IDS mailing list archives

Re: Firewall-fooling techniques


From: Richard Bejtlich <taosecurity () gmail com>
Date: Thu, 17 Feb 2005 05:55:58 -0500

On Sun, 13 Feb 2005 00:00:31 +0100, Göran Sandahl <goran () gsandahl net> wrote:
Or, can someone please in short terms
describe what kind of traffic IDSs have problem detecting today.  And how
will the bad guys do it tomorrow?

Hello,

Chapter 18 of my book addresses this subject. [0]  The problem is
broader than running traffic through Fragrouter, and depends on the
attacker's goal. Some techniques are designed to fool an analyst, not
the IDS.  Here is a summary:

- Promote anonymity
 -- Attack from a stepping-stone
 -- Attack using a spoofed source address
 -- Attack from a netblock not owned by the intruder (advertise BGP routes)
 -- Attack from a trusted host
 -- Attack from a familiar netblock
 -- Attack the client, not the server
 -- Use public intermediaries
- Evade detection
 -- Time attacks properly
 -- Distribute attacks through Internet space
 -- Employ encryption
 -- Appear normal
- Degrade or deny collection
 -- Employ decoys
 -- Consider volume attacks
 -- Attack the sensor
 -- Separate analysts from their consoles

Sincerely,

Richard
http://www.taosecurity.com

[0] The Tao of Network Security Monitoring: Beyond Intrusion
Detection, http://www.taosecurity.com/books.html

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