Re: The sky's downward trajectory

[jf <jf () danglingpointers net>]

As I understood it, they are only randomized once at boot time with 4 bits
of entropy, and it's currently opt-in for most applications (including
IE), but opt-out for system DLLs. I tend to agree that only randomizing
once may be an issue, but no one seems to agree with me.

On Mon, 19 Feb 2007, endrazine wrote:

> Date: Mon, 19 Feb 2007 19:27:33 +0100
> From: endrazine <endrazine () gmail com>
> To: Rhys Kidd <rhyskidd () gmail com>
> Cc: dailydave () lists immunitysec com
> Subject: Re: [Dailydave] The sky's downward trajectory
>
> Hi dear readers,
>
> Rhys Kidd a écrit :
> > So what does Microsoft provide to make this more secure?
> >
> > Firstly the push by Michael Howard et al to get ASLR implemented in
> > Vista beta 2 and above means the addresses within ntdll.dll are going
> > to be somewhat random, thereby making reliable use of this technique
> > difficult. NX bit based defenses really should be implemented
> > hand-in-hand with some form of memory randomisation, as was documented
> > by the PaX project.
> Put me in my place if I'm wrong, but adresses are only randomized once
> at boot up, making the Vista randomization far less effective than a run
> time randomization a la PaX. Well, at least, thats what I understood
> from the Microsoft TechDays in Paris 2 weeks ago.
> > Secondly, as Dave mentioned setting "AlwaysOn" in boot.ini should
> > prevent DEP from being disabled on a per-process basis.
> >
> > HTH.
> > Rhys
>
> Regards,
>
> endrazine-
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