Interesting People mailing list archives
IP: TMD (Theater Missile Defence)
From: Dave Farber <farber () cis upenn edu>
Date: Tue, 25 Feb 1997 15:55:09 -0500
Date: Tue, 25 Feb 97 15:16:45 EST To: fukuzawa () ucsd edu From: "Richard J. Samuels" <samuels () MIT EDU> DFS-ers: I have read recent posts on Japanese TMD deployment with some interest. In addition to the issue of the size and consequence of the FSX "cloud" over co-development (I think it will--and should-- be a huge influence on the way any potential deal is structured) there is a larger strategic question of whether or not deployment (or even development) will touch off a destabilizing miltech race in the region. There is also the unresoiolved debate about how the US and Japan might manage to proceed without violating arms control agreements. Finally, though, there is the simple, pragmatic issue of whether or not such a system works. I passed along Mike Smitka's post to Ted Postol, the resident expert at MIT on these matters. He is called the "missile blower" in these parts because he was the first to suggest (and demonstrate) that DoD claims for the effectiveness of the Gulf War Patriot batteries were wildly exaggerated. Here is his response, and his offer to provide further information. I should add, by the way, that he has tried and failed to engage Chinese and Japanese non-governmental engineers and scientists in a dialogue about TMD. The Japanese side has thus far refused to talk to the Chinese side. Postol's reaction to Mike's post: ************ Postol begins: This note is to provide some information relevant to a comment on the capabilities of the Patriot missile defense posted on Tue, 25 Feb 1997 by Michael Smitka. Our group at MIT has published a very detailed analysis of the performance of the Patriot PAC II during the 1991 Gulf War. The analysis uses data from press video cameras during Patriot Scud engagements in Riyahd, Dahran, Tel Aviv and Haifa. Extensive information was extracted from the video by combining the observed events with detailed numerical modelling of the basic motion of Scud missiles and Patriot interceptors in the atmosphere. We also anlayzed the fuze-warhead system on the PAC II to understand the lethality of the Patriot against the high-crossing-speed Scud targets. Our work has been reviewed by an independent panel of the American Physical Society and our analysis and analytical techniques have been found to be completely correct. Our work concludes that the Patriot PAC II almost certainly did not destroy even a single Scud warhead in the Gulf War of 1991. We have identified several factors that largely explain why this occurred. First, the Iraqi modified Al-Husayn Scud was unstable on atmospheric reentry. As a result Scud targets would make erratic maneuvers that were too sudden for the relatively unmaneuverable Patriot PAC II to match. This caused the Patriots to have relatively large miss distances, resulting in the Patriot's missing their targets. Second, the fuze/warhead system in the Patriot was not designed to handle the high crossing speeds of roughly 3,500 m/s. This is a fundamental design limitation of the PAC II Patriot interceptor. The limitations of the PAC II fuze/warhead system were known, or should have been known, to the contractor, the Raytheon Company, and its customer, the US Army's Missile Command. A congressional investigation of the Army's and Raytheon's claims about Patriot's Gulf War performance found numerous serious problems with the Army's and Raytheon's performance claims, which were initially a 96 percent success rate, far different from the probable zero percent success-rate shown by our analysis. The General Accounting Office and the Congressional Research Service issued independent investigation reports also confirming the findings of House Government Operations Committee investigators. Unfortunately, the past history of misrepresentations continues in the form of ongoing unsupportable claims being made by the contractor, the US Army, and the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization, about the Patriot, Patriot upgrades, and other TMD systems currently under development. I advise anyone interested in the problem of TMD to exercise great caution before accepting or acting on claims about system capabilities made by these organizations. Our analysis of Patriot's Gulf War performance is available on request from: Professor Theodore A. Postol MIT Center for International Studies 292 Main Street Cambridge, MA 02142 Voice: (617) 253-8077 FAX: (617) 258-5750 E-Mail: postol () mit edu I would also be more than pleased to discuss the findings in this report, and others we have done on TMD and NMD, with anyone who is interested. Ted Postol Professor of Science, Technology, and National Security Policy Defense and Arms Control Studies Program and Program in Science, Technology, and Society Massachusetts Institute of Technology ************************ Richard J. Samuels Ford International Professor and Head, Department of Political Science Massachusetts Institute of Technology Tel. (617)253-2449 Director, MIT Japan Program Fax. (617)258-6164
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- IP: TMD (Theater Missile Defence) Dave Farber (Feb 25)