Educause Security Discussion mailing list archives
Re: IPv6 and DHCP and ICMP
From: randy marchany <marchany () VT EDU>
Date: Wed, 23 May 2012 22:31:12 -0400
One of the "prime directives" in any security strategy is asking a) what is the purpose of a particular security control b) how effective is the control? Which brings me to ICMP blocking? I believe it's totally ineffective for the reasons below. What is the purpose of ICMP blocking? To keep someone from mapping your network? Do you think someone can't map your net if ICMP is blocked? Do you have wireless nets? Yes? Then your network is mapped. Do you have web servers? Yes? Then your net can be mapped. Do you have stateless firewalls at the border? Yes? Your net can be mapped by inverse mapping. Do you prevent "outbound" connections? Yes? then why not disconnect from the Internet :-)? No? your net has been mapped. IMHO, blocking ICMP v4 or v6 accomplished nothing from a security perspective. There are far more effective strategies to accomplish the same goals. Our preliminary work with v6 (and by extension v4) is shows you can't hide a machine on the net if there's wireless connectivity. So why bother? Accept the fact that a machine can be identified on the net and change your focus to protecting the data on a machine rather than the machine itself. So to answer the 2 initial questions I raised at the beginning of the post: 1. What is the purpose of ICMP blocking? To keep someone from mapping your net. 2. How effective is the control? Not effective at all because there are multiple ways to map a network and we cannot block all of them without interfering with the "business" purpose of your organization. My personal opinion is that I don't care what comes into my net. I care about what "leaves" my net. Protect the data. -r. On Wed, May 23, 2012 at 8:10 PM, Michael Sinatra < michael () rancid berkeley edu> wrote:
On 05/23/2012 14:22, John Ladwig wrote:ICMPv4 should **never** have been “completely eliminated” from public network (interacting with local network), but there’s only a small set of messages that **need** to pass an Internet/local policy boundary. Limited, yes, but I’ve seen way to many blanket drop policies that I’m a little touchy on the subject. There’s a slightly larger set of required ICMPv6 messages that must cross an Internet/local policy boundary to enable, for example, path-MTU discovery. Our current proposals, LAN and WAN testbed configurations follow RFC 4890 ICMPv6 recommendations for firewall transit “must not be dropped” and “normally should not be dropped” pretty closely, although we’re not currently testing mobile IPv6, and haven’t decided whether to support it in the near term.+1 on RFC 4890--it's a really good resource both for firewalls and router ACLs. Keep in mind that blocking all ICMPv6 means blocking all IPv6. You simply won't have connectivity if you block ND, for example. michael
Current thread:
- Re: IPv6 and DHCP and ICMP Manjak, Martin (May 23)
- Re: IPv6 and DHCP and ICMP Morrow Long (May 23)
- Re: IPv6 and DHCP and ICMP John Ladwig (May 23)
- Re: IPv6 and DHCP and ICMP Michael Sinatra (May 23)
- Re: IPv6 and DHCP and ICMP randy marchany (May 23)
- Re: IPv6 and DHCP and ICMP John Ladwig (May 24)
- Re: IPv6 and DHCP and ICMP Everett, Alex D (May 24)
- Re: IPv6 and DHCP and ICMP John Ladwig (May 24)
- Re: IPv6 and DHCP and ICMP Michael Sinatra (May 23)