Re: Symlink vulnerabilities

[xD 0x41 <secn3t () gmail com>]

Oh man thats awesome paper...
I love to read tavs stuff but, yea...hmmm. i also PMd vlad, and,
exactly showed him, it is same place where it is failing, well, when
it comes to clipping in the shell, exactly, it even complains ion
removing a file, yet this is also,. in its cocde :s
so, something is not winnin and, im so tired ill speak more on this in
morning but, i trust you, itcannot be exploited, in any way, it will
only cause corruption of tar and compression utils, at most.
gnite and, thx for this paper, ill read it b4 i switch the lamp off
cheers mate.
xd


On 28 October 2011 00:51, Jeffrey Walton <noloader () gmail com> wrote:
> On Thu, Oct 27, 2011 at 9:43 AM, xD 0x41 <secn3t () gmail com> wrote:
> > [SNIP]
> >
> > This means that right after the "ln" command AND before "/tmp/dd" is
> > launched, the user can replace the directory "/tmp/dd" by a shell script
> > with the same name ("/tmp/dd").
> >
> > You try to change and fiddle here, it would need alot better than just
> > the current shell scripting, and, even then, i dnt think it would win
> > the race conditiobn.
> See Bishop and Dilger's paper:
> nob.cs.ucdavis.edu/bishop/papers/1996-compsys/racecond.pdf

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