BreachExchange mailing list archives

10 lessons learned from major retailers' cyber breaches


From: Audrey McNeil <audrey () riskbasedsecurity com>
Date: Wed, 24 Sep 2014 21:06:33 -0600

http://www.propertycasualty360.com/2014/09/23/10-lessons-learned-from-major-retailers-cyber-brea


There has been extensive adverse publicity surrounding what has become the
largest data breach in the retail industry, affecting Target and two other
U.S. retailers. In November-December 2013, cyber thieves executed a
well-planned intrusion into Target’s computer network and the point-of-sale
terminals at its 1,800 stores around the holiday season and successfully
obtained not only 40 million customers’ credit and debit card information,
but also non-card customer personal data for as many as 70 million
customers. In addition, 1.1 million payment cards from Neiman Marcus and 3
million cards used at Michaels were reportedly exposed.

The respected Ponemon Institute announced this June it believes that
hackers have exposed the personal information of 110 million
Americans—roughly half of the nation’s adults—in the last 12 months alone,
and this number reflects the impact of major retailer breaches and others
in different governmental or business sectors, but does not include hacks
revealed in July-August 2014.

As we speak, there are new s reports about the discovery of large
quantities of personal information (including user names and passwords)
mined from many websites by a Russian-based hacker group and new malware
threats focused at retailers. According to a report released by the U.S.
Department of Homeland Security, technology that is widely used to allow
employees to work from home or permit IT and administrative personnel to
remotely maintain systems is being exploited by hackers to deploy
point-of-sale (PoS) malware that is designed to steal credit card data.
This threat is being called “Backoff Malware.

Homeland Security estimates it has been around since October 2013 with a
very low antivirus detection rate at the time it was discovered, meaning
that even systems with fully updated and patched antivirus software would
not be able to identify Backoff as malicious malware.

Snapshot of Target

Target announced at the end of February 2014 that the company’s profit fell
by 40% in the fourth quarter of 2013. The company reported $61 million
pretax expenses related to the breach, but expected $44 million in cyber
insurance payments against this figure. These expenses were incurred for
legal costs, breach notification, forensics, and PR/crisis management to
date. However, the worst financial costs are yet to come. A senior Gartner
analyst estimated that the total exposure to Target could be $450–$500M,
which considers lawsuits, regulatory investigations, breach response, fines
and assessments, loss of revenue and security upgrades.

Both the cyber insurance and directors & officers insurance programs at
Target are involved, since Target announced significant revenue/profit
shortfalls caused by brand damage/customer fallout and costs to improve IT
security. At least two derivative shareholder actions have been filed,
which have triggered Target’s D&O insurance.

More than 100 lawsuits are pending against Target at this time, with many
consumer class actions and some actions filed by individual financial
institutions, claiming for costs of cancelling and reissuing compromised
cards, absorbing fraudulent charges made on the cards, and the loss of
anticipated fee income from the holiday season. There has been activity to
consolidate these lawsuits into three groups of plaintiffs to facilitate
the legal process.

Allegations surround Target giving network access to a third-party vendor,
a small HVAC company with weak security, which allowed the attackers to
gain a foothold on Target’s network. From that point of entry, the
attackers allegedly moved to the most sensitive areas of Target’s network
storing customer information. Malware installed at POS terminals utilized
so-called “RAM scraping,” and the attack apparently proceeded despite
apparent warning signals.

Target staff had urged the company to review the security of its payment
system months prior to the breach, according to *American Banker *and* Wall
Street Journal* reports. Some financial institution plaintiffs are alleging
that as early as 2007, Target was warned by a data security expert about
the possibility of a data breach in its point-of-sale system. Banks claim
that a layered security system would have made the hackers’ task more
challenging—Brian Krebs, a noted security analyst, describes a “POS kill
chain” for more effective layered security posture.

Despite Target having obtained a certification based on the credit card
association data security standards (called PCI DSS), the cyber thieves
implanted malware on POS terminals and successfully removed massive amounts
of sensitive customer information/card information to a server in Eastern
Europe. The cyber thieves were able to sell information from these cards
via online black-market forums so that later others could use these
compromised cards to purchase high-dollar items or extract money from an
ATM.

Target executives have appeared at U.S. Congressional hearings and have
repeatedly been the subject of adverse media attention, which further
compounds financial and brand damage. Target’s chief information officer
and chief executive officer have resigned.

Major insurers and Lloyd’s underwriters are involved in the cyber and
directors and officers programs of Target and other retailers.

Underwriters’ View

The lessons learned from these events by underwriters reflect themselves in
selection, retention, and limits offered. So what are these lessons?

Underwriters understand that there is an underlying security vulnerability
of magnetic swipe cards (common in the U.S.) vs. Europe’s adoption of EMV
“smart” chip-and-PIN payment cards. Underwriters are responding favorably
to a company with major credit card/POS exposure who embarks on
tokenization in North America.

Hacks are getting more sophisticated, with teams of hackers in multiple
countries. Offensive hacking weapons are numerous and cheap, and hackers
have learned to quietly roam inside corporate networks for a significant
length of time before a pattern of consumer fraud emerges. Underwriters
want to understand how the retailer knows its system has not already been
compromised.

Writing both cyber and directors & officers liability can lead to
unacceptable aggregation exposure. Additionally, multiple companies in the
U.S., Bermuda, and Europe, of the same insurer, can be writing lines on the
same insured. AIG, for example, has a centralized approval for
U.S.-domiciled business through its underwriting management team based at
its New York headquarters.

Insurers wrote layers of major retailers at minimum premiums that now look
thin, to say the least. Some insurers are no longer writing new major
retailers or do not want to be at the thin top of the program. CNA, Axis,
and XL are examples of insurers taking such actions.

PCI DSS standards (required by credit card associations) do not guarantee
immunity from the ever-evolving tactics used by the global criminal
community to exploit data and systems. The complexity of questions being
asked about credit card security and POS is at much greater depth, and PCI
DSS compliance is viewed as a minimum—underwriters want to know what areas
of security are even better than the PCI DSS standards.

The retail industry lacks threat intelligence, unlike the major financial
institutions that have had a long-established ISAC and interactions with
senior law enforcement agencies. Recently, an ISAC was formed for the
retail industry. Underwriters want to know the extent of threat
intelligence available to a retailer to build on its internal IS knowledge.

Static defense models (e.g., antivirus and intrusion detection) upon which
many companies rely, are not sufficient to prevent a systemic data breach
or “advanced persistent threats. The “kill chain” concept is part of the
more knowledgeable underwriter’s vocabulary.

Outsourcing provides process efficiencies and expense reduction, but it
does not reduce security risk, particularly in the age of ever-evolving
technology, the shift to IT/software/communications as a service (including
cloud), and multiplicity of access points to vendors (such as Target’s HVAC
contractor). For example, vendors may store multiple clients’ sensitive
data in a single database—that has happened in a breach involving a major
e-mail marketing/customer loyalty program vendor. Underwriters want to
understand vendor risk management, which is comprised of due diligence,
contractual provisions including a strong indemnity, and cyber insurance
requirements. Is such sensitive customer data encrypted and held in
separated databases when stored by vendors? With regard to credit cards and
third party providers, merchants need to implement policies and procedures
in line with PCI DSS Requirement 12.8, which is part of the updated PCI DSS
3.0 security standards issued late last year. Recently the PCI governing
body issued new guidance to merchants to help them fulfil this requirement,
focusing on due diligence, risk assessment, contractual requirements, and
monitoring PCI compliance. Demonstration of compliance in this area is a
significant concern in the underwriting process.

Better underwriters want to be aggressive on quality risks but are becoming
more selective and considering the use of increased retentions, limits
containment, and, in some cases, pricing changes. We have successfully
navigated these waters with our major retailers through a much more
thorough underwriting briefing presentation, in which we assist and
rehearse with our client’s presenters.

A note on privacy is needed here—some major markets have cut back on
privacy coverage, particularly on criminal eavesdropping (critical for a
call center exposure), violation of TCPA and other consumer protection
laws, wrongful collection, and aggressive marketing practices. Law and
regulation is constantly evolving with new and greater exposure. The E.U.
is talking about the “right to be forgotten.” We have focused on this area
and have been alerting our clients to privacy risk vs. privacy coverage and
negotiating much better terms than basic forms allow.

Peer Group View

Our major clients are asking this essential question post-Target at their
shop: “How bad can a bad day be?”

Since the Target breach, major retailers generally want higher towers if
they purchased less than $50M. The average limit is $50M now, but there are
retailers at $100–$125M. Prior to the Target breach, the average limit was
$25M.

Post-Target, we have seen some retailers ask underwriters for a higher
retention quote in order to shift funding to severity (i.e., higher tower),
but there is no equal swap for retention to fully fund another $10M on the
tower. For $1B plus revenue retailers, retentions start at $1M and
typically range to $2.5M—certainly $5M would be on the top end. It is
critical from our broker perspective to find the right balance between
premium and risk.

Our clients are asking to have best market wordings for their security and
privacy exposures, and we are constantly evolving our coverage requests
with insurers. We deliver underwriting specifications as part of the
submission, rather than just forwarding underwriting data. An example of an
innovation from Lockton is including nonreimbursable defense coverage for
TCPA to at least $1M. We are able to achieve better results because we
recognize the underwriters’ concern for better information, and we are
known for providing a strong underwriting briefing for all underwriters to
listen to and ask questions.

Our clients are concerned about the whole data breach response and
coordination with underwriters. A breach can cause not only major financial
loss, but also significant damage to brand and reputation if handled badly.
We have developed a coordinated approach with clients so that all major
aspects of breach response are built into the program they purchase,
including preapproved forensics and external legal counsel. The response
must consider possible jurisdictions and venues of the affected individuals
who could be in multiple states, provinces, and countries.

At Lockton, we attract and retain the best talent to ensure that our
clients have access to a team with an enviable spectrum of skills. This is
particularly evident within our Global Technology and Privacy Practice
(“GTPP”), where we have drawn together experienced individuals from legal,
broking, and underwriting backgrounds in the U.S. and in London. We design
cyber insurance programs for first and third-party exposures and the
client’s desired approach for data breach contingency response.
_______________________________________________
Dataloss Mailing List (dataloss () datalossdb org)
Archived at http://seclists.org/dataloss/
Unsubscribe at http://lists.osvdb.org/mailman/listinfo/dataloss
For inquiries regarding use or licensing of data, e-mail
        sales () riskbasedsecurity com 

Supporters:

Risk Based Security (http://www.riskbasedsecurity.com/)
YourCISO is an affordable SaaS solution that provides a comprehensive information security program that ensures focus 
on the right security.  If you need security help or want to provide real risk reduction for your clients contact us!

Current thread: