Bugtraq mailing list archives
Re: Analysis of trin00
From: stefan () AESCHBACHER COM (Stefan Aeschbacher)
Date: Thu, 9 Dec 1999 16:39:02 -0800
Jacob Langseth wrote:
Stefan Aeschbacher scribed:Hi here are some snort rules which could show the presence of a trin00The nature of these attacks do not lend themselves to an easy defense; finding a master and retrieving its list of clients is currently one of the best, albeit proactive, countermeasures. By making rules to detect the master available for a free IDS, you greatly improve the chances of fighting the default configuration. Thank you.
I thought of the problem of fighting the default configuration and this is definitely a valuable point. I think that the (malicuous) people reading Bugtraq need a certain amount of technical knowledge and such a person will change the default configs. So this rules are mainly to protect against script-kiddies. Searching a master is definitely the better alternative but I have the problem that one of my servers is located in a subnet where I am not allowed to do any administrative actions on the other machines and the people there don't really care about security. (Yea, I should move this server to another location ;). I even assume a check for a master server could be regarded as an attack (If they notice it). So the only thing I (and probably some more people on this list) can do is listen for trin00.
I have a few suggestions, if I may.alert tcp any any -> 192.168.1.0/24 27665 (msg:"Trin00: Attacker to Master (default startup pass detected!)"; content:"betaalmostdone";))Trinoo uses crypt(3) to verify this password. Stock crypt(3) bases its one-way function on DES, which is limited to a 56-bit key. Passwords exceeding this length are truncated, making "betaalmo" sufficient to authenticate.
right, didn't think to far when I wrote this rule.
alert tcp any any -> 192.168.1.0/24 27665 (msg:"Trin00: Attacker to Master (default r.i. pass detected!)"; content:"gOrave";))The gOrave password is read via stdin during master startup, making its occurance on the control channel highly unlikely. (As gOrave is required for startup, it's verification takes place before the control port is listening.) I think this rule may be safely dropped.
right. thanks you for your corrections Stefan -- Stefan Aeschbacher Federal Institute of Technology Where do you want to go today? Lausanne Switzerland http://www.aeschbacher.ch/stefan - NOT in your direction! -
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