Re: /proc filesystem allows bypassing directory permissions on Linux

[Pavel Machek <pavel () ucw cz>]

On Thu 2009-10-29 18:24:01, Dan Yefimov wrote:
> On 29.10.2009 0:27, Pavel Machek wrote:
> > > > That race is easily fixed.
> > >
> > > No, you're not right.
> > >
> > > > After chmodding the directory to 0700, *first*
> > > > check the link count, *then* chmod the file to 0666:
> > > >
> > > >      User1 creates file with permissions 0644
> > > >                      User2 opens file for read access on file descriptor 4
> > > >      User1 chmod's directory to 0700
> > > >      User1 verifies no hard links to file
> > >
> > > Here's a window, during which User2 is able to create a hardlink and
> > > that will remain unnoticed by User1. There's no way to perform link
> > > check and conditionally do chmod in an atomic manner.
> >
> > 0700 on directory prevents hardlink creation, see?
> Do you still remember about openat()? If the directory was created with 

No, you said you can do hardlink, and you can't. Try
it. openat(O_SEARCH) does not seem to exist.  

> 0700 mode from the origin, you would be right, and procfs wouldn't
> allow 
> opening files in that directory too, but if you let others to traverse 
> that directory and open your believed to be secure files from the origin, 
> it's your fault.

I can do the example with fd passing and 700 directory, but it would
be lot of C code. Feel free to play, my example was not nearly the
only way to demonstrate it, and no, it was not racy.
                                                                        Pavel
-- 
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