Re: CVS woes: .cvspass

[Tilman Schmidt <Tilman.Schmidt () ePost de>]

Greg A. Woods schrieb in <bugtraq () SecurityFocus com>:
> [ On Thursday, August 5, 2004 at 12:52:10 (+0300), Delian Krustev wrote: ]
>
> > There's a site outhere. It's sf.net . They demonstrate, with the number
> > of projects being hosted there (with pserver access), You're not right
> > again.

> In the scenario you speak of sf.net has no real requirement for
> accountability -- their offerning using CVSpserver is effectively the
> same as providing anonymous access.  Sf.net doesn't care who the real
> humans are in this case -- they simply do their best (which isn't always
> perfect) to keep whole projects from interfering with each other.

In fact, you are even more right than you seem to think. Sf.net's
pserver access is actually anonymous and read-only. Project data in
the SF repository is considered public, and open to anonymous read
access anyway. Their pserver access doesn't add anything to that.

> Meanwhile, IIUC, sf.net does also offer secure SSH access to systems
> hosting CVS repositories and they use true system identities for eash
> SSH account, and presumably with this offering there's normally one (or
> maybe more) unique system accounts for every real human using this

That is so, and SSH access, with a system identity that is a member
of the project's development team, is required for committing changes
to a project repository.

> service, though of course the responsibility of verifying the uniqueness
> of system identities will be on the shoulders of the CVS project admins,
> and perhaps not on sf.net themselves.

Indeed. The registration form asks you to enter a real name, and
a valid E-mail address which is verified by a confirmation E-mail,
but there is no verification beyond that.

-- 
Tilman Schmidt                       E-Mail: Tilman.Schmidt () ePost de
Bonn, Germany
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