Bugtraq mailing list archives
Re: Statistical Attack Against Virtual Banks
From: andre () CS UCSB EDU (Andre L. Dos Santos)
Date: Tue, 8 Feb 2000 23:38:05 -0800
On Wed, 9 Feb 2000, HC Security wrote:
(...) Therefore, it is a wide spread practice to use 4 or 6 digit PINs. Because of the small length of the PINs an attacker can target a particular account and try all possibilities. In order to defend against this class of attacks, banks usually lock out accounts after a certain number of unsuccessful identification attempts.I don't know what is the case in California, but I don't think I can emphasise heavily enough how immensely stupid it is to rely _solely_ on a 4 (or 6) digit PIN for full access to the bank account. How come, when there are so many other easy-to-implement solutions which are way better when it comes to security? To use the same code day after day on the same website...... that statistical attack is perhaps not the worst, what if someone snooped your traffic or logged on to your win98 computer and simply retrieved your PIN?
How are you going to snoop a PIN code that is not stored localy and is transmitted using SSL or a java applet using encryption? Anyway, if I have access to a win98 computer I can do many nasty things...
Here in Norway I don't know of _any_ "virtual bank" which doesn't _at least_ use one-time passwords, or so-called digipasses (the user types his PIN on an small, personal calculator-type device which returns a 6 digit code to use for authentication in the virtual bank - this code expires after 15 min or so).
I don't see why this is better than a PIN, unless it is a separated device (with the overhead of the user having to carry this token). In addition, if I know how the device generates the code from the PIN, this only represents an extra step in the attack.
Some banks use alphanumeric characters for authentication. An attacker can use dictionary words, instead of numbers, in this case to attack these banks.Mensch! -- Regards, Snorre Haugnes HC Security
Cheers, Andre.
Current thread:
- rp_filter? (was Re: DDOS Attack Mitigation), (continued)
- rp_filter? (was Re: DDOS Attack Mitigation) Julien Nadeau (Feb 18)
- Re: DDOS Attack Mitigation Homer Wilson Smith (Feb 14)
- Re: DDOS Attack Mitigation Andrzej Bialecki (Feb 14)
- Re: DDOS Attack Mitigation Darren Reed (Feb 14)
- "Association of Responsible Internet Providers"? David Nesting (Feb 15)
- Re: DDOS Attack Mitigation Andreas Busse (Feb 15)
- Re: Evil Cookies. Ari Gordon-Schlosberg (Feb 08)
- Re: Evil Cookies. Michael Bryan (Feb 08)
- Statistical Attack Against Virtual Banks Andre L. Dos Santos (Feb 08)
- Re: Statistical Attack Against Virtual Banks HC Security (Feb 08)
- Re: Statistical Attack Against Virtual Banks Andre L. Dos Santos (Feb 08)
- Re: Statistical Attack Against Virtual Banks HC Security (Feb 09)
- Re: Statistical Attack Against Virtual Banks Swift Griggs (Feb 09)
- Re: Statistical Attack Against Virtual Banks Andre L. Dos Santos (Feb 08)
- SCO OpenServer SNMPD vulnerability NAI Labs (Feb 07)
- Re: Tempfile vulnerabilities Werner Koch (Feb 02)
- Re: Tempfile vulnerabilities Chris Cappuccio (Feb 03)
- Cross Site Scripting security issue Robert Zilbauer (Feb 02)
- Re: Tempfile vulnerabilities Len Budney (Feb 03)
- Re: Tempfile vulnerabilities antirez (Feb 05)
- Re: Tempfile vulnerabilities Ian Turner (Feb 07)