Re: Filezilla's silent caching of user's credentials

[Michael Wood <itnetsec () gmail com>]

I agree.  I've always wondered why this information was stored in plain
text...baffles me

--
Sent from my Droid Incredible
Virtuous ROM v3.0.1
On Oct 7, 2010 11:22 PM, "Ryan Sears" <rdsears () mtu edu> wrote:
> Hi all,
>
> As some of you may or may not be aware, the popular (and IMHO one of the
best) FTP/SCP program Filezilla caches your credentials for every host you
connect to, without either warning or ability to change this without editing
an XML file. There have been quite a few bug and features requests filed,
and they all get closed or rejected within a week or so. I also posted
something in the developer forum inquiring about this, and received this
response:
> "I do not see any harm in storing credentials as long as the rest of your
system is properly secure as it should be."
> Source:(http://forum.filezilla-project.org/viewtopic.php?f=3&t=17932)
>
> To me this is not only concerning, but also completely un-acceptable. The
passwords all get stored in PLAIN TEXT within your %appdata% directory in an
XML file. This is particularly dangerous in multi-user environments with
local profiles, because as we all know physical access to a computer means
it's elementary at best to acquire information off it. Permissions only work
if your operating system chooses to respect them, not to mention how simple
it is *even today* to maliciously get around windows networks using
pass-the-hash along with network token manipulation techniques.
> There has even been a bug filed that draws out great ways to
psudo-mitigate this using built-in windows API calls, but it doesn't seem to
really be going anywhere. This really concerns me because a number of my
coworkers and friends were un-aware of this behavior, and I didn't even know
about it until I'd been using it for a year or so. All I really want to see
is at the very least just some warning that Filezilla does this.
> Filezilla bug report:(http://trac.filezilla-project.org/ticket/5530)
>
> My feelings have been said a lot more eloquently than I could ever hope to
in that bug report:
> "Whoever keeps closing this issue and/or dismissing its importance
understands neither security nor logical argument. I apologize for the slam,
but it is undeniably true. Making the same mistake over and over does not
make it any less of a mistake. The fact that a critical deficiency has
existed for years does not make it any less critical a deficiency.
Similarly, the fact that there are others (pidgin) who indulge in the same
faulty reasoning does not make the reasoning any more sound." ~btrower
> While it's true you can mitigate this behavior, why should it even be
enabled by default? The total lapse in security for such a feature-rich,
robust piece of software is quite disturbing, and I don't understand how the
developers don't think this is an issue.
> I just wanted to gauge the FD community on this issue, because with enough
backing and explanation from the security community as to why this is a
problem, this issue may finally be resolved (it's been doing this for years
now).
> Regards,
> Ryan Sears
>
> _______________________________________________
> Full-Disclosure - We believe in it.
> Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html
> Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/
_______________________________________________
Full-Disclosure - We believe in it.
Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html
Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/