Dailydave mailing list archives

RE: We got owned by the Chinese and didn't even get a "lessons learned"


From: "Ferguson, Justin (IARC)" <FergusonJ () nv doe gov>
Date: Wed, 24 May 2006 10:20:12 -0700

I'd be interested in hearing dialogue on detecting covert channels in things
like HTTP/S, DNS, SMTP where all of the traffic is completely valid use of
the application layer protocols that have been assigned secondary definition
to both ends.

Best Regards,

Justin Ferguson
Reverse Engineer
NNSA IARC
702.942.2539

"It is a capital mistake to theorize before one has data. Insensibly one
begins to twist facts to suit theories, instead of theories to suit facts."
-- Sir Arthur Conan Doyle

-----Original Message-----
From: Dave Aitel [mailto:dave () immunityinc com] 
Sent: Wednesday, May 24, 2006 9:14 AM
To: s.wilson () eris qinetiq com
Cc: dailydave () lists immunitysec com
Subject: Re: [Dailydave] We got owned by the Chinese and 
didn't even get a "lessons learned"


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Steve Wilson wrote:
</delurk>

A large government organisation with no egress firewalling 
policy? No
restrictive and monitored outbound proxies? What sort of a 
perimeter is 
that[1]? 


It's most non-classified networks that allow http, https or 
dns access.
You can tunnel effectively through any of them. You could even tunnel
through SMTP if you were ballsy enough. Everyone's been doing 
this since
1992AD, and I assume that if anyone puts an anomaly detection
application firewall in place on HTTP and HTTPS, there'll be 
some public
research into covert channels. Maybe Joanna will release something to
explain how egress filtering without an air gap is just amusing.

Protecting networks against worms is a valuable thing. But it's not
security, and I think events like this are a wake up call 
to what the
technology you've deployed actually can do.

OK, I'm a pedant - so I can't let that slip by. If 
protecting networks against 
worms (or even deliberate targetted attacks) isn 't 
security, what is it? ;-p


I guess the whole point is that nothing you can deploy right now
actually protects you from targeted attacks. They just handle worms.
Worms are essentially a bandwidth problem. :>

- -dave

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