Full Disclosure mailing list archives
Re: msblast DDos counter measures (More Insight Maybe?)
From: Vladimir Parkhaev <vladimir () arobas net>
Date: Fri, 15 Aug 2003 14:27:39 -0400
Quoting Christopher Lyon (cslyon () netsvcs com):
OK, Sorry that I didn't see that before but I see it now. Thanks.
It is allright. I liked the idea of playing with DNS to avoid the DOS myself... Looks like m$ killed windowsupdate.com and there will be no dDOS (booooring:) Here is what Len forwarded to me, it was send to nanog: ----- Forwarded message from "Ingevaldson, Dan (ISS Atlanta)" <dsi () iss net> ----- Delivered-To: nanog-outgoing () trapdoor merit edu Delivered-To: nanog () trapdoor merit edu Delivered-To: nanog () merit edu X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft Exchange V6.0.6249.0 Subject: RE: microsoft.com - what happens when there is no DNS record Date: Fri, 15 Aug 2003 11:14:03 -0400 X-MS-Has-Attach: X-MS-TNEF-Correlator: Thread-Topic: microsoft.com - what happens when there is no DNS record Thread-Index: AcNjOP7QgiIqaiAWTHWs68yAsjZQywAACeZgAAGGo0A= From: "Ingevaldson, Dan (ISS Atlanta)" <dsi () iss net> To: "McBurnett, Jim" <jmcburnett () msmgmt com>, <Patrick_McAllister () WASHGAS COM>, "Robbie Foust" <rfoust () duke edu> Cc: "Bryan Heitman" <bryan () bryanheitman com>, <nanog () merit edu>, <owner-nanog () merit edu>, "Chris Horry" <zerbey () wibble co uk> X-OriginalArrivalTime: 15 Aug 2003 15:14:06.0749 (UTC) FILETIME=[DEBC7CD0:01C3633F] Precedence: bulk Errors-To: owner-nanog-outgoing () merit edu X-Loop: nanog X-MIME-Autoconverted: from quoted-printable to 8bit by netsys.com id h7FFGiQ23485 Our assessment of worm's behavior is below: If windowsupdate.com fails to resolve, it will return a -1, which is not interpreted because this routine has no error checking. The worm then attempts to send its SYN packets to 255.255.255.255, which may have done some interesting things, but it looks like the Windows raw socket implementation won't let that packet out. So basically, nothing happens. There might be some issues with cached DNS, but besides that it looks like the majority of the infections won't be doing much of anything besides eating CPU cycles on the infected hosts. Regards, =============================== Daniel Ingevaldson Engineering Manager, X-Force R&D dsi () iss net 404-236-3160 Internet Security Systems, Inc. The Power to Protect http://www.iss.net =============================== _______________________________________________ Full-Disclosure - We believe in it. Charter: http://lists.netsys.com/full-disclosure-charter.html
Current thread:
- RE: msblast DDos counter measures (More Insight Maybe?) Christopher Lyon (Aug 15)
- RE: msblast DDos counter measures (More Insight Maybe?) B3r3n (Aug 15)
- Re: msblast DDos counter measures (More Insight Maybe?) Vladimir Parkhaev (Aug 15)
- Re: msblast DDos counter measures (More Insight Maybe?) Chris Garrett (Aug 15)
- msblast DDos counter measures - a new worm to fix the problem Daniel Rudolph (Aug 15)
- Re: msblast DDos counter measures - a new worm to fix the problem Paul Schmehl (Aug 15)
- Re: msblast DDos counter measures - a new worm to fix the problem Ron DuFresne (Aug 15)
- msblast DDos counter measures - a new worm to fix the problem Daniel Rudolph (Aug 15)
- RE: msblast DDos counter measures (More Insight Maybe?) B3r3n (Aug 15)
- <Possible follow-ups>
- RE: msblast DDos counter measures (More Insight Maybe?) Christopher Lyon (Aug 15)
- Re: msblast DDos counter measures (More Insight Maybe?) Vladimir Parkhaev (Aug 15)
- RE: msblast DDos counter measures (More Insight Maybe?) Christopher Lyon (Aug 15)
- Re: msblast DDos counter measures (More Insight Maybe?) Vladimir Parkhaev (Aug 15)