IP: Louis Freeh: "I have not given up on encryption"

[Dave Farber <farber () cis upenn edu>]

Date: Mon, 08 Feb 1999 22:24:14 -0500
From: Declan McCullagh <declan () well com>


On February 4, FBI Director Louis Freeh testified before the Senate
Appropriations subcommittee chaired by Sen. Judd Gregg (R-NH).

Since the topic was counterterrorism, the discussion naturally turned to
encryption.

You may remember the FBI in September 1997 persuaded one House committee to
make it a federal crime to manufacture, sell, or import unapproved encryption
devices (including hardware and software). That bill never made it to the
House
floor.

-Declan

********

SEN. GREGG: Have you given up on  encryption? 
MR.  FREEH:  I have not given up on  encryption. 
SEN. GREGG: I thought you might have.
MR.  FREEH:  And I am pleased to report that both the attorney general and I
have had very good discussions with leaders of the industry.  We have reached
some agreements on the support of a technical center.  In fact, the
legislation

that was passed in October gives us the authority to receive their offer of
services and personnel to solve some of these problems on a case-by-case
basis,

if not on a global basis.
And we're very optimistic about that.  We also believe, however, that we need
to
come back to the Congress for authority and certainly for support in
implementing a program where we have non-mandatory controls but incentives
which
will give our industry the impetus to continue to support what we want to
establish.

*******

This is from Freeh's prepared statement:

Terrorists, both abroad and at home, are using technology to protect their
operations from being discovered and thwart the efforts of law enforcement to
detect, prevent, and investigate such acts. Convicted spy Aldrich Ames was
told

by his Russian handlers to encrypt his computer files. International drug
traffickers also are using  encryption  to avoid detection by law enforcement.
Most  encryption  products manufactured today for use by the general public
are 
non-recoverable. This means they do not include features that provide for
timely
law enforcement access to the plain text of encrypted communications and
computer files that are lawfully seized. Law enforcement remains in unanimous
agreement that the continued widespread availability and increasing use of
strong, non-recoverable  encryption  products will soon nullify our effective
use of court authorized electronic surveillance and the execution of lawful
search and seizure warrants. The loss of these capabilities will devastate our
capabilities for fighting crime, preventing acts of terrorism, and protecting
the national security. Recently, discussions with industry have indicated a
willingness to work with law enforcement in meeting our concerns and assisting
in developing a law enforcement counterencryption capability. I strongly urge
the Congress to adopt a balanced public policy on  encryption,  one that
carefully balances the legitimate needs of law enforcement to protect our
Nation's citizens and preserve the national security with the needs of
individuals.
The demand for accessing, examining, and analyzing computers and computer
storage media for evidentiary purposes is becoming increasingly critical to
our ability to investigate terrorism, child pornography, computer-facilitated
crimes, and other cases. In the past, the Subcommittee has supported FBI
efforts
to establish a data forensics capability through our Computer Analysis
Response

Teams. There is a need to further expand this capability to address a growing
workload. Indeed, our limited capability has created a backlog that impacts on
both investigations and prosecutions.