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Re: [iputils] Integer overflow in iputils ping/ping6 tools


From: Gage Bystrom <themadichib0d () gmail com>
Date: Tue, 13 Mar 2012 16:06:37 -0800

Shoulda gotten a lawyer o.O professor sex scandals can rake in decent money
On Mar 13, 2012 4:32 PM, "Jeffrey Walton" <noloader () gmail com> wrote:

On Tue, Mar 13, 2012 at 6:17 PM, Marcus Meissner <meissner () suse de> wrote:
Hi,

How is this different from writing a fork bomb?
:)

Fork bombs can be remediated with RLIMIT_NPROC. The runaway ping
program needs to be fixed and then recompiled.

I suppose you could say the same about runaway fork'd programs,
though. I had one accidentally get away from me in college. The
professor who performed the post-mortem was very impressive. He had me
fingered in under an hour.

Jeff


On Tue, Mar 13, 2012 at 09:42:29AM +0100, Christophe Alladoum wrote:
====[ Description ]====

An integer overflow was found in iputils/ping_common.c main_loop()
function
which could lead to excessive CPU usage when triggered (could lead to
DoS). This
means that both ping and ping6 are vulnerable.


====[ Proof-Of-Concept ]====

Specify "big" interval (-i option) for ping/ping6 tool:
{{{
$ ping -i 3600 google.com
PING google.com (173.194.66.102) 56(84) bytes of data.
64 bytes from we-in-f102.1e100.net (173.194.66.102): icmp_req=1 ttl=50
time=11.4 ms
[...]
}}}

And check your CPU usage (top, htop, etc.)


====[ Explanation ]====

Here, ping will loop in main_loop() loop in this section of code :
{{{
/* from iputils-s20101006 source */
/* ping_common.c */

    546 void main_loop(int icmp_sock, __u8 *packet, int packlen)
    547 {
[...]
    559         for (;;) {
[...]
    572                 do {
    573                         next = pinger();
    574                         next = schedule_exit(next);
    575                 } while (next <= 0);
[...]
    588                 if ((options & (F_ADAPTIVE|F_FLOOD_POLL)) ||
next<SCHINT(interval)) {
[...]
    593                         if (1000*next <= 1000000/(int)HZ) {
}}}

If interval parameter (-i) is set, then condition L593 will overflow
(ie. value
exceeding sizeof(signed integer)), making this statement "always true"
for big
values (e.g. -i 3600). As a consequence, ping process will start looping
actively as long as condition is true (could be pretty long).

As far as looked, this bug is unlikely to be exploitable besides
provoking
Denial-Of-Service.


====[ Affected versions ]====

Tested on Fedora/Debian/Gentoo Linux system (2.6.x x86_32 and x86_64)
on iputils
version 20101006. ping6 seems also to be affected since it's relying on
same
ping_common.c functions.

Since iputils is not maintained any longer
(http://www.spinics.net/lists/netdev/msg191346.html), patch must be
applied from
source.


====[ Patch ]====
Quick'n dirty patch (full patch in appendix) is to cast test result as
long long:
{{{
    593                  if (((long long)1000*next) <= (long
long)1000000/(int)HZ) {
}}}


====[ Credits ]====
* Christophe Alladoum (HSC)
* Romain Coltel (HSC)

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