Firewall Wizards mailing list archives

Security policy language


From: Marco Cremonini <cremonini () dti unimi it>
Date: Thu, 1 Feb 2007 20:30:52 +0100

Thank you all for your comments.
However, there is something I'm still missing from what has been said: why are we thinking to a single, complete and comprehensive policy language rather than to more languages used to express the same policy by different people?

I mean, I agree with all of you that the definition of a complete security policy language is almost impossible and probably useless. And absolutely agree with Marcus that at the end the complexity will become overwhelming.

Jean-Denis wrote that "The problem is that the main part of a security policy is not technical but organizationnal, and have to deal with human behavior!", many of you said the same thing and I perfectly agree. For the same reason we always speak different "languages" with different people even when talking about the same issue, and this is what I'm thinking to, let people at different organizational levels express the security policy, for what they are in charge of, in a language that they can understand and we can parse.

For instance, Tina's example "No personal use of Company X e-mail facilities is allowed." is typical enterprise level policy which is actually a fuzzy poorly-defined problem from a technical standpoint but that's the current enterprise language and often the language used by many privacy protection & data management laws and regulations. And such vague statement must still be enforced by someone in some technical way.

We miss a logical mapping between the meaning of "personal use" specified by the enterprise-level policy and all fitering and denials implemented somehow by a security admin to enforce it.

The consequence is that no functional constraint can be automatically produced from the enterprise statement for the low-level security policy (say for instance a content inspection device configuration) and there is no way to automatically (or semi-automatically) check whether the actual security configuration complies with the "personal use" defined by the enterprise policy.

The whole mapping between the enterprise policy and the configuration/ verification is a manual task that a human must do, and we all know that it is perfectly fine when humans are skilled, expert, collaborative etc., but unfortunately this is not the case in most situations.

Couldn't we think to different security policy languages, at different abstraction layers to let people speak their "own" language? From an enterprise policy we could derive logical constraints for the lower level that could be, say, an "administration level" that adds more details about the meaning of "personal use" like, for instance "no picture or multimedia attachment can be exchanged", and so on until the technical security policy that must specify ports, IP addresses or configuration files of security devices.

With a framework that maps policies at different logical levels, a partial automatic definition/verification of the security configuration with respect to the enterprise security policy (perhaps ...) could be done. We avoid fully automated solutions that have already proved to be a wrong path but still we could drive security configurations.

Ok, I know that this is probably (or certainly) completely unrealistic because for real-world policies the complexity is still overwhelming, but, at least in theory, why not thinking to a layered security policy with every layer expressed with a language that people logically in charge of that layer can understand?

Stephen, is this something that resemble somehow to your "think about think about developing a grammar specification"?

marco

===================================
Marco Cremonini
Dept. of Information Technology
University of Milan
cremonini at dti.unimi.it
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