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Kerio Fake 'iphlpapi' DLL injection Vulnerability


From: Matousec - Transparent security Research <research () matousec com>
Date: Mon, 01 Jan 2007 14:05:49 +0100

Hello,

We would like to inform you about a vulnerability Sunbelt Kerio Personal Firewall:

Description:

When Sunbelt Kerio Personal Firewall (SKPF) loads dependant modules, it relies on the operating system. System library 
iphlpapi.dll is located in the system directory but the main SKPF service, which requires and loads this DLL, is 
located 
in the installation directory of SKPF. This is why it tries to find iphlpapi.dll in its installation directory at first 
and then, if it is not found in this directory, it tries to find it in the system directory. Moreover, it is possible 
to 
create new files in the installation directory of SKPF. A malicious application can create a fake iphlpapi.dll in the 
installation directory of SKPF, which will be loaded by the operating system into the SKPF service during its 
initialization. This is how the malicious application is able to execute an arbitrary code inside SKPF service and 
bypass any of its security mechanisms.


Vulnerable software:

     * Sunbelt Kerio Personal Firewall 4.3.268
     * Sunbelt Kerio Personal Firewall 4.3.246
     * probably all versions of Sunbelt Kerio Personal Firewall 4
     * possibly older versions of Sunbelt Kerio Personal Firewall



More details and a proof of concept including its source code are available here:
http://www.matousec.com/info/advisories/Kerio-Fake-iphlpapi-DLL-injection.php


Regards,


-- 
Matousec - Transparent security Research
http://www.matousec.com/

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