Security Incidents mailing list archives

Re: An ICMP Type 3 Signature


From: "Stephen P. Berry" <spb () MESHUGGENEH NET>
Date: Mon, 9 Oct 2000 12:53:09 -0700

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA1


In message <200010051350.JAA09245 () obelix dgrc crc ca>, Donald McLachlan writes:

As you say the ICMP message includes the IP header of the packet which could
not be delivered.
3) Look at the IP header of the included packet.  If the TTL is close to
  (within 1 or 2 of) one of the default initial TTLs (255, 128, 64, 32)
  you can be pretty sure that the host spoofing your addresses is behind
  that border router.

There's a simpler and better indicator:  check to see if the source
of the ICMP packet is between the destination of the ICMP packet and
the `unreachable' host.  If this isn't the case, it's a pretty good
bet that the actual origin of the original traffic is behind the ICMP source.


P.S.  Now that I've said how we can detect them, I bet they modify the
     stimulus packets.  :-(

It seems unlikely.  There are much more brittle testing criteria which
are much better documented and widely used---i.e., snort signature
collections.  Although most of these (signatures in general, not snort's
in particular) are fairly trivially defeatable, the tools don't seem
to mutate very frequently[0].






- -Steve

- -----
0     Compared to, for example, virii.
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: GnuPG v1.0.3 (GNU/Linux)
Comment: For info see http://www.gnupg.org

iD8DBQE54iIOG3kIaxeRZl8RAk7mAKD8E5l+l9guuRORYSPVbfLZDb9c8wCfT2ud
H5f0eBUle0tCU0fvpHs4RKk=
=yO58
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----


Current thread: