Bugtraq mailing list archives
Re: mktemp() and friends
From: agent99 () boytoy csd sgi com (SGI Security Coordinator)
Date: Tue, 24 Dec 1996 15:18:33 -0800
Happy Holidays. DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTIONS: NONE - FOR PUBLIC RELEASE -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- ______________________________________________________________________________ Silicon Graphics Inc. Security Advisory Title: TCP SYN and Ping Denial of Service Attacks Title: CERT(sm) Advisory CA-96.21, CERT(sm) Advisory Title: CA-96.26, Silicon Graphics Advisory 19960901 Number: 19961202-01-PX Date: December 24, 1996 ______________________________________________________________________________ Silicon Graphics provides this information freely to the SGI user community for its consideration, interpretation, implementation and use. Silicon Graphics recommends that this information be acted upon as soon as possible. Silicon Graphics will not be liable for any indirect, special, or consequential damages arising from the use of, failure to use or improper use of any of the instructions or information in this Security Advisory. ______________________________________________________________________________ - ------------------ - --- Background --- - ------------------ In September of 1996, two alternative technical magazines published articles expanding upon historical documents and discussions about a possible "Denial of Service" (DoS) attack in the TCP/IP protocol. In these recent magazine articles, actual code to accomplish a SYN Denial of Service attack was provided. A SYN DoS attack uses a flood of SYN TCP/IP packets to consume all available new network connections on a targeted host. The result is that the system is delayed in responding to new network connections and/or stops servicing requests altogether. Later in October 1996, a public newsgroup discussion started regarding a "fat ping" or "ping of death" DoS attack. This particular ping DoS attack uses a ping packet of an abnormal size exceeding the TCP/IP specification to either cause a system crash or network programs to stop processing in the targeted host. The very nature of these attacks are an abuse of the defined standards for the TCP/IP protocol and these vulnerabilities exist, to some degree, in the Silicon Graphics Inc. product line which uses the TCP/IP protocol for networking. Since any solutions to these issues could potentially effect TCP/IP interoperability, system stability and performance, Silicon Graphics worked closely with other TCP/IP product vendors, standards groups and external security organizations such as CERT to ensure a proper solution. - -------------- - --- Impact --- - -------------- Silicon Graphics systems that are subject to a SYN DoS attack may experience varying degrees of degradation in network response and performance. Silicon Graphics systems subject to a ping DoS attack, may under certain circumstances panic and require a reboot. The nature of both the SYN and ping DoS attacks allow for remote exploitation without a local account on the targeted system. Although a Denial of Service attack does not directly indicate that a system has had a compromise, a Denial of Service attack could be used to divert attention from actual intrusion activity. Systems most likely to be attacked are hosts that are directly connected to the Internet as firewalls or servers (web, FTP, telnet, etc). - -------------------------------------- - --- Attack Detection and Reporting --- - -------------------------------------- During normal operation, detecting a SYN attack may be difficult since the attack only effects new incoming network connection attempts. Existing incoming network connections as well, as outgoing connections will continue to function properly. If an attack is suspected, any user on the system can execute the following command: % /usr/etc/netstat -a -f inet If a large number of the connections are in the state of "SYN_RECEIVED", this is a possible indication of a SYN Denial of Service attack is occurring. However, a large number of connections in "SYN_RECEIVED" may be normal depending on the systems purpose and user base eg. webserver for Internet Service Provider. Detection of a ping attack, could be possible using a packet tracing program and monitoring for ping and other packets of abnormally large size. Sites experiencing SYN or ping denial of services attacks should report these attacks to the Computer Emergency Response Team/CERT(sm) Coordination Center or the computer security response organization in your area. The CERT(sm) Coordination Center can be contacted at: CERT(sm) Coordination Center Internet: cert () cert org Phone: +1 412 / 268-7090 FAX: +1 412 / 268-6989 http://www.cert.org/ - ---------------- - --- Solution --- - ---------------- There are no interim solutions for these issues. The only solution for these vulnerabilities is the installation of a patch. **** IRIX 3.x **** Silicon Graphics Inc, no longer supports the IRIX 3.x operating system and therefore has no patches to provide. **** IRIX 4.x **** Silicon Graphics Inc, does not support patches for the IRIX 4.x operating system. An upgrade to 5.3 or better is required first. **** IRIX 5.0.x, 5.1.x, 5.2 **** For the IRIX operating systems versions 5.0.x, 5.1.x, and 5.2 an upgrade to 5.3 or better is required first. When the upgrade is completed, then the patches described in the following sections can be applied depending on the final version of the upgrade. **** IRIX 5.3 **** For the IRIX operating system version 5.3, an inst-able patch has been generated and made available via anonymous FTP and your service/support provider. The patch is number 1529 and will install only on IRIX 5.3. The SGI anonymous FTP site is sgigate.sgi.com (204.94.209.1) or its mirror, ftp.sgi.com. Patch 1529 can be found in the following directories on the FTP server: ~ftp/Security or ~ftp/Patches/5.3 ##### Checksums #### The actual patch will be a tar file containing the following files: Filename: README.patch.1529 Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 03188 44 README.patch.1529 Algorithm #2 (sum): 43063 44 README.patch.1529 MD5 checksum: 6F6BDE312ADA6CC86BCC23DA1F8CAC88 Filename: patchSG0001529 Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 04373 26 patchSG0001529 Algorithm #2 (sum): 32498 26 patchSG0001529 MD5 checksum: 5542FAF3D35A5D5A9E69EEFD240A323F Filename: patchSG0001529.dev_hdr Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 55046 18 patchSG0001529.dev_hdr Algorithm #2 (sum): 21666 18 patchSG0001529.dev_hdr MD5 checksum: 12D756C9AAADDA464F628FB08B8012C2 Filename: patchSG0001529.eoe1_man Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 58486 19 patchSG0001529.eoe1_man Algorithm #2 (sum): 19828 19 patchSG0001529.eoe1_man MD5 checksum: 971A700918352743FDFAD9DC7AAC7F08 Filename: patchSG0001529.eoe1_sw Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 61823 3751 patchSG0001529.eoe1_sw Algorithm #2 (sum): 2250 3751 patchSG0001529.eoe1_sw MD5 checksum: 622F1D1511C9806299C69FBC312B3412 Filename: patchSG0001529.eoe2_man Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 20509 16 patchSG0001529.eoe2_man Algorithm #2 (sum): 64242 16 patchSG0001529.eoe2_man MD5 checksum: B0491FEFB0CE1C0BC03F7A1345BDE250 Filename: patchSG0001529.eoe2_sw Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 22111 1384 patchSG0001529.eoe2_sw Algorithm #2 (sum): 16791 1384 patchSG0001529.eoe2_sw MD5 checksum: E6ACC9007CE438C9F2A0F2E05B8DE224 Filename: patchSG0001529.idb Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 61507 45 patchSG0001529.idb Algorithm #2 (sum): 6895 45 patchSG0001529.idb MD5 checksum: F2ED426C3A80CB89B88F95EB73C0146C Filename: patchSG0001529.nfs_man Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 22345 17 patchSG0001529.nfs_man Algorithm #2 (sum): 21111 17 patchSG0001529.nfs_man MD5 checksum: 8782FA52CAB650472352DABC1C38B823 Filename: patchSG0001529.nfs_sw Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 47185 162 patchSG0001529.nfs_sw Algorithm #2 (sum): 59946 162 patchSG0001529.nfs_sw MD5 checksum: 1C8543E58D67133B82CE1BD9FFCC7741 **** IRIX 6.0.x, 6.1 **** For the IRIX operating system versions 6.0.x and 6.1, an upgrade to 6.2 or better is required first. When the upgrade is completed, then the security patches described in the following sections can be applied depending on the final version of the upgrade. **** IRIX 6.2 **** For the IRIX operating system version 6.2, an inst-able patch has been generated and made available via anonymous FTP and your service/support provider. The patch is number 1418 and will install only on IRIX 6.2. The SGI anonymous FTP site is sgigate.sgi.com (204.94.209.1) or its mirror, ftp.sgi.com. Patch 1418 can be found in the following directories on the FTP server: ~ftp/Security or ~ftp/Patches/6.2 ##### Checksums #### The actual patch will be a tar file containing the following files: Filename: README.patch.1418 Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 08227 19 README.patch.1418 Algorithm #2 (sum): 7263 19 README.patch.1418 MD5 checksum: 2A29C3E6BD2BC36BC3FBBF7F84D32F85 Filename: patchSG0001418 Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 15567 3 patchSG0001418 Algorithm #2 (sum): 32384 3 patchSG0001418 MD5 checksum: 518F314AB6B434D4C176A99E26FEABC8 Filename: patchSG0001418.eoe_man Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 46721 72 patchSG0001418.eoe_man Algorithm #2 (sum): 55830 72 patchSG0001418.eoe_man MD5 checksum: 5714CBC0D1E35DC6767CA2BB4BAC02F8 Filename: patchSG0001418.eoe_sw Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 12616 5926 patchSG0001418.eoe_sw Algorithm #2 (sum): 21075 5926 patchSG0001418.eoe_sw MD5 checksum: 2081563727DE1A58B1C2DBEC54628CC7 Filename: patchSG0001418.idb Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 22595 24 patchSG0001418.idb Algorithm #2 (sum): 53385 24 patchSG0001418.idb MD5 checksum: 90AD7C6B4114CE94E954CEFC332F0E4F **** IRIX 6.3 (Early Access for O2) **** IRIX operating system version 6.3 (Early Access for O2) is a limited release version. An update to "IRIX 6.3 for O2 including R10000" is required for this security issue. This security issue has been addressed in the "IRIX 6.3 for O2 including R10000" distribution which will go to all registered O2 customers. **** IRIX 6.4 S2MP (Origin200, Origin2000, Onyx2) **** IRIX operating system version 6.4 S2MP (Origin200, Origin2000, Onyx2) is a limited release version. A future release of the IRIX 6.4 operating system will be released that will have corrections for this issue. Customers with the limited release will receive the future IRIX 6.4 release when it is available. - ------------------------ - --- Acknowledgments --- - ------------------------ Silicon Graphics wishes to thank the Unix vendor community, FIRST members and CERT organizations worldwide for their assistance in this matter. - ----------------------------------------- - --- SGI Security Information/Contacts --- - ----------------------------------------- If there are questions about this document, email can be sent to cse-security-alert () csd sgi com. ------oOo------ Silicon Graphics provides security information and patches for use by the entire SGI community. This information is freely available to any person needing the information and is available via anonymous FTP and the Web. The primary SGI anonymous FTP site for security information and patches is sgigate.sgi.com (204.94.209.1). Security information and patches are located under the directories ~ftp/security and ~ftp/patches, respectively. The Silicon Graphics Security Headquarters Web page is accessible at the URL http://www.sgi.com/Support/Secur/security.html. For issues with the patches on the FTP sites, email can be sent to cse-security-alert () csd sgi com. For assistance obtaining or working with security patches, please contact your SGI support provider. ------oOo------ Silicon Graphics provides a free security mailing list service called wiretap and encourages interested parties to self-subscribe to receive (via email) all SGI Security Advisories when they are released. Subscribing to the mailing list can be done via the Web (http://www.sgi.com/Support/Secur/wiretap.html) or by sending email to SGI as outlined below. % mail wiretap-request () sgi com subscribe wiretap <YourEmailAddress> end ^d In the example above, <YourEmailAddress> is the email address that you wish the mailing list information sent to. The word end must be on a separate line to indicate the end of the body of the message. The control-d (^d) is used to indicate to the mail program that you are finished composing the mail message. ------oOo------ Silicon Graphics provides a comprehensive customer World Wide Web site. This site is located at http://www.sgi.com/Support/Secur/security.html. ------oOo------ For reporting *NEW* SGI security issues, email can be sent to security-alert () sgi com or contact your SGI support provider. A support contract is not required for submitting a security report. ______________________________________________________________________________ This information is provided freely to all interested parties and may be additional distributed provided that it is not altered in any way, Silicon Graphics is appropriately credited and the document retains and includes its valid PGP signature. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMsBidLQ4cFApAP75AQESjwP9Eie6RTRKmud/0tZbfKQL/ErB7n7X19rz OP8TZqjrDi5KFLzGvp7DIsjf8xX11uWiP4SWZsd6AwsjC8xfTfy058KST1DHF2qD gaxTTG0VjtTYBQyzD+SPlESPMUxGd4+ol/IxJtCR64N1pzeaIyW+sKoheryxtwwL V+dwrNDO3Xs= =/mGC -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
Current thread:
- Re: mktemp() and friends, (continued)
- Re: mktemp() and friends Darren Reed (Dec 23)
- Re: mktemp() and friends Uriel Maimon (Dec 23)
- Re: mktemp() and friends Theo de Raadt (Dec 23)
- Re: mktemp() and friends Darren Reed (Dec 23)
- Re: mktemp() and friends Steve \ (Dec 24)
- Re: mktemp() and friends Casper Dik (Dec 24)
- Re: mktemp() and friends Theo de Raadt (Dec 23)
- Re: mktemp() and friends Benedikt Stockebrand (Dec 23)
- Re: mktemp() and friends Theo de Raadt (Dec 24)
- Re: mktemp() and friends D. J. Bernstein (Dec 24)
- Re: mktemp() and friends SGI Security Coordinator (Dec 24)
- Re: mktemp() and friends Darren Reed (Dec 23)