Bugtraq mailing list archives
Re: Apache 1.3.27 mod_proxy security issue
From: "William A. Rowe, Jr." <wrowe () apache org>
Date: Tue, 29 Jul 2003 15:36:40 -0500
At 04:34 AM 7/29/2003, Michael Shigorin wrote:
On Tue, Jul 22, 2003 at 05:30:39PM -0500, William A. Rowe, Jr. wrote:As described in the default configuration, open proxies are never recommended [from Apache 1.3.27 conf/httpd.conf-dist];[skip]# Allow from .your-domain.comIs it reasonable to use something intentionally broken like .your_domain.com (not even example.*) in configuration samples like this one?
No, it's not. We recently attempted to standardize the occurrences of 'invalid' domain names to the accepted 'example.*' faux domains. The stock configurations in the next releases of Apache Web Server have corrected the few that were missed, including the example above. On the other side of this issue, it's not unreasonable to use a class of addresses that doesn't exist, for the purposes of prohibiting all access until the user takes the time to properly update their conf, IMHO. At 12:31 PM 7/23/2003, Greg A. Woods wrote:
I don't know how clients are matched against domains in ACL statements such as the above in Apache, but I will note that it is NEVER safe to rely on the Reverse DNS alone to implement ACLs that affect the ability of a random remote client system.
On this point, too, it would be valuable to provide an example subnet as a preferable alternative to reverse DNS queries. That change has not been made yet - but is referred to our documentation project. Bill
Current thread:
- Re: Apache 1.3.27 mod_proxy security issue Michael Shigorin (Jul 30)
- Re: Apache 1.3.27 mod_proxy security issue William A. Rowe, Jr. (Jul 30)
- Re: Apache 1.3.27 mod_proxy security issue Joshua Slive (Jul 30)
- Re: Apache 1.3.27 mod_proxy security issue William A. Rowe, Jr. (Jul 30)