RE: Transitive Trust: 40 million credit cards hack'd

["Richards, Jim" <jim.richards () dot state wi us>]

The problem with that analogy is that the bear will be much more motivated
and persistent when the runner is coated in honey (or credit card
information).

Jim Richards
Computer Security Officer
Wisconsin Department of Transportation

-----Original Message-----
From: Behm, Jeffrey L. [mailto:BehmJL () bvsg com]
Sent: Monday, June 20, 2005 11:26 AM
To: Marcus J. Ranum; David Lang
Cc: Firewal Wizards
Subject: RE: [fw-wiz] Transitive Trust: 40 million credit cards hack'd


On Sunday, June 19, 2005 4:40 PM, Marcus J. Ranum spake:

> David Lang wrote:
> > 2. require authentication that isn't fully contained on the 
> > remote system (i.e. a token or one-time password, a digital
> > certificate with a passphrase is NOT good enough)
> That doesn't work, either. If you assume that the endpoint is insecure
> (and it is, so that's a safe assumption) the 2 factor authentication
works
> only because it's harder to bypass than a password. If everyone was
> using 2 factor authentication, you can bet hacker toolkits would be
> full of nasty rootkits and malware that stole live sessions, or typed
> keystrokes into live sessions once they came up (transparently, of
course)
> mjr. 

True, Marcus, but not everyone _does_ use 2 factor auth. So, at this
point, it can be effective.  You don't gotta outrun the bear, just
the guy next to you.

Jeff
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