Full Disclosure mailing list archives

Re: it\'s all about timing


From: full-disclosure () lists netsys com (full-disclosure () lists netsys com)
Date: Fri, 2 Aug 2002 13:05:01 -0700

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Let me ask you this, who _exactly_ is bound by the END USER LICENSE AGREEMENT?

Why not have the vendor include in it, "if you find a bug in our product, agree to inform us and us only until we 
resolve the issue"

I come to your house and play on your machine. You are the party who installed the software and selected "I agree" when 
you installed that piece of software. Now I find a bug and do with it as I see fit. Is this correct?

I think one of the anti virus companies tried to pull a similar stung in the EULA where by accepting installation you 
were not allowed to write a review of their product without their permission. In New York or New Jersey possibly, the 
States Attorney shot it down in two seconds. Cannot remember the vendor Mckafee or nai or symantec or something.

Any in the scenario above where I use your machine and installed software and find a bug, given there is that condition 
in the EULA to which you, the party who installed the software and agreed to the terms, am I now bound too?

On Fri, 2 Aug 2002 14:07:53 -0400 (EDT), full-disclosure () lists netsys com wrote:
It is interesting that the people screaming loudest for some sort of
order in the submission of bugs, are in fact non-bug hunters at
all. Rather a vocal group academics who intent of have their name on a
draft or ratified document they came up with. Sure some may have
posted a few findings but none are consistently doing so, and the bug
hunters, sure don't sound like they need some else telling them what
to do. You don't hear them crying to for order.

Wonder why that is.

I think it's because there are more "consumers" of vulnerability
information than just other bug hunters, for example, people who want
to remove those bugs from their vulnerable systems.  I would be very
interested in hearing the experience of bug hunters who are also
responsible for the security of large, diverse networks; they may see
this situation from both angles.

The audience for a security advisory includes individuals and
organizations with many different needs for security information.
Having some order to disclosure can make it easier for people to
identify the vulnerabilities that they care about, and to secure their
systems.

The audience includes:

- System administrators, who often need to manage or support dozens of
 products

- Security administrators, who need to research and understand
 hundreds of vulnerabilities across their enterprise, and who may not
 fully understand all the products that have been deployed at their
 enterprise.

- Vulnerability database maintainers, who need to research,
 understand, and/or verify thousands of vulnerabilities.  Since
 databases are relied upon by many people, errors or inconsistencies
 in your own advisories will be multiplied greatly.

 For a list of some of the challenges in vulnerability database
 maintenance, see my post at:
 http://lists.netsys.com/pipermail/full-disclosure/2002-July/000568.html

- Vulnerability researchers, who may have specialized research
 interests that require greater detail (or different types of detail)
 than most of your audience.

- Potential customers, or the consultants that they rely on

- Existing customers who care about security issues but do not
 regularly read advisories


Sysadmins and security admins often have time pressures that may make
it difficult for them to sift through "noisy" vulnerability
information - incomplete, inaccurate, etc.  If an advisory is released
without a vendor patch, the admins then have to keep track of which
bugs are outstanding, and figure out which researchers they can trust
when there is no vendor patch.

One of the roles of vulnerability databases is to sift through the
"noise" and make it easier to access vulnerability information.  But
since it's resource-intensive for experienced vulnerability database
maintainers to manage the noise, it seems reasonable to assume that
admins may have difficulty managing the same information... or at
least figuring out which information is actually correct.  The job is
only going to get harder with the increasing de-centralization of
vulnerability information.

In my experience, the most informative and accurate security
advisories offer a mixture of the details that researchers provide,
along with the correct version, fix and actual cause of the problem,
as is often best known by vendors.

High-quality information may not be needed by everyone, and some
people may not think it's important, but better information means
better security overall.

- Steve
_______________________________________________
Full-Disclosure - We believe in it.
Full-Disclosure () lists netsys com
http://lists.netsys.com/mailman/listinfo/full-disclosure


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