funsec mailing list archives

EFF: An Open Letter to Sony-BMG


From: "Fergie" <fergdawg () netzero net>
Date: Tue, 15 Nov 2005 00:37:03 GMT

In case you haven't seen it...

Via The EFF.

[snip]

To: Andrew Lack, CEO of Sony-BMG
Cc: Rolf Schmidt-Holtz, Chairman of the Board, Sony-BMG
Cc: Howard Stringer, CEO of Sony Entertainment
Cc: Gunter Thielen, CEO of Bertelsmann AG


Dear Mr. Lack,

The Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) has viewed with growing concern the revelations regarding the XCP Content 
Protection Software and the SunnComm MediaMax software that your company has chosen to include on at least two dozen of 
your music CD releases. We are also concerned by your company's limited response to the concerns of your customers and 
the computer security community.

As has been documented by independent researcher Mark Russinovich and many others, the XCP software appears to have 
been designed to have many of the qualities of a "rootkit." It was written with the intent of concealing its presence 
and operation from the owner of the computer, and once installed, elements of the software run continuously -- even 
when no Sony-BMG music CD is in use. It provides no clear uninstallation option. Additionally, without notifying users, 
the software appears to contact a remote machine under your control. The MediaMax software is somewhat different, but 
similarly has no true uninstall option and an undisclosed ongoing communication from the usersÂ’ computer to SunnComm.

You must be aware that the discovery of this software has shocked and angered your customers. Software that deceives 
the owner of the computer it runs upon and opens that computer up to attacks by third parties may be expected to come 
from malicious cyber-attacks; it is certainly not expected nor acceptable to be distributed and sold to paying 
customers by a major music company. Accordingly, EFF welcomes your company's decision to temporarily halt manufacturing 
CDs with XCP and to reexamine "all aspects" of your "content protection initiative."

But if you truly intend to undo the harm you have caused, your company should immediately and publicly commit to the 
following additional measures:

    * Recall all CDs that contain the XCP and SunnComm MediaMax technology. The recall must include removing all 
infected CDs from store shelves as well as halting all online sales of the affected merchandise. We understand from a 
recent New York Times article that well over 2 million infected CDs with the XCP technology are in the marketplace and 
have yet to be sold.
    * Remove from all current and future marketing materials statements like that on 
http://cp.sonybmg.com/xcp/english/updates.html that say the cloaking software "is not malicious and does not compromise 
security."
    * Widely publicize the potential security and other risks associated with the XCP and SunnComm MediaMax technology 
to allow the 2.1 million consumers who have already purchased the CDs to make informed decisions regarding their use of 
those CDs. The publicity campaign should include, at a minimum, issuing a public statement describing the risks and 
listing every Sony CD, DVD or other product that contains XCP or SunnComm MediaMax. The publicity campaign should be 
advertised in a manner reasonably calculated to reach all consumers who have purchased the products, in all markets 
where the CDs have been sold.
    * Cooperate fully with any interested manufacturer of anti-virus, anti-spyware, or similar computer security tools 
to facilitate the identification and complete removal of XCP and SunnComm MediaMax from the computers of those 
infected. In particular, Sony should publicly waive any claims it may have for investigation or removal of these tools 
under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) and any similar laws.
    * Offer to refund the purchase price of infected CDs or, at the consumerÂ’s election, provide a replacement CD that 
does not contain the XCP or SunnComm technology. For those consumers who choose to retain infected CDs, develop and 
make widely available a software update that will allow consumers to easily uninstall the technology without losing the 
ability to play the CD on their computers. In addition, consumers should not be required to reveal any personally 
identifying information to Sony in order to access the update, as Sony is currently requiring.
    * Compensate consumers for any damage to their computers caused by the infected products, including the time, 
effort, and expenditure required to remedy the damage or verify that their computer systems or networks were or were 
not altered or damaged by XCP or SunnComm MediaMax products.
    * Prior to releasing any future product containing DRM technology, thoroughly test the software to determine the 
existence of any security risks or other possible damages the technology might cause to any user's computer.
    * Certify in a statement included in the packaging of every CD containing DRM technology that the product does not 
contain any concealed software such as the XCP rootkit, does not electronically communicate with Sony-BMG or any other 
party, does not initiate the download of any software update or other data without informed consent of the consumer 
immediately prior to each communication, can be uninstalled without any need to contact Sony or disclose personally 
identifying information to anyone, does not present any security risks to any consumer's computer, and will not damage 
or reduce the performance of the consumer's computer or data in any way.

We look forward to hearing that you are in the process of implementing these measures by 9:00am PST on Friday, November 
18, 2005.

Sincerely,

Electronic Frontier Foundation 

[snip]

http://www.eff.org/IP/DRM/Sony-BMG/?f=open-letter-2005-11-14.html

- ferg

--
"Fergie", a.k.a. Paul Ferguson
 Engineering Architecture for the Internet
 fergdawg () netzero net or fergdawg () sbcglobal net
 ferg's tech blog: http://fergdawg.blogspot.com/


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