Bugtraq mailing list archives
Re: PPTP Revisited
From: aleph1 () UNDERGROUND ORG (aleph1 () UNDERGROUND ORG)
Date: Sun, 14 Feb 1999 11:34:48 -0800
On Sat, Feb 13, 1999 at 03:39:05PM -0800, Paul Leach wrote:
Nice analysis. Correct as far as I can see with a quick review. I only have one quibble with it. See below...-----Original Message----- From: aleph1 () UNDERGROUND ORG [mailto:aleph1 () UNDERGROUND ORG] Sent: Saturday, February 13, 1999 11:29 AM To: BUGTRAQ () NETSPACE ORG Subject: PPTP Revisited ยท MPPE does not provide true 128-bit or 40-bit security. This is still true. Under MSCHAPv2 the MPPE session keys continue to be derived from the user password, the challenges, and some magic numbers. All this information is public with the exception of the password, ergo the session key is only as strong at the password.Some comments: The conclusion that the session key is only as strong as the password is true. I think it is somewhat misleading to conclude that the protocol doesn't offer "true" 40 or 128 bit security. It is easy to have a password that is more than 40 bits in strength. To give some context, it is equally true that Kerberos 5 does not provide "true" 40 or 128 bit security -- even though it generates random session keys, the ticket granting ticket containing the initial session key is encrypted with a key derived from the password.
That is correct. That is why you can perform a dictionary attack againts Kerberos. Given this I don't see why you consider it missleading. I would consider missleading claiming that Kerberos offers 40 or 128 bit security.
To my knowledge, the same will hold for any authentication and key exchange protocol that doesn't use public key technology.
Well technically it is true for any protocol where the keys are not derived from true random sources, the problem is having both parties agree to the key. This can normally can be acomplished via public key technology. But as you point out above even password based schemes like PPTP's can provide 40 or 128-bit security, if they pasword itself provides 40 or 128-bit security its simply that for the average password this is not true.
Paul
-- Aleph One / aleph1 () underground org http://underground.org/ KeyID 1024/948FD6B5 Fingerprint EE C9 E8 AA CB AF 09 61 8C 39 EA 47 A8 6A B8 01
Current thread:
- PPTP Revisited aleph1 () UNDERGROUND ORG (Feb 13)
- <Possible follow-ups>
- Re: PPTP Revisited Paul Leach (Feb 13)
- Re: PPTP Revisited aleph1 () UNDERGROUND ORG (Feb 14)