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IP: Kantor reply to Wash Post Editorial (from cyberpunks)
From: Dave Farber <farber () central cis upenn edu>
Date: Fri, 18 Oct 1996 14:50:56 -0400
The Washington Post, October 18, 1996, p. A26. The Administration's Encryption Plan I write in response to The Post's Oct. 4 editorial [below] that mischaracterizes the administration's recent encryption plan. The administration's encryption plan is reasonable, workable, fair and coherent. It addresses the critical issues of promoting the export of encryption products and protecting the public safety and our national security. The administration's objective is to put forth a balanced plan that promotes commerce and protects people. And that's exactly what we've done. The proof that our plan will work is with the critical mass of industry that has announced its intention to work with the administration to develop a key recovery system, which will allow law enforcement, under proper court order, to have access to encrypted data. In fact, many of these companies have products they will soon market that both safeguard information and protect society, and more are expected to follow. The National Research Council (NRC) report to which the editorial referred recommended allowing the export of encryption up to the strength of 56 bits. Contrary to the editorial, the president has not "embraced a looser form of licensure" than this report. Instead, this administration's plan allows the export of encryption up to 56 bits so long as industry commits to build and market products that support a key recovery system. This is, in fact, a stronger form of licensure not called for by the NRC report. The Post's editorial conveniently ignores the critical role encrypted products play in protecting businesses against illegal activity and the privacy rights of individuals. This is a disturbing omission that avoids critical concerns that can only be advanced by the administration's plan. Finally, this administration takes seriously its responsibility to protect its citizens and our national security. That's why we are not lifting all restrictions on the export of encryption products, and why there is a two-year deadline on the export of 56-bit encryption products. The administration's plan will accelerate the development of a market-driven, global key management system. That will provide the best security of all. Michael Kantor Secretary of Commerce Washington [End] ---------- The Washington Post, October 4, 1996, p. A22. Crypto Politics [Editorial] The Clinton administration once had a coherent, if unpopular, position on encryption software, the stuff that allows you to encode your email messages or other data so that no one can read it en route without a key. Now, in the wake of word that the president will sign an executive order, the position is no longer coherent, nor discernibly more popular with the high-tech audience it attempts to mollify. People and companies doing international financial business are highly interested in this kind of software, the more powerfully "uncrackable" the better. The U.S. software industry thinks there's a lot of money in it, especially if encryption becomes routine. The administration position till recently was that, much as U.S. software companies might profit from being able to market "uncrackable" encryption software freely, national security and law enforcement considerations dictated that such exports be controlled by license. Powerful encryption, like arms, could be dangerous in the hands of terrorists, rogue governments or international criminals. The software was classed as a munition; software above a certain uncrackability level could not be exported unless law enforcement authorities could get access somehow to the "key" after obtaining the proper warrants. Unbreakable codes on the loose strike us as a real danger, a legitimate reason for tight export controls. But if the administration really believes this, you'd think it would stick with steps that can plausibly meet the goal of control. Instead, trying to please, it has been splitting and splitting the difference between itself and the largely unmoved industry, which argues that no one will buy an encryption product that a government can decrypt at will. As with arms sales, the companies also argue that if they don't sell it, somebody else will, and that anyway it's far too late to fence off rogues. The national security people respond that there is still a "window," perhaps two years, in which they can prevent, if not all leaks of unauthorized crypto technology, at least its off-the-shelf use and wide adoption as the international standard. The administration initially proposed, then repeatedly refined, the concept of key "escrow" -- depositing a copy of the code with trusted third parties -- but never came up with a version the industry would accept. It commissioned a National Research Council report, which recommended a significant easing of restrictions. Now the president appears to have embraced a yet looser form of licensure upon declaration by a company that it will develop a plan within two years for key recovery. Also, the technology no longer will be considered munitions. What kind of plan? Nobody can quite say. What if the plans aren't acceptable? Licensing will revert to the old rule in two years. Will the security issue be moot by then? Probably. Barring some burst of clarity, one is left wondering whether the administration has compromised or caved, and what it now believes about the dangers of exporting uncrackable software. [End] See the National Research Council report: http://jya.com/nrcindex.htm
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- IP: Kantor reply to Wash Post Editorial (from cyberpunks) Dave Farber (Oct 18)