Firewall Wizards mailing list archives

Re: Re: Code Red: What security specialist don't mention in warnings(Frank Knobbe)


From: "daN." <dan () evilhippo com>
Date: Thu, 09 Aug 2001 23:37:36 -0700

Sigh...Even an application proxy cannot stop a cleverly designed trojan from tunneling out..what if it uses valid DNS queries as the tunnel? You can, block them and the relay them along, and then relay back an encoded DNS reply..there is absolutely no way of stopping this, and you can do similar over any valid services, application proxies can only take things so far..and there are many many many servers which crash upon receiving messages completely legal by the protocol.

daN.

At 11:49 AM 8/6/01 -0400, Joseph Steinberg wrote:

I agree wholeheartedly that we do need to come up with a better way of
addressing these issues than patching every specific vulnerability. Our
e-Gap systems do this with positive logic -- i.e., enforcing that
web-servers/applications only receive requests in formats that the
web-servers/apps expect. So, worm attacks, hacker attacks, etc. (which are
generally based on unexpected submissions) fail -- regardless of whether the
particular hack is known to our product or not. I am curious how others deal
with this.

Tunneling -> There are ways to mitigate against tunneling threats. I know
that our products address tunneling by eliminating TCP/IP connectivity and
TCP/IP headers, there may be other that do so as well. We also distinguish
between types of attacks, and I am certain others do as well.

BTW: Even a firewall with a strong application proxy will likely not solve
this unless it uses positive logic. There will always be new vulnerabilities
to keep up with.

Joseph

>Security is not a binary value, yes or no, but a spectrum.  The more
>secure you make the system the fewer worms and script kiddies get
>through.  In this case, Code Red would have been contained (and probably
>was on many well maintained systems).  Are there still holes?  Sure.

>There is no protection at this moment from tunneling.

>Also, a well formed DDOS attack is indestinguishable from the "Slashdot
>Effect."  So there is no defence from that one.

>But that doesn't mean that we just give up, go home and play with our
>Commodore 64's.

>So I must agree that patching is not the only issue here.  I cannot
>clean up the web, but I appreciate the helpfull ideas to help protect my
>site.
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