Re: Proof of concept for Windows Messenger Service overflow

[Paul Tinsley <pdt () jackhammer org>]

I compiled the PoC DOS with one small change so that it would accept IP 
addresses from the command line instead of recompiling per test.  I ran 
the dos several times per OS, here are the results I got (none of the 
test systems have the KB828035 hotfix applied.)

Windows 2000 Advanced Server SP4:
System Crash: 
http://www.jackhammer.org/exploits/ms03-043/ms03-043_2KASsp4_POC_DOS.jpg

Windows XP Gold:
No effect

Windows XP SP1:
No effect

Windows 2003 Server Enterprise Edition (default config):
No effect

Windows 2003 Server Enterprise Edition (Messenger Service turned on):
No effect

Doesn't look like this one is the silver bullet to catch them all 
(*phew*) but it does bring us a bit closer to this hole turning ugly.

Hanabishi Recca wrote:

> /*
>
> DoS Proof of Concept for MS03-043 - exploitation shouldn't be too hard.
> Launching it one or two times against the target should make the machine
> reboot. Tested against a Win2K SP4.
>
> "The vulnerability results because the Messenger Service does not properly
> validate the length of a message before passing it to the allocated buffer"
> according to MS bulletin. Digging into it a bit more, we find that when a
> character 0x14 in encountered in the 'body' part of the message, it is replaced
> by a CR+LF. The buffer allocated for this operation is twice the size of the
> string, which is the way to go, but
>
> DoS Proof of Concept for MS03-043 - exploitation shouldn't be too hard.
> Launching it one or two times against the target should make the machine
> reboot. Tested against a Win2K SP4.
>
> "The vulnerability results because the Messenger Service does not properly
> validate the length of a message before passing it to the allocated buffer"
> according to MS bulletin. Digging into it a bit more, we find that when a
> character 0x14 in encountered in the 'body' part of the message, it is replaced
> by a CR+LF. The buffer allocated for this operation is twice the size of the
> string, which is the way to go, but is then copied to a buffer which was only
> allocated 11CAh bytes. Thanks to that, we can bypass the length checks and
> overflow the fixed size buffer.
>
> Credits go to LSD :)
>
> */
>  

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