Re: MD5 Considered Harmful Today: Creating a rogue CA certificate

["Thomas Ptacek" <tqbf () matasano com>]

So now that the details are (mostly) out, can you tell us who did
what? Jeremy and I have think the RapidSSL serial number was you.

On Tue, Dec 30, 2008 at 10:52 AM, Alexander Sotirov <alex () sotirov net> wrote:
> Our research team, consisting of 7 researchers from the United States,
> Switzerland and the Netherlands, was able to execute a practical MD5 collision
> attack and create a rogue Certification Authority trusted by all common web
> browsers. This allows us to perform transparent man-in-the-middle attacks
> against SSL connections and monitor or tamper with the traffic to secure
> websites or email servers.
>
> The infrastructure of Certification Authorities is meant to prevent exactly
> this type of attack. Our work shows that known weaknesses in the MD5 hash
> function can be exploited in realistic attack, due to the fact that even after
> years of warnings about the lack of security of MD5, some root CAs are still
> using this broken hash function.
>
> More details:
> http://www.phreedom.org/research/rogue-ca/
>
> Enjoy!
>
> Alex
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Thomas H. Ptacek // matasano security
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