Bugtraq mailing list archives
SGI Security Advisory 19970509-02-PX - IRIX ordist Buffer Overrun
From: agent99 () BOYTOY CSD SGI COM (SGI Security Coordinator)
Date: Tue, 5 Aug 1997 10:58:57 -0700
DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTIONS - NONE - FOR PUBLIC RELEASE -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- ______________________________________________________________________________ Silicon Graphics Inc. Security Advisory Title: IRIX ordist Buffer Overrun Vulnerability Number: 19970509-02-PX Date: August 5, 1997 ______________________________________________________________________________ Silicon Graphics provides this information freely to the SGI user community for its consideration, interpretation, implementation and use. Silicon Graphics recommends that this information be acted upon as soon as possible. Silicon Graphics provides the information in this Security Advisory on an "AS-IS" basis only, and disclaims all warranties with respect thereto, express, implied or otherwise, including, without limitation, any warranty of merchantability or fitness for a particular purpose. In no event shall Silicon Graphics be liable for any loss of profits, loss of business, loss of data or for any indirect, special, exemplary, incidental or consequential damages of any kind arising from your use of, failure to use or improper use of any of the instructions or information in this Security Advisory. ______________________________________________________________________________ - ----------------------- - --- Issue Specifics --- - ----------------------- The ordist(1c) program is used to maintain identical copies of files over multiple hosts. The program is setuid root and as part of normal usage accepts user arguments to establish specific ordist operation. It has been determined that an appropriately crafted set of arguments could be input to the ordist program allowing execution of arbitrary user commands with root privileges. This resulting buffer overflow condition is considered a security vulnerability in the ordist program. Silicon Graphics Inc. has investigated the issue and recommends the following steps for neutralizing the exposure. It is HIGHLY RECOMMENDED that these measures be implemented on ALL SGI systems. This issue will be corrected in future releases of IRIX. - -------------- - --- Impact --- - -------------- The ordist program (/usr/bsd/ordist) is installed on all IRIX systems by default. A local account is required in order to exploit this vulnerability both locally and remotely. This vulnerability can be utilized to execute commands with root privileges. This vulnerability has been publically discussed in Usenet newsgroups and mailing lists by several individuals and reported in AUSCERT Advisory AA-97.23 and CERT Advisory CA-97.21. - -------------------------- - --- Temporary Solution --- - -------------------------- Although patches are available for this issue, it is realized that there may be situations where installing the patches immediately may not be possible. The steps below can be used to remove the vulnerability by removing the permissions of the ordist program. 1) Become the root user on the system. % /bin/su - Password: # 2) Change the permissions on the ordist program. # /bin/chmod 500 /usr/bsd/ordist ************ *** NOTE *** ************ Removing the setuid root permissions from the ordist program will prevent non-root users from using the ordist program including any user level programs utilizing the the ordist program. 3) Return to previous level. # exit $ - ---------------- - --- Solution --- - ---------------- OS Version Vulnerable? Patch # Other Actions ---------- ----------- ------- ------------- IRIX 3.x no IRIX 4.x no IRIX 5.0.x yes not avail Note 1 IRIX 5.1.x yes not avail Note 1 IRIX 5.2 yes not avail Note 1 IRIX 5.3 yes 2212 IRIX 6.0.x yes not avail Note 1 IRIX 6.1 yes not avail Note 1 IRIX 6.2 yes 2213 IRIX 6.3 yes 2213 IRIX 6.4 yes 2213 NOTES 1) upgrade operating system or see "Temporary Solution" section. Patches are available via anonymous FTP and your service/support provider. The SGI anonymous FTP site is sgigate.sgi.com (204.94.209.1) or its mirror, ftp.sgi.com. Security information and patches can be found in the ~ftp/security and ~ftp/patches directories, respectfully. ##### Patch File Checksums #### The actual patch will be a tar file containing the following files: Filename: README.patch.2212 Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 55665 8 README.patch.2212 Algorithm #2 (sum): 21084 8 README.patch.2212 MD5 checksum: 63D2F78F2A053FBCF20B7B4F261F69E6 Filename: patchSG0002212 Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 30446 1 patchSG0002212 Algorithm #2 (sum): 25510 1 patchSG0002212 MD5 checksum: 34C8AFD6D5AF0C8DC8186340DF0FB5F6 Filename: patchSG0002212.eoe2_sw Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 35919 83 patchSG0002212.eoe2_sw Algorithm #2 (sum): 21443 83 patchSG0002212.eoe2_sw MD5 checksum: 24BCC0E339DA5E77EE02DABB80CD25CD Filename: patchSG0002212.idb Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 27980 1 patchSG0002212.idb Algorithm #2 (sum): 35351 1 patchSG0002212.idb MD5 checksum: 669956DF29236E6F575F53CBAC36120C Filename: README.patch.2213 Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 43157 8 README.patch.2213 Algorithm #2 (sum): 25429 8 README.patch.2213 MD5 checksum: 5EBFCA7C2A62CCF9ABC21A0AE35C65ED Filename: patch2213.pgp.and.chksums Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 26202 3 patch2213.pgp.and.chksums Algorithm #2 (sum): 28902 3 patch2213.pgp.and.chksums MD5 checksum: E9973C7F6877C589FC0C87C548BC98AA Filename: patchSG0002213 Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 45834 1 patchSG0002213 Algorithm #2 (sum): 28307 1 patchSG0002213 MD5 checksum: 8DEC766B3F70C64C89CC1A486A5F969F Filename: patchSG0002213.eoe_sw Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 54215 83 patchSG0002213.eoe_sw Algorithm #2 (sum): 35616 83 patchSG0002213.eoe_sw MD5 checksum: 296C50BAF715BCE2A593990E4EF60EE9 Filename: patchSG0002213.idb Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 43355 1 patchSG0002213.idb Algorithm #2 (sum): 35527 1 patchSG0002213.idb MD5 checksum: 98DC9A6AEA6C4FAE34433EEBE5C84A6F - ------------------------ - --- Acknowledgments --- - ------------------------ Silicon Graphics wishes to thank the worldwide Internet community and the AUSCERT and CERT Coordination Center organizations for their assistance in this matter. - ----------------------------------------------------------- - --- Silicon Graphics Inc. Security Information/Contacts --- - ----------------------------------------------------------- If there are questions about this document, email can be sent to cse-security-alert () sgi com. ------oOo------ Silicon Graphics provides security information and patches for use by the entire SGI community. This information is freely available to any person needing the information and is available via anonymous FTP and the Web. The primary SGI anonymous FTP site for security information and patches is sgigate.sgi.com (204.94.209.1). Security information and patches are located under the directories ~ftp/security and ~ftp/patches, respectively. The Silicon Graphics Security Headquarters Web page is accessible at the URL http://www.sgi.com/Support/security/security.html. For issues with the patches on the FTP sites, email can be sent to cse-security-alert () sgi com. For assistance obtaining or working with security patches, please contact your SGI support provider. ------oOo------ Silicon Graphics provides a free security mailing list service called wiretap and encourages interested parties to self-subscribe to receive (via email) all SGI Security Advisories when they are released. Subscribing to the mailing list can be done via the Web (http://www.sgi.com/Support/security/wiretap.html) or by sending email to SGI as outlined below. % mail wiretap-request () sgi com subscribe wiretap <YourEmailAddress> end ^d In the example above, <YourEmailAddress> is the email address that you wish the mailing list information sent to. The word end must be on a separate line to indicate the end of the body of the message. The control-d (^d) is used to indicate to the mail program that you are finished composing the mail message. ------oOo------ Silicon Graphics provides a comprehensive customer World Wide Web site. This site is located at http://www.sgi.com/Support/security/security.html. ------oOo------ For reporting *NEW* SGI security issues, email can be sent to security-alert () sgi com or contact your SGI support provider. A support contract is not required for submitting a security report. ______________________________________________________________________________ This information is provided freely to all interested parties and may be redistributed provided that it is not altered in any way, Silicon Graphics is appropriately credited and the document retains and includes its valid PGP signature. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBM+dg97Q4cFApAP75AQGlkAP/V/9LZky+RA/3RJPmeqXQAO9mgJ/CizhK fqqXaDb327GtA9CBBFSauhmX7NJS9+ZwFj0URfWhA1U6twtJetvoMsTEjdJI3t40 b99ygx6z7kjlIJtoMo+ez09Gm95idYCvuvE8eN77msInpfwsIAQ4n/pJeBxV5jpN SNzCjEpm78w= =GdzF -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
Current thread:
- Re: SSH LocalForward Sevo Stille (Aug 02)
- <Possible follow-ups>
- Re: SSH LocalForward Sevo Stille (Aug 03)
- Re: SSH LocalForward long-morrow () CS YALE EDU (Aug 03)
- Re: SSH LocalForward Kyle Amon (Aug 04)
- Netscape Referer header considered harmful? Ronald L. Parker (Aug 04)
- Re: Netscape Referer header considered harmful? Eric Murray (Aug 06)
- Re: SSH LocalForward Bryan Andregg (Aug 05)
- SGI Security Advisory 19970509-02-PX - IRIX ordist Buffer Overrun SGI Security Coordinator (Aug 05)
- IMAPd scans Steve Herman (Aug 06)
- XFREE86 can block reserved ports Willy TARREAU (Aug 06)
- Re: XFREE86 can block reserved ports Alex Belits (Aug 06)
- Re: SSH LocalForward Kyle Amon (Aug 04)