Re: Protocol Anomaly Detection IDS - Honeypots

[Lance Spitzner <lance () honeynet org>]

On Wed, 19 Feb 2003, Robert Graham wrote:

> People have been hoping that there is some sort of magic-pill technology that
> solves the problem of IDS. "Protocol-anomaly detection" is one of those
> buzzwords that promises a magic pill.

Okay, I'll admit, to me alot of the security problems I see are nothing
more then nails, and honeypots are the hammer.  However, seriously, have folks
considered the detection capabilities of honeypots?  The reason I bring
this up in this thread, is for honeypots, everything is an anamoly.  The
concept of a honeypot is it has no production or authorized activity.  
Everything it captures its way is most likely malicious activity.  Not
only that, but you dramaticaly reduce 'noise'.  Instead of dealing with
5,000 alerts a day (not that high of a number for many organizations) a 
honeypot in the same environment could only generate 5 or 10 alerts a day, 
alerts you most likely need to take action on.  These small data sets
can make it far easier and cost effective to identify and act on 
unauthorized activity.

I'm in no way suggesting that honeypots replace any existing detection
technologies, I'm suggesting that can contribute.  Personally, I feel
the concept of deception has overshadowed the value of honeypots, when
one of their true values lies in detection.

lance


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