IDS mailing list archives
Re: ssh and ids
From: Martin Roesch <roesch () sourcefire com>
Date: Tue, 22 Jun 2004 18:09:30 -0400
On Jun 22, 2004, at 4:31 PM, Peter_Schawacker () NAI com wrote:
Hi Marty,Since you were kind enough to mention us :-) I thought I would offer twocomments about what you wrote regarding SSL "key escrow" (is it really "key escrow" when the key isn't handed to a third party?) and IDS/IPS. First, remember that storing your web server's private key on an external system is something that's done routinely with SSL accelerators. Hardware SSL accelerators are commonplace these days.
SSL accelerators typically provide algorithmic (cryptographic) acceleration only, they don't have any service ports to get into nor are they performing highly complex stateful analysis of the traffic and simulating an entire network stack. The opportunities are probabilistically higher (significantly!) for something going disastrously wrong in an IDS engine are a lot higher than they are in a hardwired cryptographic MPU. I certainly wouldn't feel comfortable about it, I can't speak for others...
Second, we fully understand that folks are often squeamish about sharingkeys, so great care was taken to protect the private keys on the IntruShield appliance. We believe we have found the best possible strategy for mitigating private key theft risk while eliminating the SSL/NIDS "blind spot". Through the use of public key cryptography, we persist the key in such a way that one would need information that is resident only in the sensor, along with information that is residentonly in the IntruShield Manager in order to recover the key. Having justone or the other will not suffice. I won't bore the list with the details, but our implementation is described here:http://www.nai.com/us/_tier2/products/_media/sniffer/ wp_encr_th_prot.pdf
Looks like the security of the server's private keys is dependent on the attacker never getting access to the unencrypted copy you keep in your sensor's RAM. Can you assure people that that scenario can never happen with 100% certainty? I guess it depends on what people are using SSL for ultimately, if they want truly secure communications or if they just want to have some level of session integrity/privacy/nonrepudiation for whatever purpose.
Should an attacker root your web server, how safe will your private keysbe? If your IDS/IPS can't handle TCP/443 to your production web servers, you have a blind spot where attackers can operate unseen and unhindered. Which is worse, copying your web servers' private keys to your IPS to prevent a web server compromise, or being blind to attacks against those same servers?
How about just using a host-based IPS? Seems to me that a HIPS would give you better coverage in all scenarios against compromise without sharing your secret key off the system. After all, a shared secret isn't really a secret...
Frankly, I can't think of a single IDS/IPS product that is less secure than a typical web server.
Oh man, that's a blanket statement if I ever saw one. How many commercial IDS/IPS systems have been through real 3rd party code audits where the results are available for inspection by 3rd parties? We've done analysis of some 3rd party commercial IPSes here that have been considerably less secure than the a well configured web server. What's the track record of security for a product that's been on the market for ~18 months that costs so much that maybe a thousand units are out in the field?
To quote Schneier's Law: Anyone can come up with a security system so clever that he can't see its flaws. The only way to find the flaws in security is to disclose the system's workings and invite public feedback.
Security is all about trade-offs. This is not a difficult one.
Depends on how serious you are about your crypto. I personally think a HIPS addresses the scenario you outline more appropriately than a NIPS, but that's just me.
You also alluded to the problem of covert channels. I believe that the best protection against covert channels is to stop the attacker before the back door is installed. Failing that, a host based IPS/firewall is the last, strongest line of defense.
Sure, if your deterministic detection engine has been tuned to detect and prevent it. If your engine can't recognize things that it hasn't been told to look for (or worse yet, isn't deployed in a position where it can see the covert channel because it only has visibility into the traffic traversing it) then you're not going to be able to do anything about it. The best defense for covert channels is to be able to recognize and remediate them whether or not they are the result of an attack or of an authorized insider acting contrary to site policy, regardless of how they route their traffic to the internet.
-Marty -- Martin Roesch - Founder/CTO, Sourcefire Inc. - (410)290-1616 Sourcefire: Intelligent Security Monitoring roesch () sourcefire com - http://www.sourcefire.com Snort: Open Source Network IDS - http://www.snort.org --------------------------------------------------------------------------- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Current thread:
- Re: ssh and ids, (continued)
- Re: ssh and ids Adam Powers (Jun 22)
- Re: ssh and ids David W. Goodrum (Jun 22)
- RE: ssh and ids Thierry Evangelista (Jun 23)
- Re: ssh and ids David W. Goodrum (Jun 23)
- Re: ssh and ids Tony Carter (Jun 24)
- RE: ssh and ids KoƧ.net (Jun 22)
- RE: ssh and ids Murtland, Jerry (Jun 22)
- RE: ssh and ids Runion Mark A FGA DOIM WEBMASTER(ctr) (Jun 22)
- RE: ssh and ids Peter_Schawacker (Jun 22)
- now SSL and ids ( was Re: ssh and ids ) Jason (Jun 23)
- Re: ssh and ids Martin Roesch (Jun 25)
- RE: ssh and ids Drew Copley (Jun 22)