IDS mailing list archives
RE: on NIDS/NIPS tuning
From: "Hazel, Scott A." <Scott.Hazel () unisys com>
Date: Sun, 12 Jun 2005 00:19:54 -0400
This is a fundamental question we've been dealing with as well. By default we tune the IDS. But when the SIM tool is thrown into the mix, the question becomes where to tune. Theoretically, the SIM uses all the data it sees to correlate attacks, attackers, trends in suspicious activity, etc. If you tune what appears to be noise at the IDS, you could potentially be tuning out data the SIM uses to correlate and alert on a higher quality event. Conversely, tuning out known FP's at the IDS should create a higher quality data stream for the SIM to use. Logic points me to opening the IDS and letting the SIM do the work. The SIM would also be where the data was tuned. In the end, it seems you could go either way depending on how you want your alerts served up to you and how much disk you've got to hold all that data in the IDS. Thanks for starting this thread though. Tuning an IDS seems as much an art as a science. I'm glad to see input on how the rest of you handle it. Scott Hazel -----Original Message----- From: Gary Halleen [mailto:ghalleen () cisco com] Sent: Friday, June 10, 2005 4:17 PM To: 'Drew Simonis'; 'Anton A. Chuvakin'; focus-ids () securityfocus com Subject: RE: on NIDS/NIPS tuning I'm seeing many organizations now tuning not on the IDS, but on the SIM product they're using for monitoring them. Gary -----Original Message----- From: Drew Simonis [mailto:simonis () myself com] Sent: Friday, June 10, 2005 6:02 AM To: Anton A. Chuvakin; focus-ids () securityfocus com Subject: Re: on NIDS/NIPS tuning
All, I was thinking about some issues with IDS alerts (their volume, etc) and realized I could use some help from the list. It might also be a fun discussion item. So, here it is: how many folks who buy/download a NIDS/NIPS actually tune it? Long time ago when I was asking this question the previous time, I was scared to learn that lots of people do not tune their NIDSs. Is it any better now?
I know that, in my experience, many orgs don't tune at all. The fear is that they might do it wrong and thereby miss some important event. IMO, this is a stupid way of thinking, but I bet it isn't as rare as it should be. In other cases, people do not tune and rely on a correlation engine or MSS to filter the events. This is better, but really just moves the tuning to a different level. Personally, I tune sigs and also tailor the sig sets to the devices being monitored. For example, if there are no webservers on a segment, I might not be as inclined to use sigs that check for Apache exploits. I've never really measured the impact on the system vs. the administrative cost of doing this, however, so it is quite possible I am wasting time for a negligable benefit. On the tuning side, I believe that filters and exclusions should be part of the incident response lifecycle. If I am alerted to an event by an IDS, I investigate and discover that the event was benign or did not take place, a filter should result, and thus be properly documented. -Ds -- ___________________________________________________________ Sign-up for Ads Free at Mail.com http://promo.mail.com/adsfreejump.htm ------------------------------------------------------------------------ -- Test Your IDS Is your IDS deployed correctly? Find out quickly and easily by testing it with real-world attacks from CORE IMPACT. Go to http://www.securityfocus.com/sponsor/CoreSecurity_focus-ids_040708 to learn more. ------------------------------------------------------------------------ -- ------------------------------------------------------------------------ -- Test Your IDS Is your IDS deployed correctly? Find out quickly and easily by testing it with real-world attacks from CORE IMPACT. Go to http://www.securityfocus.com/sponsor/CoreSecurity_focus-ids_040708 to learn more. ------------------------------------------------------------------------ -- -------------------------------------------------------------------------- Test Your IDS Is your IDS deployed correctly? Find out quickly and easily by testing it with real-world attacks from CORE IMPACT. Go to http://www.securityfocus.com/sponsor/CoreSecurity_focus-ids_040708 to learn more. --------------------------------------------------------------------------
Current thread:
- RE: on NIDS/NIPS tuning, (continued)
- RE: on NIDS/NIPS tuning Darren Webb (Jun 12)
- RE: on NIDS/NIPS tuning Joshua Berry (Jun 09)
- Re: on NIDS/NIPS tuning Jason Falciola (Jun 10)
- Re: on NIDS/NIPS tuning Martin Roesch (Jun 12)
- Re: on NIDS/NIPS tuning Drew Simonis (Jun 10)
- RE: on NIDS/NIPS tuning Gary Halleen (Jun 10)
- Re: on NIDS/NIPS tuning Adam Powers (Jun 12)
- RE: on NIDS/NIPS tuning Gary Halleen (Jun 10)
- RE: on NIDS/NIPS tuning M. Shirk (Jun 10)
- RE: on NIDS/NIPS tuning Phil Hollows (Jun 10)
- Re: on NIDS/NIPS tuning Brent Stackhouse (Jun 12)
- RE: on NIDS/NIPS tuning Hazel, Scott A. (Jun 12)
- RE: on NIDS/NIPS tuning Anton A. Chuvakin (Jun 14)
- RE: on NIDS/NIPS tuning Kohlenberg, Toby (Jun 14)
- RE: on NIDS/NIPS tuning David Kee (Jun 14)
- Re: on NIDS/NIPS tuning Raffael Marty (Jun 15)
- RE: on NIDS/NIPS tuning Anton A. Chuvakin (Jun 16)
- RE: on NIDS/NIPS tuning Kohlenberg, Toby (Jun 16)
- RE: on NIDS/NIPS tuning Gary Halleen (ghalleen) (Jun 16)