Bugtraq mailing list archives
Re: Diebold Global Election Management System (GEMS) Backdoor Account Allows Authenticated Users to Modify Votes
From: Tracy Bost <tbost () appraisalforum com>
Date: Tue, 28 Sep 2004 10:41:09 -0500
I've been following this thread and bit and can't hold back my 2 cents .Running voting machines on OSS software seems obvious its the only way to do it correctly, since its true noone trusts each other.
Each polictical party can have their own team of hired geeks to make sure the code stays clean and fair.
Otherwise, it become a finger pointing and guessing game. Mike Healan wrote:
And I'd strongly discourage folks from calling for open source, as it playsdirectly into the hands of folks like Diebold, who claim that the people (like me) who want Voter Verified Paper Audit Trails (VVPATs) are reallytrying to kill free enterprise.I understand your point but I disagree with it entirely.Yes, I'm sure they'll grasp at any FUD they can to head off what they do not want. IMHO that shouldn't stop the call for open source software (OSS) to run those voting machines. Killing off free enterprise is clearly not the reason why people want OSS as, as you say, it is a different issue entirely.Australia's voting machines are electronic and the software running them is OSS. They don't seem to be having any problems with it. It must be nice to be able to fully trust that the vote just cast was recorded properly. That's a feeling I don't have here at home.Personally, I want a voting machine running code that any suspicious geek can double (triple, quadruple, etc) check and that verifies to me, on paper, that it recorded exactly which votes I cast. Considering that the future of the world's only global superpower depends on the outcome, I don't think that's too much to ask.Points 2 and 3 I'll agree with.(4) WRT getting one set of software approved, and then installing another...that's an old problem in any environment.If I recall correctly, this is exactly what Diebold has been accused of doing in at least two states (Georgia, which concerns me directly, and California), has been sued for it and has even had their software decertified for it.Maybe OSS should be used and maybe it shouldn't. Given Diebold's record to date, I believe they should be barred from making *any* of these machines. I don't trust them and I sincerely hope I don't see their name stamped on the voting machine I use in 5 weeks.Regards, Mike Healan Editor www.spywareinfo.com Jeremy Epstein wrote:As someone who's been involved in the electronic voting controversy, I'd like to add a few points: (1) I agree that source code should be inspected by someone truly independent and competent, and that the standards for approving votingmachines should be stronger. However, that's NOT the same as open source. And I'd strongly discourage folks from calling for open source, as it playsdirectly into the hands of folks like Diebold, who claim that the people (like me) who want Voter Verified Paper Audit Trails (VVPATs) are reallytrying to kill free enterprise. [Yes, I know all the examples of businesses based on open source, but that's not what this is about.] As an example,Harris Miller, the president of ITAA (www.itaa.org), a politicallyinfluential consortium of technology vendors, is on record as having equatedthe VVPAT groups with the open source community. So rather than putting your energy into trying to get Diebold et al to move to open source, itwould be far more productive to put your energy into VVPATs. Towards thatend, I'll encourage everyone participating in this discussion to look at www.verifiedvoting.org. VVPATs can give us the assurance we need ofaccurate elections, without delving into the political morass of open sourceand related topics.(2) WRT the web page showing a "Sun server when discussing Windows", I hope people realize that web pages for companies are made up by marketing people who don't understand the difference. Don't hold that against them... Thereare plenty of real reasons to oppose Diebold. (3) WRT requiring that the technology protect itself in case the usersdon't, that's simply unrealistic. In *any* real computer system, there are expectations about the environment (e.g., the administrators aren't hostileto the functioning of the system). It's important to state what thoseexpectations are, but there will ALWAYS be some that rely on non-technical means. The important part about election systems is that they be explicitly stated, and they be enforceable using non-technical means (e.g., by having locks on doors). The problem today is that some of the assumptions (e.g., the vendor provided software doesn't have any bugs) are clearly unrealistic.(4) WRT getting one set of software approved, and then installing another... that's an old problem in any environment. The way it's supposed to work in election systems is that a particular version is approved, and it's illegal for the vendor to install something different. If there are teeth in the law, and the vendor can be fined for installing illegal software, then it's a reasonable non-technical measure. Of course, one could also use thingslike cryptographic checksums to verify that what's installed is what was approved. That still requires non-technical elements, such as that the people who ran the checksums weren't deliberately trying to cover up a change, the checksums were protected from tampering, the software thatcalculated the checksums wasn't subverted, etc. [For those of us old enough to remember, vendors were required to address this as part of "Orange Book" evaluations, and are now required to address it as part of Common Criteriaevaluations.] Bottom line, election systems are no different than any other systems inthat the security of the whole system is based on risk management. While we should have higher expectations of election software than office automation software, let's recognize what it is. IMHO, VVPATs are the only real way togo. --Jeremy
Current thread:
- RE: Diebold Global Election Management System (GEMS) Backdoor Account Allows Authenticated Users to Modify Votes Jeremy Epstein (Sep 25)
- Re: Diebold Global Election Management System (GEMS) Backdoor Account Allows Authenticated Users to Modify Votes Mike Healan (Sep 27)
- Re: Diebold Global Election Management System (GEMS) Backdoor Account Allows Authenticated Users to Modify Votes Tracy Bost (Sep 28)
- Re: Diebold Global Election Management System (GEMS) Backdoor Account Allows Authenticated Users to Modify Votes Coleman (Sep 28)
- RE: Diebold Global Election Management System (GEMS) Backdoor Account Allows Authenticated Users to Modify Votes Yoav Nir (Sep 27)
- RE: Diebold Global Election Management System (GEMS) Backdoor Paul Wouters (Sep 27)
- Re: Diebold Global Election Management System (GEMS) Backdoor Crispin Cowan (Sep 28)
- Re: Diebold Global Election Management System (GEMS) Backdoor Adam Shostack (Sep 29)
- RE: Diebold Global Election Management System (GEMS) Backdoor Account Allows Authenticated Users to Modify Votes Greg A. Woods (Sep 27)
- Re: Diebold Global Election Management System (GEMS) Backdoor Account Allows Authenticated Users to Modify Votes Mike Healan (Sep 27)