tor vulnerabilities?

[Neel Rowhoiser <neel.rowhoiser () outlook com>]

I just stumbled across this and despite its sort of half-assed write up, I think its possibly an advisory? If I am 
understanding it correctly, they're saying that you can use a directory authority that hands out invalid/wrong RSA keys 
for other relays, you can cause decryption to fail and thus introduce path bias to nodes of the directory authorities 
choosing by selectively handing out valid RSA keys?
If the bit towards the end about guard nodes is correct, it would seem to indicate that they can use the semantics for 
detecting when a guard is causing too many extend relay cells to fail to cause valid guards to be marked invalid, and 
their rogue guards to succeed essentially using tor's semantics against them and causing the odds that you-re ingress 
point to the tor network is rogue to approach 1.
Why aren't the tor relay keys signed? And what other myriad of documents do directory authorities serve that also don't 
have integrity controls? This sort of makes me question the tor projects ability to deliver on any of the promises they 
make, as it would seem that a person needs like 3 or 4 rogue nodes before they could start de-anonymizing users, and 
the more of them they introduced the more of the network they could capture?
What I ran across (pastebin-- source unknown) http://pastebin.com/pRiMx0CW
Cheers,
Neel Rowhoiser

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