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THE POLITICAL VICTORY OF THE RUSSIAN MILITARY... part 1 of 2 [I found this very
From: David Farber <farber () central cis upenn edu>
Date: Mon, 4 Jul 1994 15:02:08 -0400
Stan Przybylinski, Senior Member of the Technical Staff Industrial Technology Institute, P.O. Box 1485, Ann Arbor, MI 48106 Internet: smp () iti org (313) 769-4517 FAX: (313) 769-4064 THE POLITICAL VICTORY OF THE RUSSIAN MILITARY: ASSESSING THE IMPACT ON THE NEW MILITARY DOCTRINE by Sean Kay Department of Political Science University of Massachusetts - Amherst (copywrite December 1993 and June 1994) * This article does not necessarily represent official opinion or policy of member governments or NATO. YELTSIN'S DEBT TO THE MILITARY The decision by the Russian armed forces to back Boris Yeltsin against the Parliament in October 1993 was not a show of support for democracy and economic reform. It was a political decision to side with the forces in Russia that could manipulate power and address a multitude of foreign policy frustrations and internal disarray in the military. Shortly after the October crisis ended, the Russian government approved a new military doctrine. It is a highly political document which establishes the guidelines through which the military will receive its payback for their tenuous support for President Yeltsin. In trying to satisfy the needs of the military, Yeltsin must strike a careful balance between their increasing demands for authority, influence, respect, and a limited economic capacity to alter the status of an armed forces which is largely in disarray. At all levels, the Russian military is suffering from extremely poor social conditions, low morale, high levels of absenteeism and low conscription, corruption, inadequate funding, and a general loss of purpose. The inability of the government to address these problems was a prime reason that the armed forces gave their support to Yeltsin and attained promises from the Russian President that their concerns would be addressed. The desire to reap political benefit from the October events was summarized well by Maj. General V. M. Dudnik, who told Moscow Television on 17 October that: The army never was, cannot be, and never will be outside politics...army policy is determined by the events taking place within and the actions of the leadership echelons. I would put it this way: the army never supports the weak; the army always supports real power. That is why it currently supports the authority and those structures which found they had the real levers of power. Second, it will support the power which shows a real readiness to raise its status third, it will support the power which is ready to implement a moral cleansing away of the dead weight it has inherited. Today, this function is being carried out by the President and his team.(1) Support for Yeltsin in the armed forces is limited and will depend on his ability to meet their increasing demands. Thus the Russian President must walk a fine line between meeting the needs of the armed forces within an extremely constrained economic environment while not alienating its neighbors and partners in the West. DEFEAT WITHOUT A BATTLE: SOURCES OF DISARRAY IN THE RUSSIAN MILITARY For the armed forces, almost all of their problems relate to the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union. The end of the conflict between East and West was as welcome in the Soviet Union as it was in the West. However, the end result was the return of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, Eastern Europe, and Cuba to a country that was ill-prepared to adapt to their needs. Mikhail Gorbachev's unilateral force reductions and acceptance of troop limits under the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe to enhance "reasonable sufficiency" in defence planning, contributed to this problem. These decisions precipitated an unforeseen crisis in the Soviet Union in which there was insufficient housing, pension-funding, or adequate retraining programs for demobilized officers. The collapse of the Soviet Union, the failure of the Commonwealth of Independent states, and the continued presence of Russian armed forces and strategic nuclear assets in what are now considered the "near abroad" former republics of the Soviet Union exacerbated these problems. Thus the Russian military which came into existence on 16 March 1992 by a presidential decree would not be the same immense power that was the Soviet military. Rather its first and current Minister of Defense General Pavel Grachev would be tasked with starting anew with demoralized and imploding armed forces. To the average officer or conscript, the most serious problems facing the armed forces are the social status of servicemen and a desire to attain adequate funding for the military. If living standards for officers and their families continues to fall criminal, nationalist, or communist activity is possible at multiple levels in the military. The image of undisciplined, unpaid, lawless, hungry, and well armed individuals is not a pleasant prospect to the Russian central command. These problems were detailed by Col. General Valeriy Mironov (Deputy Defense Minister for Personnel) in Krasnaya Zvezda on 19 August 1993. According to Mironov, there were over 125 000 servicemen without apartments. Moreover, some 77 000 officers, ensigns, and warrant officers who have been discharged into the reserve or retired, were waiting for apartments. "Given that troops are being withdrawn from the Baltic, the Transcaucauses, Moldova, and distant foreign countries and returning to Russia", wrote Mironov, "the number of people needing a roof over their heads may reach 400 000 families."(2) These housing problems are compounded by the fact that the current ratio of officer to enlisted servicemen is nearly 1:1. This image of a military in disarray has resulted in a very high level of absenteeism and draft evasion. According to a recent public opinion poll, 80% of draft-age men do not want to serve in the military.(3) The Russian Finance Ministry is widely viewed by the military as the central obstacle to resolving a number of the social problems of the armed forces. According to a Vesti newscast on 7 August 1993, the Finance Ministry has not been "allocating money to the military construction workers, and the figure of 120 000 homeless servicemen threatens to rise to 400 000 due to troops returning from abroad, graduates from military academies, and contract servicemen, plus 120 000 released from the army, without housing.(4) Vesti quoted N. Chekov, (the Russian Federation Armed Forces chief for construction and housing of troops) saying that "there has been no improvement on the most important issue - funding of capital construction. Our debts are rising and have already topped 200 billion roubles."(5) The problem is circular as the Finance Ministry does not have the funds to allocate to the military despite its promises to do so. The defense budget for the Soviet Union has fallen from around 17% during the Cold War to 5% for Russia in 1994. The housing problem is compounded by the fact that many units have gone without pay for months at a time. According to Army General Konstantine Kobets (the first Deputy Minister of Defence): The Finance Ministry is allocating the Defense Ministry just one twelfth of the funds needed and is delaying its debt payments, 60 percent of servicemen have not received their July pay, and there are even units where people were paid last May. As a result there is growing social tension in the army and declining confidence in the government.(6) The Finance Ministry owes about 2 trillion rubles for maintaining the army, including some 200 billion rubles in wages to civilian personnel.(7) The problems of the average Lieutenant grade officer personifies this dilemma. An average Lieutenant receives 20 000 rubles (R) for his post plus (R)26 000 for his rank, yet it costs about (R)40 000 to rent an apartment. This leaves this officer with (R)6000 for the remaining necessities of life. Yet even these small wages are paid with a delay of often two or three months.(8) The inability of the executive branch to attain a compromise with the Russian parliament during the summer of 1993 led a number of military representatives to urge Yeltsin to take an authoritative stand to break the gridlock. In early August 1993, representatives of two main military unions - the "Military Men for Democracy" and the "Shchit" movement - called on Boris Yeltsin to assume not only personal responsibility for the constitutional process, but also to take power. At a press conference the respective representatives (Maj. General Vladimir Dudnik and Nikolay Moskovchenko) insisted that Yeltsin lift the country out of crisis. Their formal statement asserted that: The military are following with anguish and unease the sharpening confrontation between the executive and legislative branches. The armed forces, torn by political differences and enmeshed in political battles, are losing their combat readiness and are in a process of disintegration. The army, like all of Russian society is weary of the protracted rivalry.(9) With these concerns in mind, Yeltsin made a landmark visit to the Taman and Kantemir divisions of the Moscow Military District outside of the Russian capital in late August. The event was designed by the military to draw his attention to their concerns and by the government to demonstrate Yeltsin's solidarity with the military's problems.(10) These troops were the primary elements of the military assault on the parliament on 3-4 October. Almost within hours of the end of the crisis at the Russian parliament, the military began to receive a number of immediate debt returns from the Yeltsin government. The most important was a statement by Yeltsin that he favored the rapid adoption of the Draft Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation - without public debate or constitutional provisions - by 15 October. REDRAFTING THE DRAFT DOCTRINE: THE MILITARY WINS A CLOSED CONTEST The Russian Ministry of Defense began intensive work on the draft military doctrine in early summer 1993. Much of this work was done in confidential working groups with only an occasional press leak by a high level figure such as Defense Minister Grachev.(11) The draft doctrine was the primary agenda item of special meetings of the Russian Security Council held on 3 and 6 October 1993 and continued to be debated in the council through October. The most significant information regarding the Security Council discussions was released through a high level defence analyst Pavel Felgengauer on 9 October.(12) Felgengauer stressed that the debate over the doctrine was occurring behind closed doors and would remain the decision of a narrow circle of permanent members of the Security Council. According to Felgengauer, the impact of the events of October 3-4 had a profound impact on the nature and tone of the doctrine. Apparently a draft had been approved by the Defence Ministry in early September which the Security Council was to have signed in October and then sent to the parliament for final approval. After the events of October 3-4, Felgengauer wrote that: "Today, everything is different."(13) Felgengauer disclosed that an amendment had been inserted into the draft in its final stages allowing for the use of armed forces to maintain internal security and the territorial integrity of Russia. The attachment of last minute amendments to the draft doctrine delayed the initial goal of 15 October as the date for its completion. According to a Kommersant-Daily report on 19 October, the seed of discord between the Defense Ministry and the top political leadership was the military's position on the use of armed forces to restore and maintain internal security. The report suggested that both the supreme command and the bulk of the officer corps categorically rejected the use of the military for internal purposes.(14) Because the armed forces had already demonstrated their willingness to act in internal conflicts and to maintain order, this dispute might have been an attempt by the military to restore some public sense of neutrality. However, this precedent would be but one of a number of problematic elements of the new Russian Military Doctrine approved without public debate on 2 November 1993. ASSESSING THE BASIC PROVISIONS OF THE MILITARY DOCTRINE OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION The new Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation is designed to resolve the problems facing the Russian military. First, it defines the basic security concept of the Russian Federation as being purely defensive. Second, it is designed to restore armed forces stature, social standing, funding, and a general sense of purpose. This could only be assured by stressing the third element, that Russia must have a renewed status as a major regional power and that it must be prepared to use its armed forces to exert such influence and defend the interests of the Russian Federation. It is important to note that there are many positive elements in the doctrine - particularly with regard to arms reduction, non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, etc,. However, the second and third elements serve to qualify these positive elements. No longer is reasonable sufficiency in defense the primary element of deterrence. Rather, the general purpose is to enhance the stature and capability of the armed forces to fight aggressive offensive and defensive wars and to intervene in areas of conflict that effect the interests of the Russian Federation. The most authoritative comment on the doctrine came on 3 November by Defense Minister Grachev who held an extensive meeting with Russian and foreign press at the Ministry of Defense. Since Grachev's press conference, numerous articles and commentary provided insight into the key aspects of the doctrine and on 18 November, the main text was published in Rossiyskiye Vesti.(15) The detailed elements of the doctrine are divided into political, military, and technical foundations. The political foundations of the Russian Military Doctrine reflect the views of Russia's general approach to the use of military force, to armed conflict and wars, sources of military danger, and the causes of military conflicts. The document begins with a declaration that the Russian Federation does not regard any state as its enemy. Thus, the Russian Federation will not use military force against any state except for individual or collective self-defense. However, this statement is qualified with a stipulation that the non-use of force is in conjunction with guarantees of the non-use of nuclear weapons against states party to the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty which do not possess nuclear weapons. The assertion of this clause regarding the possible use of conventional or nuclear force against states that continue to possess nuclear weapons and have not signed the NPT treaty is a veiled threat against the Ukraine which continues to possess nuclear weapons claimed by Russia. This would also apply to any other state which might pose a similar threat to the Russian Federation. At his 3 November press conference, Defense Minister Grachev asserted that Russia would consider use of nuclear weapons against countries that joined an alliance linked by agreements with nuclear states. This statement is also a threat against those states in Central and Eastern Europe which have expressed a desire to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The doctrine stresses that nuclear weapons are regarded primarily not as a means of conducting military operations, but as a political means of deterrence against aggression. The document places a high priority on arms control, arms reduction, and nuclear non-proliferation. However, Russia reserves the right to use all of its resources if attacked - including nuclear weapons. This reconsideration of nuclear deterrence was given considerable media attention in the West as it is a formal departure from past Soviet doctrine that the USSR would never be the first to use nuclear weapons. This policy was never taken seriously in western military planning and therefore should not have caused the commotion that it did. The new policy on the first use of nuclear weapons is much closer to the American understanding of deterrence that a nuclear weapon is only as good as its deterrent value and that requires an assertion of willingness to utilize the device.(16) Alongside tasks of deterrence and defense, the Russian armed forces and other troops are authorized to conduct peacekeeping or peacemaking operations. According to the doctrine, these operations can be carried out by a decision of the UN Security Council, other organs of collective security or in accordance with international commitments within the CIS - provided that this does not contravene the interests of the Russian Federation. To prepare for this possibility, the doctrine maintains that it may be necessary to site Russian Federation troops and weapons outside Russian territory. At his 3 November press conference, Defense Minister Grachev suggested that the intervention and removal of such troops could depend on the status and treatment of Russian minorities living within a particular region. Grachev emphasized that this could apply as a condition for the continued withdrawal of Russian troops from Latvia and Estonia. Depending on how Russian or CIS peacekeeping was carried out under a United Nations or CSCE mandate, such activity might not be discouraged in the West. The litmus test would have to be the degree to which the Russian Federation made peacekeeping an operational activity according to internationally accepted standards and did not represent intervention to favor one side or another in a given dispute. In the "near abroad" countries, this element of the doctrine is a prescription for renewed Russian imperialism. Indeed such fears have been given credence by one of the most liberal individuals in the foreign policy apparatus, Foreign Minister Andrei Kosyrev. On 8
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