code-Red.  The passive worm cannot
spread at all unless Code-Red is operating.

The passive worm would almost certainly disable the IIS service, in fact it
might be a good idea to have it produce a default web page stating so,
together with instructions on how to download the security fix.  An improved
version may even apply the fix itself.

The question arises as to whether a passive worm is illegal in any way.

The arguments for a passive worm are that the system it is defending is
under attack and it is taking steps to stop that attack.  As a by-product,
the attacker is unable to attack any other systems.  The attacker does not
suffer any damage as a result of the disinfection.

The argument against it is that the defender places and executes code on the
hostile machine.  This may well breach any number of anti-virus laws.

The real test of the argument will be when a very dangerous worm, say like
Code-Red but 100 times as potent, is unleashed.  The various Governments
will be left in the serious dilemma as to whether to allow a vital national
resource be destroyed, or to unleash a probably illegal antidote.

The time scale to make such a decision could be a matter of hours from first
discovery to Internet meltdown.  Governments (and Microsoft) must have a
contingency plan in place.  I wonder what it is?

Jeremy



For archives see: http://www.interesting-people.org/


Current thread: