Re: Getting Off the Patch

[phocean <0x90 () phocean net>]

I just agree with all that.

But once again, as with Pete, how is this new ? It has been the best
practice of good system/security administrators for years.

And it doesn't look like a "no patching" policy yet...

Le mardi 18 janvier 2011 à 11:19 -0800, coderman a écrit :
> On Tue, Jan 18, 2011 at 10:39 AM, Thor (Hammer of God)
> <thor () hammerofgod com> wrote:
> > ... Any security model that not only advocates non-patching, but that is designed with the intent of not patching 
> > is completely retarded.  I defy anyone to provide verifiable evidence to the contrary that is not based on a server 
> > and a couple of workstations.
>
> while the vast majority of this thread has sucked the will to live
> from my consciousness, the concept of a non-patch model is
> interesting.
>
> i have used something similar to great success with some specific caveats:
>
> a. you still need to patch sometimes.  based on past experience this
> can be as infrequent as once or twice a year.
>
> b. you have a compensating control (more below) for your not-patching
> preference.  If you can't manage testing and deployment of patches,
> you are not in good shape no matter the defense in depth.
>
> c. trade-off need for patching by reducing attack surface of
> applications and systems by disabling all unnecessary features,
> services, and capabilities.  this can vastly reduce the scope of
> software under test and affected by patching, often by orders of
> magnitude.
>
> d. trade-off patching and testing difficulty by virtualizing the
> software into a common environment more suited for automation,
> expansive testing, rapid deployment, limited scope, and overall
> robustness.
>
> e. trade-off patching induced service interruptions by utilizing a
> highly available cluster configuration with distinct pools of software
> for on-demand halt, update, and restore with only transient service
> interruption. where possible, hot binary patching of kernel and
> applications without interruption in processing state is ideal.
>
> f. monitor service availability and vulnerability impact. identify
> patches affecting components not in use, and patches incurring a test
> and release cycle.  confirm that you are actually better off focused
> on a hardened, agile, automated process less focused on patching as
> security strategy given the man hours used to achieve a, b, c, d and
> e.
>
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