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IP: nothing like being welcomed -- Asahi Evening News, October
From: David Farber <farber () central cis upenn edu>
Date: Sat, 21 Oct 1995 12:22:43 -0400
"Presence of Bases Erodes Japan-U.S. Alliance," by Mike Millard. Reprinted with permission. The rape of an Okinawan schoolgirl, in which three U.S. servicemen have been charged, ignited protest reaching beyond the crime itself to what is perceived to be its inevitable cause--29,000 U.S. troops garrisoned on a small island. Nearly 80% of Okinawans surveyed said U.S. bases should go, and their convictions are justified. Not only for the welfare of their long-beleaguered island, but for that of the crucial Japan-U.S. alliance, which is based on an anachronistic Cold War arrangement that in the absence of a unifying Soviet threat grows ever more duplicitous and corrosive. Even former diplomat Hisahiko Okazaki, who has written that the "security, prosperity and freedom of the Japanese people depend entirely" on the alliance, more recently wrote that "confidence is lacking" in the shaky relationship. Some Japanese officials have groused that Japan should "grow up" and defend itself. But the 47,000 U.S. troops deployed in Japan are cherished by the Pentagon, which recently asserted in its "Nye Initiative" that while the Cold War may be over, the massive American military presence in east Asia must remain because--among other reasons--it ensures the stability of the region, strengthens alliances and friendships, and even serves to open foreign markets to U.S. products. This is misleading. First, east Asia is better stabilized by interdependencies linking the interests of its burgeoning capitalist trading states than it ever could be by military force. Secondly, the claim that huge concentrations of troops in small areas such as Okinawa strengthen friendships is absurd, as the rape clearly shows. And third, it is obvious that American military presence does nothing to open Japanese markets. How could it? The presence is desired more by the United States than by Japan. When illusion is dispensed with, there seem to be two factors sustaining America's Japan garrison: 1. In a classic example of hegemonic overreach, the Pentagon has found that in a time of shrinking budgets, it is cheaper to station troops here because Japan kicks in $4.5 billion annually--for what amounts to a national defense bargain. 2. Japanese trade negotiators have discovered they can utilize the bases so coveted by the Pentagon as bargaining chips. As Chalmers Johnson suggested recently in Foreign Affairs, Japan uses the Pentagon as a virtual lobby these days. These unhealthy dependencies erode the alliance through endless trade friction, turn public opinion in both nations against each other and distort valid national interests and legitimate defense needs at a time when there is no "enemy" in east Asia capable of projecting military power. Historically, China has never invaded Japan nor even displayed much interest in the world beyond what it perceives as its middle kingdom. North Korea, despite its high-profile "nuclear threat" gambit, is a failed economy that can no longer even feed itself. While most leading Asian nations are increasing defense spending, the International Institute of Strategic Studies said that this reflects "increased investment in non-offensive defense and security" made possible by economic growth, and represents no threat to regional security. Japan's 1995 defense budget is $47 billion, probably the third largest in the world, and it fields 288,000 troops and reserves armed with modern weapons as a means of defending this nation. Some, however, find this a matter of concern. In 1990, Marine Corps Maj. Gen. Henry C. Stackpole III said that if U.S. forces were withdrawn, Japan would further bolster its already formidable military. "No one wants a rearmed resurgent Japan," Stackpole said. "So we are a cap in the bottle, if you will." But why shouldn't Japan become an ordinary nation as Germany has? If Japan remains dependent solely upon the United States for defense and for foreign policy guidance, how will it ever "grow up?" If Japan were to shoulder multilateral defense responsibilities, much as it does those in economic organizations such as APEC, why shouldn't it be capable of growing into that role as well? The Economist has editorialized that through flexible interpretation of its peace constitution, Japan could let its "navy roam farther from shore in defense of the sea lanes that are vital to trade." The magazine further noted that, while Europe is "criss-crossed by treaties and security clubs that can help take any strain, Asia has virtually none." Perhaps it is time for Asia-Pacific trading states to begin forming a regional web of multilateral defense ties as well. Japan's atrophied foreign policy and defense institutions would be able to strengthen and mature if the U.S. garrison were gradually withdrawn. Japan would not be forced into a sudden buildup or made to "go nuclear," as some fear; it could remain protected indefinitely under the umbrella of U.S. strategic nuclear forces, something that need not be linked to U.S. troop presence. Besides, the open markets that America unilaterally provides to maintain a Cold War alliance that is becoming morbidly dependent is a price that it can ill afford. If the United States were to begin sending its troops home, perhaps the deteriorating alliance could be revitalized, public confidence in it could be restored and the Okinawan people could live in peace. But don't bet on it. When President Bill Clinton visits Tokyo next month, expect a shell game with a few bases, followed by ringing affirmations of the status quo, full of sound and fury, from two weak governments. .............................................................................. The author is an Asahi Evening News staff writer. Chalmers Johnson President, Japan Policy Research Institute E-mail: cjohnson () ucsd edu Fax: (619) 944-9022
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- IP: nothing like being welcomed -- Asahi Evening News, October David Farber (Oct 21)