IDS mailing list archives
RE: [Bulk] Re: Firewalls (was Re: IDS evaluations procedures)
From: "Biswas, Proneet" <pbiswas () ipolicynetworks com>
Date: Tue, 26 Jul 2005 11:30:45 -0700
I would tend to agree with Bill here. In fact, with the number of implementations of different protocols out there, it would be even tough for defining what is "known good" for an IDS/IPS solution too. For some implemntations, it is not just the implementation but its specific binary running on a particular OS/platform. Example: Apache Server on Linux could be affected by a particular vulnerability which can be exploited whereas on Windows it might be perfectly safe. That is why it is often suggested to approach the issue from the vulnerability("known bad") angle. Identify the vulnerabilities in the software packages being run and how they can be exploited. Check if the IDS/IPS solutions provide the protection from these vulnerabilities. Devdas Bhagat said: " everything which is not known good is bad. Any security policy which attempts to enforce otherwise is broken" The problem is that earlier understandings of "known good" such as "follows the protocol exactly and does not use any unsafe commands in the protocol", which is what a proxy firewall implements are not complete. The "known good" paradigm is not as simple as it appears on the surface. Because of problems in actual implementations of protocols on servers and workstations, there is now the problem that "known good" for Apache web servers may be bad for Windows IIS servers. So there needs to be a finer resolution of "known good" than most proxy firewalls can handle. The technology used to develop IDS has more of that finer resolution than most present firewalls, whether proxy or not. So taking the analysis technology from IDS and adding it to a secondary firewall called an IPS (as well as to application specific firewalls) helps add to the security policy. It would be nice if proxy firewalls were more accurate in identifying "known good" traffic, but the complexity that adds to a choke point would make the firewall a risk in itself. By having separate systems in a layered approach, one can separate the firewall that only passes valid safe protocol traffic but doesn't know about particular flaws in particular implementations from the IPS that protects a particular implementation of that protocol by ensuring only safe traffic for that implementation. That separation of roles can provide better "defence in depth" than either one alone. -----Original Message----- From: Devdas Bhagat [mailto:devdas () dvb homelinux org] Sent: Monday, July 25, 2005 3:31 PM To: focus-ids () securityfocus com Subject: [Bulk] Re: Firewalls (was Re: IDS evaluations procedures) On 22/07/05 14:32 -0700, Swift, David wrote:
Right up front, I'll admit I work for a vendor, but... 1. There are a growing number Intrusion Detection/Intrusion Prevention Systems that have integrated firewall. 2. IPS is a significant step in the right direction, and does things a firewall can't. If you have doubts, try using Firewalker to pinpoint
Only if your "firewall" is a pure packet filter. Why not improve the IPS to disallow all traffic except that which is found to be legitimate. The subset of all traffic which is legitimate is far smaller and deterministic. And then you might as well terminate the connection right there and build a wholly new one which is known to be good. And then market it as a proxy? <snip>
Oh, and by the way while you have the data payload open for
inspection,
why not apply intelligent rules to look for MalWare in the payload?
Then
toss the bad payload packets away with everything else you've already filtered with the firewall rules.
I repeat: everything which is not known good is bad. Any security policy which attempts to enforce otherwise is broken. Oh well, history repeats itself. Devdas Bhagat ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Test Your IDS Is your IDS deployed correctly? Find out quickly and easily by testing it with real-world attacks from CORE IMPACT. Go to http://www.securityfocus.com/sponsor/CoreSecurity_focus-ids_040708 to learn more. ------------------------------------------------------------------------ ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Test Your IDS Is your IDS deployed correctly? Find out quickly and easily by testing it with real-world attacks from CORE IMPACT. Go to http://www.securityfocus.com/sponsor/CoreSecurity_focus-ids_040708 to learn more. ------------------------------------------------------------------------
Current thread:
- RE: [Bulk] Re: Firewalls (was Re: IDS evaluations procedures) Biswas, Proneet (Jul 27)