RE: [inbox] RE: MS03-039 has been released - critical

["Jade E. Deane" <jade.deane () riven net>]

On a somewhat related note, although a tad off-topic...

I'm curious as to how some of you using IDS are capturing sessions that
don't make it past the first line of defense packet filtering.

I have an IDS on a spanned port of a packet filter, who only allows
established traffic in.  Obviously I'd never see these RPC related
exploits due to the fact I'll only log and capture the first SYN.  Often
thought about the use of netcat or something, but staying WAY away from
a true administrative nightmare of a honeypot.

Would love any advice/suggestions off-list.

Regards,
Jade

On Wed, 2003-09-10 at 18:55, Exibar wrote:
> Sounds good to me, I've already given my IDS guy the details that you've
> posted and he's going to write his IDS rules by them.
>
>   No problem here :-)
>
>   Exibar
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: full-disclosure-admin () lists netsys com
> [mailto:full-disclosure-admin () lists netsys com]On Behalf Of Marc
> Maiffret
> Sent: Wednesday, September 10, 2003 6:26 PM
> To: Peter Kruse; 'Mike Tancsa'; 'Exibar';
> full-disclosure () lists netsys com
> Subject: [inbox] RE: [Full-disclosure] MS03-039 has been released -
> critical
>
>
> Hi,
>
> Just to cut off any stupid debate, that I promise anyone stepping to will
> lose... ;-) Giving details of where a flaw is does not make exploits/worms
> happen any more often. The "bad guys" do not need details in order to write
> exploits and worms. That is apparent when you look at the first RPC flaw and
> how NO details were released yet an exploit and worm were. However, with
> details, we can all audit our networks for the flaws, to know systems we
> need to fix, and setup IDS/IPS systems to monitor for attackers, whereas we
> couldn't without details. Also, we can check to make sure vendors did not
> (yet again) screw up and release a patch that does not truly fix a system.
>
> Signed,
> Marc Maiffret
> Chief Hacking Officer
> eEye Digital Security
> T.949.349.9062
> F.949.349.9538
> http://eEye.com/Retina - Network Security Scanner
> http://eEye.com/Iris - Network Traffic Analyzer
> http://eEye.com/SecureIIS - Stop known and unknown IIS vulnerabilities
>
> | -----Original Message-----
> | From: full-disclosure-admin () lists netsys com
> | [mailto:full-disclosure-admin () lists netsys com]On Behalf Of Peter Kruse
> | Sent: Wednesday, September 10, 2003 2:20 PM
> | To: 'Mike Tancsa'; 'Exibar'; full-disclosure () lists netsys com
> | Subject: SV: [Full-disclosure] MS03-039 has been released - critical
> |
> |
> | Hi,
> |
> | > "The new DoS vulnerability was disclosed by a hacking group
> | > in China on July 25, 2003, and functional exploit code is
> | > already in use on the Internet. "
> |
> | This is well known. However it´s not the BoF exploit.
> |
> | Yet again, the detailed advisory from Eeye makes it fairly easy to write
> | a working exploit. Although I haven´t seen a PoC yet I would expect it
> | to be release shortly. It´s a bit harder to exploit than the previous
> | RPC Dcom weakness but it´s certainly possible.
> |
> | Please note that Eeye has already released an update for Retina Security
> | Scanner and I suppose every script kid, cracker or hacker should be able
> | to sniff to code from Retina going to a remote vulnerable host. You
> | think? CHAM, yeah?
> |
> | I suggest we update RPC - again.
> |
> | Med venlig hilsen // Kind regards
> |
> | Peter Kruse
> | Kruse Security
> | http://www.krusesecurity.dk
> |
> |
> | _______________________________________________
> | Full-Disclosure - We believe in it.
> | Charter: http://lists.netsys.com/full-disclosure-charter.html
> |
>
> _______________________________________________
> Full-Disclosure - We believe in it.
> Charter: http://lists.netsys.com/full-disclosure-charter.html
>
> _______________________________________________
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